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# THE SOUTHWESTERN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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Vol. IX

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## LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON TAXES AND DEBTS

BY E. T. MILLER

*University of Texas*

### PURPOSES OF TAX LIMITATIONS

The most widespread motive to tax limitations is to check the growth of expenditures. It is not to stop the growth, but to exercise a restraining effect on it. The marked increase in expenditures which followed the close of the Civil War and which resulted in higher and higher property taxes for state and local purposes led many states to seek protection in both tax and debt limitations. For example, the Texas Constitution of 1876, unlike the previous Texas constitutions, is full of these and other financial restraints on the legislature and the local governments. These restrictions expressed the reaction of the people to the financial burdens of the Reconstruction regime. The great growth of local expenditures beginning after 1900 stimulated throughout the country the adoption of methods of local control and of reforms in local administrative machinery.

Limits on tax rates and on debt creation have been the most favored method of control. This effort to hold down the growth of expenditures is due fundamentally to a distrust by the people of their public officials. To consider the grounds for this distrust, however, would lead one into the very large question of the theory and practice of democratic government. The fact that one tax—and that the general property tax—is the main source of revenue for state, county, town, city, and

district governments has simplified the task of control by making it seem to be merely necessary to limit the property tax rate and to relate the amount of debt to assessed value of property.

Other reasons that have been behind the adoption of legal limits are the expectation that limited rates will induce the owners of intangible personal property to render more of it for taxation and will force public officials to more economy and efficiency. In several states—Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Utah, West Virginia—limitation of tax rates was companion legislation to that which sought to put assessed values on either a full value basis or a higher basis than existed before.

#### EXTENT OF PRACTICE OF TAX LIMITATION

The practice of legal limits on the taxing power of local governments is more general than that of limits on state taxes. In 1927 forty-six states had limits applying to municipalities, and in 1923 forty of the forty-seven states in which the county existed as a fiscal unit limited county rates. The southwestern states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas have limitations on both state and local taxes. In Texas, however, a constitutional amendment adopted in 1917 (Article 16, section 59a) removed constitutional restrictions on the debt and taxes of drainage, levee, fresh water supply, water improvement, and conservation and reclamation districts, and the legislature has imposed no statutory limit on them. Navigation and water control and preservation districts remain subject to the provisions of Article 3, section 52, of the Constitution, and their taxing power is limited by their debt limit, which is 25 per cent of the assessed value of real property.

An amendment to Article 7, section 3, in 1926 removed the constitutional tax limit on independent school districts, but the legislature has fixed a statutory limit of \$1 on the \$100 of assessed valuation. This is now (1928) the limit in Texas for all classes of school districts—common, independent, and municipal. It is the limit for both maintenance and bond requirements in the cases of common and independent school districts, but it is the limit for only maintenance in municipal

districts, as the bonds issued for school purposes are held to be city bonds and their interest and sinking fund requirements are met out of city taxes other than the tax for schools. Municipal districts are few in number and are those in which the school system is under the control of the city government, though it is usual for elected trustees to administer control. There are in Texas some school districts—both common and independent—which were created by special acts of the legislature, and in some of them the authorized tax rate is as much as \$1.50. These are exceptions and will not be increased in number, as a constitutional amendment has been adopted which prohibits the creation of school districts by special act of the legislature.

#### METHODS OF LIMITATIONS

In some states the limits are set by the constitution, in other states they are solely statutory. Restrictions on the state tax are, of course, in the constitutions. In Texas the constitutional limits on the property taxes levied by the state are 35 cents for general revenue, 35 cents for public free school purposes, and 7 cents for Confederate pensions—a total of 77 cents. Cities and towns of 5,000 or less population have a constitutional limit of \$1.50 and those of over 5,000 have a limit of \$2.50. The county limit is given in terms of limits for specific purposes and these total 95 cents but coast counties have an additional 50 cents for the construction of sea-walls, breakwaters, or for sanitary purposes.

As heretofore stated, there are no constitutional restrictions on certain kinds of water districts or on school districts, but there are statutory limits on school districts. There is in the Constitution no mention of the tax rates of road districts and of navigation, water control, and preservation districts, but these are controlled by the limitation of the district debt to one-fourth of the assessed value of real property.

The principal objection to constitutional limits is that once imbedded in the constitution change is subject to all the delays and difficulties which attend any amendment of the tax provisions of that instrument. If it be granted, as it must be, that the needs of governmental jurisdictions legitimately increase in the course of time, additional revenues must be forthcoming. The sources of revenue of local governments are

usually defined in the constitution; new sources are not easily found, and if found there is the process of constitutional amendments to be gone through with to have them legalized. It would be utterly unreasonable to suppose that tax rate limitations adopted before the Civil War would be adequate now. The enlarged scope of governmental activities, the changes in the price level, and the other causes of increase in public expenditures make the old rates obsolete. As between constitutional and statutory restrictions the latter are more readily adaptable to changing needs and new conditions. This is the opinion of constitutional limitations held by practically all political scientists and authorities in the field of public finance. In "A Model State Constitution" which was proposed by the Committee on State Government of the National Municipal League in 1921 there are no tax limitations, but such limits are left to legislative determination.

The limits set in the Texas Constitution have so far been ineffective because of lack of state control over assessed valuations. The property tax is as much a product of the base as it is of the rate, and rate limits adopted when assessed valuations are on a low basis prove not to be tax limitations at all. An effect of such rate limitation is to raise in the course of time the basis of assessment of property, but this way of raising assessments is an indirect and crude one.

Limitations, whether constitutional or statutory, may be grouped into the following four types: First, fixed maximum rates of tax; second, amount of levy limited to a stated per cent increase over the amount of the preceding year or of some previous year; third, fixed per capita amounts of levy; fourth, a statement in dollars and cents of the maximum amount of levy.

The first is the oldest method and the one now most generally employed. In 1927 at least thirty-four states used it, and included in the list were Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. There are several varieties of this method. Ohio exhibits the one which is a limit on the aggregate rate of the overlapping local jurisdictions (the county, township, or municipality, school district, etc.). A county budget commission decides how the limit of fifteen mills shall be divided among the several jurisdictions. Excluded from the limited amount



are levies for debt service and for replacement of public property destroyed by fire, flood, etc.

Another and more general variety is that of maximum rates specified for the different taxing jurisdictions. Texas has in the main this plan. Another variety is where a maximum rate is specified for the various objects of expenditure. Iowa carries this type to the extreme, and it is found in the Texas system in the case of county taxes. This type of fixed maxima for specified purposes is liable to the objection of being complex and inelastic. In Texas the specified county rates act as limits to the debt which may be created by the county in connection with the enumerated purposes, and from this point of view they may serve to secure something like a proper proportioning of the use of the credit of the county. The second method of limitation is one upon the amount of taxes levied. It is of comparatively recent origin and in a recent report of the National Industrial Conference Board the statement is made that in 1927 eight states employed this method and four other states made use of both this method and the one of a maximum rate. The chief advantage claimed for the limited levy over the limited rate method is that it is more limiting, since it protects the taxpayer against an increase in taxes due to changes in assessed values as well as changes in rates. It is claimed to be more elastic in states which have full value assessment and does not interfere, as does a maximum rate, with provision for the normal growth in needs of the local governments.

In Colorado the increase permitted over the previous year's levy is 5 per cent; in Oregon it is 6 per cent; in Missouri, 10 per cent. The Special Tax Investigating Committee of Oregon recommended in 1925 that the per cent permitted should be 3 instead of 6. Provision for debt service is outside of the percentage limit, though in some cases the exception is only for debt existing before the limitation was adopted. This exception, it appears, is necessary in order not to violate the constitutional clause against the impairment of contracts. It is doubtful, however, if provision for debt created after the adoption of the limitation should be excepted, because in the absence of strict debt limits the exception would operate to nullify the tax limit.

The method of limiting the amount of tax levy has been criticised on the ground of the difficulty of determining the percentage increase to be allowed. The different percentages may seem to prove that there is arbitrariness in their selection, and as a matter of fact of course there is, but there is similar arbitrariness involved in the adoption of maximum tax rates. A state adopting the limited levy method could through a statistical investigation of the growth of expenditures of its local governments arrive at a reasonably satisfactory conclusion as to the percentage.

Both methods of limitation have been criticised when the limits are uniform for the different local governments or for all members of each kind of local government. The Ohio law is uniformly 15 mills, the Oregon law is 6 per cent for each and every government body, and the Texas limit on county taxes is 95 cents for every county except coast counties. It is contended that needs vary according to differences in population and wealth and so a uniform rate that applies to all towns and cities is sufficient for the large cities will be excessive for the smaller ones. Statistics of cost of city government show that the principle of increasing cost operates; that is, as cities increase in size the per capita cost of government increases.

Three plans are in use to avoid the evils of fixity and uniformity of rates or levies. The one most widely accepted is a graduation of rates upon the basis of population or assessed valuations. This is the plan applying to municipalities in at least fifteen states and to counties in eight states. Texas is the only one of the southwestern states which employs the plan and it does so only in the case of cities. In the states where this plan is used rates increase with increased population and decrease, as a rule, with increases in assessments. To reduce the local tax rate as assessments increase is not a plan which can be defended. If an index of needs is to be made use of, population is about as practical a one as can be found.

A second plan is to permit the stated limitation to be exceeded upon a favorable vote of the people. This is less used than the first and, unless the people are to be protected against themselves, it has more merit than the first. Texas has this

plan in the single case of a 15-cent tax by the county for roads. A number of states apply this method to school taxes.

A third plan is for some state or local board to have the authority to permit the statutory limitations to be exceeded. In Colorado, for example, the 5 per cent increase in the levy may be exceeded upon application to, and permission by, the state tax commission. However, if the desired increase is over 5 mills or if the application is denied by the commission, the people may vote the increase by a three-fourths majority vote. As to the way this works out, Commissioner Link of Colorado said in 1924 that with only two exceptions the people voted by large majorities the increases which the commission had denied. In New Mexico the state tax commission has authority to approve or disapprove the excess over the 5 per cent increase in levy. In Indiana the state board of tax commissioners, upon appeal of not less than ten taxpayers, has power to review proposed local budgets, tax rates, and bond issues in excess of \$5,000, and its decision is final. In Oregon review of local budgets is by a county commission appointed by the governor. In Ohio a county budget commission composed of the auditor, the treasurer, and the prosecuting attorney, reviews the budgets of all taxing districts within the county. The only one of the southwestern states having any review machinery of this kind is Oklahoma and it has a county excise board composed of the county clerk, the county attorney, the county treasurer, the county superintendent, the county assessor, and one member of the board of county commissioners. This board has considerable amending authority over the budgets of counties, cities, towns, and districts, with the exception of the "home rule charter cities."

The granting to a state agency of the authority possessed by the Indiana, Colorado, and New Mexico boards is the newest development in the field of state control of local finance. Its history is still too brief to allow any ripe generalization as to its success or failure. One's tentative opinion of it is influenced by his views regarding centralization or home rule. Home rule is a sort of fundamentalist theory of government which is tenaciously held in the South and Southwest. In a state like Texas with hundreds of taxing jurisdictions it would be a staggering task for any state board to review all

local budgets. It would not be so onerous if review were confined, as it is in Colorado, to cases of proposed increase over the maximum.

In a recent study entitled "The Fiscal Problem in Illinois," by the National Industrial Conference Board, it is said in reference to the plan of state control that it perhaps represents "the beginning of an important movement destined to have far reaching results." On the other hand, Wylie Kilpatrick in his book on *Administrative Review of Local Budget Making* says of it that "it is derived from a gospel of defeatism in local self-rule. It is government by despair."

The third method of tax limitation is that of fixing a per capita amount. This is found only in Minnesota. It was proposed by the sponsors of this method in Minnesota that the maximum per capita amount for city or village purposes should be \$40 and that for local school districts \$35, but the bill carrying these amounts was amended to raise the amounts to \$100 and \$60, respectively. The chairman of the Minnesota Tax Commission reported that the limits are too high and have had little effect in curbing the orgy of spending in some of the mining towns. In arguing for the per capita plan this officer said that "population is an accurate measure of the needs of a city or village. Population determines the area to a considerable extent, it is the principal factor in sanitary regulations, in police and fire protection, in the lighting, grading, paving, and upkeep of streets, in necessary educational facilities, etc." Theoretically, it is a more effective method than that of fixed maximum rates, because it covers both the rate and the base, but it is not as simple as the limited levy method because there are two factors—the levy and the population—to ascertain.

The fourth method of limitation is fixing in dollars and cents the amount which may be raised. This is used only in Nebraska and very partially there, as in most classes of cities, the maximum rate method applies. This is a very cumbersome method and to be just and effective the amounts would need to be frequently changed. The only advantage it has over the maximum rate method is that there is no loophole through manipulating assessed valuations, but this advantage is also in the more elastic method of the limited levy.



An account of tax limitations would be incomplete if no reference were made to the fixed rates on intangible personal property. Some fifteen states have this method, though the kinds of property affected are by no means the same in all of the states. Minnesota, for example, has a 3-mill (or 30 cents on the \$100) tax on money and credits. This is the sole tax on such property; it is administered by the state and the yield is divided among the state, the county, and the locality in which the taxpayer resides. Virginia taxes bank deposits 2 mills (or 20 cents on the \$100). When administered by a strong tax commission these low rates have much better results than those under the old system.

#### RESULTS OF TAX LIMITATIONS

It is difficult to get a line on the actual operation of the tax limitations in the different states. In the literature on the subject there is much to be found about Ohio and Indiana, but not much about other states. The most stringent limitations have been in Ohio and Indiana, so some special attention to their operation is warranted. The most celebrated of tax limitation laws is the Ohio One Per Cent Law of 1911, which, as the title suggests, limited the aggregate rates of the local taxes to 10 mills. This law, according to one of the state tax commissioners, was popular with the taxpayers but not with the levying officials. The law has been modified several times from its original form. According to Mr. R. C. Atkinson, who made a thorough study of the Ohio situation, it had no appreciable influence in attracting personal property to the tax rolls and its encouragement to greater efficiency and economy on the part of public officials was nil.

The Indiana plan has been much praised by the members of the board of tax commissioners who administer it, and they cite numerous cases of prevention of extravagant or unwise local expenditures. The New York Joint Committee on Taxation and Retrenchment reported in 1920 that the first year of the Indiana method lowered the cost of government but encouraged bonding; that the Oregon law had little effect in limiting taxes, since the increase in that state was about the same as in other Pacific Coast States; and that Massachusetts

had had an unsatisfactory experience with tax limit laws and had repealed them, except for Boston, where non-fiscal reasons led to a retention of limits. According to the New York report a Massachusetts legislative committee found in 1912 that the Massachusetts cities with tax limits were worse off financially than non-tax limit towns of the same size and performing similar governmental functions.

The following table showing per cent increase or decrease of local tax collections is based on a more complete table to be found in a study by the National Industrial Conference Board entitled *The Cost of Government in the United States*:

	1925 Over 1924	1926 Over 1925
Colorado .....	1.29	5.17
Indiana .....	2.69	2.70
Ohio .....	5.53	7.17
Oregon .....	7.06	7.32
Missouri .....	10.90	6.21
New Mexico .....	7.76	1.70
Arkansas .....	-2.54	13.89
Louisiana .....	7.47	9.23
Oklahoma .....	-2.72	9.70
Texas .....	7.15	1.58
Connecticut .....	8.94	9.28
Massachusetts .....	7.17	9.29

In the above table, the no limitation states are Connecticut and Massachusetts; the limited rate states are Arkansas, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas; and all of these latter except Louisiana have confessedly very low ratios of assessed to true values of property; the limited levy states are Colorado, Missouri, New Mexico, and Oregon; the states having state supervisory boards are Colorado, Indiana, and New Mexico, and those having local supervisory boards are Oklahoma and Oregon. Differences among the states in the division of functions between the state and the local governments and the fact that for most of the states in the list the amounts of local tax collections are estimates by the National Industrial Conference Board may affect the value of the comparative statistics. Taking the list as it stands, however, the conclusions seem warranted that limited levy and state supervision are restrictive as compared with either no limitation or the limited rate method.

## THE PRINCIPLE OF TAX LIMITATION

A survey of books on municipal government shows that the writers are practically a unit in condemning the principle of limitation. They are of the opinion that not only do such limitations not limit, for cities manage somehow to get around them, but also that there should be no limitation save that effected by the vote of the people of the city. Evidence is lacking in these books of any inductive investigation by the authors into the effects of limitation. The New York Special Joint Committee on Taxation and Retrenchment, 1920, was adverse to limitations. Its conclusions were that they do not limit, that they encourage the creation of debt, and that there is no way in a democracy by which an arbitrary limitation upon the tax levy can block a genuine popular demand for increased government service. The Michigan Committee on Inquiry into Taxation, 1923, also concluded that limitation of tax rates is not a check on public expenditures.

The critics of the principle of limitation offer alternatives to it. The New York Committee referred to recommends as more effective methods of restriction (1) a comprehensive and binding budget system, (2) a thoroughgoing bonding act, and (3) a direct tax burden upon all the electorate. The Michigan Committee's alternatives are (1) a budget system, (2) proper accounting, (3) the election and appointment of efficient persons to public offices, (4) the annual collection, tabulation, and publication by the state of statistics relating to the levies, expenditures, and debt of all the political subdivisions of the state.

Another criticism of existing methods of state control is that they do not touch the fundamental cause of excessive expenditures which is the ignorance and indifference of the average citizen with respect to the business of government. Mr. Milling of Louisiana very aptly said along this same line of thought that "if the tax-paying public devoted as much time to improving tax systems as it does to dodging them, we would be the most advanced country in the world in matters of taxation."

The individual and tax committee critics of tax limitations, however, are in the minority. The alternatives suggested in the ways of budgets, debt limitations, more direct taxes and

more publicity of local financial operations are good and are worthy of adoption, but those who advocate such delude themselves in depending on any immediate change in the average citizen's intelligent and continuous interest in the financial aspects of what his governments are doing. The most effective present-day agency for critical interest in state and local government financial operations is the taxpayers' association. In 1927 there were active associations of this character in twenty-two states, but there was not one in any of the southern or southwestern states.

Tax limitations are approved by most American authors of books dealing exclusively with public finance, and the trend in the more recent literature is in favor of the Colorado method. The Committee of the National Tax Association in its reports of 1914 and 1915 on the increase of public expenditures recommended tax limits in addition to budgets, annual financial statistical publications, debt limitations, etc. The Committee said that tax limits had proved ineffective in most parts of the country, but it thought that with proper attention to details they could be made highly serviceable. It favored the method of limiting the increase in the amount of the levy, the limits to be elastic and to be exceeded by either the permission of a board or a vote of the people. In case the board is a local one its members should be appointed by an outside authority. The Committee of the National Tax Association which drew up the well known model system of state and local taxation incorporated in its report a limit on the tax on tangible property.

Critics of limitation point out that the limits are circumvented by the creation of all kinds of districts with independent tax and debt powers. It is questionable, however, whether this is the motive behind the creation of most districts. In Texas the trend is away from independent road districts and independent school districts and is in favor of making the county the unit. The navigation, drainage and other water districts are in a class to themselves. They are really co-operative economic enterprises, the purposes of which can apparently be accomplished only through the assistance the state gives in the statutes authorizing and regulating their



establishment. There have been abuses and evils in the history of these districts, and more state supervision of their financing and their financial affairs is called for.

The limitation method of maximum tax rates which is in use in Texas and the other southwestern states has not throughout the period of their history prevented a steady and large growth of both state and local expenditures. As limitations they have been a failure, but it must be remembered that these states are comparatively new, certainly in the matter of economic development, and are so rapidly growing in population and wealth that a large growth in expenditures is to be expected. Their tax limits have in general been well above the requirements of the governmental jurisdictions and when they have stood in the way resort has always been had to an increase in assessed values. However, if there had not been tax limits, assessed values would probably be on a lower basis and tax rates on a higher one.

#### DEBT LIMITATIONS AND OTHER REGULATIONS

As between tax limits and debt limits the latter are the more important. Once created debts continue until paid; an aroused public opinion can secure the abolition of a tax or of a tax increase, but debts cannot be gotten rid of so easily. Also, there are greater dangers of waste, extravagance, and graft in bond issues.

Debt limits antedate tax limits, and they are found in more states than are tax limits. At present they are found in every state except Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont. The problem of the financing of the highways is forcing a reconsideration of the debt provisions in the constitutions of many of the states, and is giving an added interest to state debt restrictions, whereas until recently the major interest has been in local debt provisions.

The restrictions on state debt in the Texas Constitution are typical of those in most state constitutions. These are that "no debt shall be created by or on behalf of the state, except to supply casual deficiencies, repel invasion, suppress insurrection, defend the state in war, or pay existing debts; and the debt created to supply deficiencies in revenue shall never exceed in the aggregate at any one time \$200,000" (Article 3,

section 49). Article 3, section 50, provides that the "Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending of the credit of the state in aid of, or to, any person, association, or corporation, whether municipal or other or to pledge the credit of the state in any manner whatsoever for the payment of the liabilities, present or prospective, of any individual, municipal or other corporation whatsoever." Similar provisions are in the Arkansas and Louisiana constitutions. Oklahoma belongs to the group of states whose constitutions provide that no debt, other than that for repelling invasion, suppressing rebellion, and the like, shall be contracted unless approved by a vote of the people. The amount of debt which may be created to meet casual deficits varies in the different states. As an example of what may be the future trend in state debt provisions the amendment adopted in North Carolina in 1924 may be noted. It provides that no new debt shall be contracted with certain exceptions, to an amount exceeding in the aggregate 7.5 per cent of the assessed value of the taxable property of the state.

The restrictions on local debts relate to the amount, to the purposes, to the terms of the bonds, and to popular referendum. The amount is usually limited to some per cent of the assessed value of property. The per cent varies in the different states but the most usual one is 5 per cent or thereabouts. In Texas there are in the cases of towns and cities, counties, and school districts no legal restriction to a percentage of assessed values, but limitation is effected through tax limits. Road, navigation, water control, and preservation districts, and any other water district created under Article 3, section 52, of the Constitution, and county road bonds, are limited to 25 per cent of the assessed value of the real property of the district. There is no legal limit of any kind upon water districts created under the provisions of Article 16, section 59, of the Constitution. The limit on increases of county issues in general at any one time is 5 per cent of the assessed value of property. There are different limits upon county issues for specific purposes; thus, the amount which may be issued for courthouse and jail purposes is limited to 2 per cent of the assessed values. Limitation of debt through a maximum tax rate is found in Texas in the case of school districts, where the maximum fixed is 50 cents, and there is a limit of

5 cents in the case of issues of counties having a population of over fifty thousand for viaducts, bridges, and the like.

In some states issues based on productive properties, such as water and light plants, are excepted from the limit to a per cent of assessed values.

An outstanding defect of the Texas law regarding county and other local debt is that the restrictions apply only to bonded indebtedness. They should apply to warrants or notes which are issued and are not retired out of the current year's revenue. Many Texas counties and municipalities are issuing long-term notes or warrants which are as much debt as are bonds. Such issues constitute a serious abuse of the borrowing power and they are particularly objectionable because they are not subject to a vote of the people.

Another class of debt regulations relates to the terms of the bonds—their life, method of payment, interest rate, sale price, denominations, etc. Some very important developments are taking place in this class of regulations. Instead of having a blanket or uniform life for all bonds some states, such as New York and Ohio, have regulated the life of the bond on the basis of the life of the improvement for which the issue is made. In Texas this principle is not recognized except in the case of bonds for school buildings. If the building is wooden, the limit of life for the bonds is twenty years; if other construction, the limit is forty years. This is a crude division as compared with the provisions in the New York law. There is no rhyme or reason in the provisions of the Texas laws relating to the length of time bonds may run.

The sinking fund as a means of debt retirement has fallen into disrepute. There have been such serious abuses of these funds, in the ways of failure to provide for them, diversion to current expenses and other purposes, speculation and graft, that no less than eleven states have made the serial bond plan mandatory. The serial bond has many advantages over the sinking fund bond. It puts some of the burden of debt payment upon those who vote the bonds and thus has an appreciable deterring effect against rushing into debt; it does away with the abuses which are connected with the sinking fund; it insures that the debt will be paid and not refunded; and it is more economical, or its cost to the people is less. The Texas law permits serial bonds, but it does not, as it should, make

their use mandatory in all cases. The practice in Texas is strongly in the direction of the issue of this type of bond.

If serial bonds are not made mandatory, refunding should be prohibited, as has recently been done in Ohio and Washington. Refunding of bonds which perpetuate them long after the improvement for which they were issued has disappeared or become obsolete and must be replaced is a serious abuse of credit. It is an abuse in Texas in connection with school bonds and road bonds. An exception to the prohibition of refunding should be made where the community has suffered some public calamity.

In the class of regulations relating to purpose of issues, a distinction should be made between issues for what are called productive purposes and those for other purposes. The debt of a locality for public utilities which will pay their way should receive different treatment from issues for schools, roads, parks, and the like. Long-term borrowing to meet current expenses, or to pay deficits and the funding of warrants which were issued for current expenses should be prohibited, except in case of some public disaster. Long-term borrowing should be reserved for only permanent improvements, or for social or economic capital assets. The Ohio debt law makes any improvement the estimated life of which is less than five years a current expense item. The Texas law is fairly good as to restrictions on the basis of purpose, except that it does not regulate sufficiently warrant or note indebtedness.

There should be a referendum of long-term issues to the people. An interesting question in this connection is as to who should be permitted to vote. Should all qualified voters, or all qualified property tax-paying voters, or only qualified real property tax-paying voters be entitled to vote on bond issues? In Texas the test for voting on bond issues by towns, cities, counties, school districts, and road districts is that the person shall be a qualified property tax-paying voter. This has been interpreted by the courts to mean that one need not have actually paid a property tax but that one need only have property which is subject to assessment. This interpretation has led to a lot of "dollar watch voters." It would seem desirable that the vote in bond elections should be restricted to those who have actually paid the last levied property tax.



The bulk of local revenues is derived from the property tax, and additional debt always means heavier property taxation for interest and discharge of principal. Some persons object to this limitation of voting to property tax-payers on the ground that property taxes are shifted in whole or part so that everybody pays directly or indirectly the property tax. There is a modicum of truth in this objection, but taxes on land, on homes occupied by the owners, and on personal property in the consumer's hand are not shifted, and the extent to which other taxes are passed on is a debatable question. Furthermore people who pay taxes indirectly are unconscious of the payment and so their feeling of responsibility in connection with government expenditures is less than that of people who pay directly. Although real property taxpayers bear the load of property taxation they do not do so as a matter of law but of administration, and to restrict voting in all bond elections to them would go to the extreme.

Finally, in the field of regulation, there should be a full reporting to some state officer, and an annual publication by that officer, of all the details of the debt of the political subdivisions of the state. There is serious need in Texas of amending the law which requires reports as to bonds to be made to the office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts. Every subdivision of government—county, town, city, and district—should be required to report the details not only of its bonded indebtedness but also of its note or warrant debt. Interest and sinking fund should be separated in the report made: it is not so done now; and there should be some state check or audit of the local sinking funds.

## GOVERNMENT AS AN EXACT SCIENCE

BY R. K. GOOCH

*University of Virginia*

A few months ago there appeared in one of the "learned" reviews an article of considerable merit with the title "Political Science at the Crossroads."<sup>1</sup> Now, Political Science, of course, takes as the object of its study the state; and in another "learned" periodical, of still earlier date, may be found an article which a highly eminent author entitles "The Discredited State."<sup>2</sup> These two articles are chosen merely at random. With the articles themselves there is no need in the present circumstances to deal; but the titles are well worth the notice of the student of government. They suggest to him that he may well take stock of his predicament, if his study is at the crossroads and the object of his study is discredited.

This precarious situation of the student of politics, it is scarcely necessary to pause to say, is only a small element in the position at which the history of the world and of man has arrived. One is told on all hands, in accents ranging from the popularized utterances of Mr. Will Durant to the enormous sweep of Count Keyserling's doubtful profundities, that human affairs are in a tremendous period of transition. At such a time, one naturally and inevitably desires something solid, something authoritative; and one is told nowadays with great show of authority that in a period of transition one "kicks against the pricks," "swims against the current," or is otherwise guilty of some similarly expressed foolhardiness unless he deserts the old and embraces the new.

About the beginning of the sixth century B.C., at the time of one of several transitions in the history of that civilization which grew to be the greatest the world has yet seen, a new temper was furnished to Greece by the preaching of the

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<sup>1</sup>By Ellen Deborah Ellis, *American Political Science Review*, xxi, pp. 773-791. November, 1927.

<sup>2</sup>By E. Barker, *The Political Quarterly*, V, pp. 101-121. February, 1915.

priests at Delphi. Those who sought guidance in the chaos of changing conditions heard preached the beauties of moderation, summed up in the famous motto of a famous oracle: "nothing in excess."<sup>3</sup> Over two thousand years later, in the much maligned eighteenth century, Alexander Pope offered wholesome advice, in a well-worn couplet in rocking-horse meter, about being quick to try the new and to lay the old aside.<sup>4</sup> Today, however, as if mankind were in its first period of transition, the wisdom of the past is little heeded, and there are few to suggest that utterances of apparently moderate and liberal oracles may be the preaching of false prophets. The student of government goes the way of the rest.

Every year the president of the learned association<sup>5</sup> into which are organized the students of political science in this country addresses words of guidance to those whose authority<sup>6</sup> he is. To the most recent of these addresses<sup>7</sup> one may turn in order to discover what is wrong and what is, in the circumstances, to be done.

Political Science, we are told, "is still in bondage to eighteenth century deification of the abstract individual man." Another trouble is that "under the influence of ideas which were borrowed from the old natural philosophy, we continue to assume that the science of government can be a science only if it is based upon a series of ultimate and fixed uniformities. Our vernacular and our thinking are still heavily saturated with the idea that there are metaphysical principles

<sup>3</sup>Cf. E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors* (London, 1918), pp. 42 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Essay on Criticism*, lines 325 ff:

"Ancients in phrase, mere moderns in their sense;  
Such labour'd nothings, in so strange a style,  
Amaze th' unlearn'd, and make the learned smile.

Be not the first by whom the new are try'd,  
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside."

<sup>5</sup>The American Political Science Association.

<sup>6</sup>This word is several times used in the course of the present essay. Someone has suggested that "an authority is a person who knows more and more about less and less." Such may perhaps be taken as a working definition for the term as here employed.

<sup>7</sup>W. B. Munro, "Physics and Politics—an Old Analogy Revived," *American Political Science Review*, xxii, pp. 1-11. February, 1928.

of human liberty to which all governmental practice must conform. And these principles are embodied in a series of impostor pietisms which stultify the thought of the people and form the greatest of all obstacles to the orderly progress of social control."

Having described thus the situation which the science of government must in transition leave behind, this most recent presidential address proceeds to indicate what ought to be done. "Political Science," it runs, "to become a science, should first of all obtain a decree of divorce from the philosophers, the lawyers, and the psychologists, with whom it has long been in the status of a polygamous companionate marriage to the detriment of its own quest for truth. . . . Our immediate goal . . . should be to release political science from the old metaphysical and juristic concepts upon which it has traditionally been based. . . . It is to the natural sciences that we may most profitably turn, in this hour of transition, for suggestions as to the reconstruction of our postulates and methods."

More than one ex-president of the same learned association, as well as large numbers of articulate "authorities" throughout the country, look hopefully to the "exact" sciences as models for and aids to the new science of government.<sup>8</sup> In this respect there is among the present-day authorities a singular unanimity of view, to which there appears a single exception, though it seems truly an exception which proves the rule. This exception is the attitude of the authorities towards psychology. Some of them, like the learned president who has been quoted, will have nothing to do with psychology. Others embrace it rapturously; and certain psychologists distinctly

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<sup>8</sup>Cf. e.g. Merriam, *New Aspects of Politics* (Chicago, 1925). A complete bibliography would be enormous. However, the student who will read the above, together with such books as Merriam, Barnes, and others, *Political Theories: Recent Times* (New York, 1924), Ogburn and Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences* (Cambridge, 1927), and Ellwood, Wissler, Gault, Sauer, Clark, Merriam, and Barnes, *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (Philadelphia and London, 1927) and any considerable part of the references contained in these works cannot but be struck by the reverent attitude towards the natural sciences. Cf. in this respect, W. Y. Elliott, *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* (New York, 1928), p. 8 *et passim*.



reciprocate their affection, declaring that psychology and politics are one.<sup>9</sup> The difference is due to the fact that political scientists, like the body of psychologists, are not in entire agreement as to what sort of a science psychology is. The authoritative political scientists are in agreement about the beauties of exact science; they disagree as to whether or not psychology is an exact science. To an eclectic one or two considerations suggest themselves. Between fifteen and twenty years ago, President Lowell, in his presidential address to the learned association of students of government, might have said of psychology as he did of Political Science that "the subject lacks the first essential of a modern science—a nomenclature incomprehensible to educated men."<sup>10</sup> The most recent president of the association observes that "... it has taken the first step on the way to become a pseudo-science by providing itself with a technical jargon which is incomprehensible to the ordinary man."<sup>11</sup> Therefore, it would seem that the political scientist may hope that a beginning is being made on the part of the psychologist to assist him in his effort at exactness. An example will show the grounds for such hopeful anticipation. The political scientist may learn from the psychologist what a thing like *propaganda* is. "Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols. The word *attitude* is taken to mean a tendency to act according to certain patterns of valuation. The existence of an attitude is not a direct datum of experience, but an inference from signs that have a conventionalized significance."<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, "... with all respect to psychologists," says the distinguished bio-chemist, Mr. J. B. S. Haldane, "I do not think psychology is yet a science."<sup>13</sup> The same eminent scientist estimates that it will require something more than three hundred years for psychology to achieve this

<sup>9</sup>Cf. e.g. Charles Elmer Gehlke, *Social Psychology and Political Theory*, Ch. X in Merriam, Barnes and others, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup>*American Political Science Review*, IV, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>W. B. Munro, *loc. cit.*

<sup>12</sup>Quoted, *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>"Science and Politics," *New Republic*, December 3, 1924. Attention to the general subject is indicated by an article of almost identical title, "Politics and Science" by Professor Fairlie in *Scientific Monthly*, January, 1924.

aim. Since the method employed, in order to arrive at this conclusion, is manifestly that of exact science, it would be presumptuous to doubt its accuracy.

It is high time to attempt as precisely as possible to determine the general characteristics of the "new politics" advocated on so widespread a scale. According to its champions, metaphysics is useless and dangerous;<sup>14</sup> idealism has no touch with reality; rationalism and analysis yield only empty abstractions; deduction is sterile; and the realm of the *a priori* is dubbed a "sublime cloudland."<sup>15</sup> In short, these things are "unscientific." On the positive side, a description of the "new politics" may perhaps be attempted, without too much risk of the glibness with which thinkers and thinking are only too often ticketed. Anti-intellectualist and pluralist in its bias, it is pragmatic in its philosophy;<sup>16</sup> it is empirical and realistic in its epistemology; it is historical in its jurisprudence; it is inductive in its logic. These things, it seems not unfair<sup>17</sup> to say, are involved in the ambition to be "scientific."

It is significant, as academic phraseology has it, to notice those whom historically the new scientists of government regard as their precursors. A few names are those of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu; and, more recently, there has been a host of others. A genuine appreciation of the position of these great names in the history of political thought might have suggested that the present is not the first period of transition in the history of mankind, and that the empirical and inductive method, instead of being the peculiar possession of the exact scientists, natural and political, has always been employed to supplement a different method by furnishing, during transitions from periods of over emphasis, new material for that method and a means of reexamining its principles. This suggestion does not seem to occur to the new political scientists. They appear to forget in denouncing metaphysics that the word itself owes its origin to the works of Aristotle

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<sup>14</sup>V. especially in this respect the views of M. Duguit in France. Cf. W. Y. Elliott, *op. cit.*, *passim*, especially Ch. IX.

<sup>15</sup>W. B. Munro, *loc. cit.*

<sup>16</sup>Cf. W. Y. Elliott, *op. cit.*, *passim*, especially Ch. III.

<sup>17</sup>On the contrary, it is difficult not to suspect many of its disciples of an almost complete ignorance of history, logic, and philosophy in general.

and that the thing itself is a most important part of the Aristotelian system. They fail to mention the fact that Aristotle established for all time to come the principles of deductive reasoning. Ignoring Plato and his influence altogether and taking of Aristotle, whom Dante calls "the master of all those who know," an even narrower view than the English philosopher who, with injustice to both the great Greeks, said that we are all either a Platonist or an Aristotelian,<sup>18</sup> they do not seem to realize that the narrowest view of the method of Aristotle must regard it as supplementary and complementary to an equally valuable method. Likewise, they are silent about the perspective in which Machiavelli would seem properly to be appraised. They do not suggest that his thought is supplementary to or even in reaction against a mediaevalized Aristotle of the schoolmen.<sup>19</sup> Still less do they acknowledge the solid and lasting contributions of Dante and St. Thomas Aquinas, of Marsiglio of Padua and William of Occam. Again, they give no indication of subscribing to the view, which has been expressed, that Montesquieu is to be regarded as an antidote for Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.<sup>20</sup> If they should envisage him in relation to this trinity, they might be constrained to recognize the abiding worth of certain parts of rationalist systems. Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and later thinkers in the same tradition they tend to regard as largely isolated examples of individuals who had the vision to catch a small gleam of the method which they themselves were to advocate.

Nothing could be further from the intention of this essay, which is not altogether sympathetic with the conception of politics as an exact science, than to identify laws of the physical and social realms. However, by way of analogy, it is often highly important in the non-physical sphere to think in terms of action and reaction. This has already been suggested by implication; for a distinctive characteristic of the "new politics" is the tendency to minimize that from which reaction takes place. Now, in America, it is in such terms that

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<sup>18</sup>Cf. Webb, *History of Philosophy* (London, 1915), p. 47.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. Dunning, *Political Theories: Ancient and Mediaeval* (New York, 1923), p. 291.

<sup>20</sup>Pollock, *History of the Science of Politics* (London, 1920), p. 86.

an explanation for the peculiarly complicated character of the present transition in political science may be ventured. History is not without examples of a phenomenon wherein action is followed by reaction in one place whereas action and reaction occur together in another. It is, for example, a commonplace with students of history that the renaissance, reformation, and counter-reformation succeeded one another on the continent of Europe whereas they struck England all at one time. Similarly, in the case of American political thought, systems which on the other side of the Atlantic marked successive stages of development are in America all at the same time exercising influence good and bad, as well as serving as the object of attack at the hands of those who fail to distinguish good from bad. Thus, advocates of the "new politics" are deeply concerned over the persistent and unfortunate influence in this country of doctrines like natural rights and the compact theory.<sup>21</sup> Elsewhere, this influence has for the most part long since disappeared, not least with those who, salvaging the sound parts of the views of the natural rights school, are, in respect of general method, in the same tradition. It was a thinker in this tradition<sup>22</sup> who said of the doctrine of natural rights and social compact that he "left it to those to amuse themselves with this rattle who could think they needed it."<sup>23</sup> Again, of the doctrines advocated by the school founded by this thinker,<sup>24</sup> later thought in the same tradition eliminates some, modifies others, and accepts what it regards as sound. However, modern America, like Elizabethan England, is struck by action and reaction at the same time. In the confusion of such a complex situation, to oppose a part is not distinguished from opposing the whole. It is a far cry from Thomas Hobbes of Malmsbury to Professor W. W. Willoughby of Johns Hopkins, and by no one are the fallacies and omissions of the former more acutely criticised than by the latter;<sup>25</sup> but they are both in the same general tradition

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<sup>21</sup>*Cf. Munro, loc. cit.*

<sup>22</sup>Jeremy Bentham.

<sup>23</sup>Quoted by Leacock, *Elements of Political Science* (Boston, etc., 1921), p. 29.

<sup>24</sup>Of whom special mention should of course be made: John Austin.

<sup>25</sup>*Cf. Nature of the State* (New York, 1922), pp. 73-74, 125.



and receive no sympathy from the advocates of the "new politics." Natural rights school, Utilitarians, analytical jurists, and contemporary thinkers in the same tradition are, so far as they are concerned, identical. They insist on the rejection of the unscientific *a priori* method of all such in favor of the inductive method of exact science.

No one could wish in the abstract to belittle the inductive method. However, what seems worth while is to belittle, if necessary, the views which certain political scientists hold concerning the inductive method. In the present circumstances, they would undoubtedly do well, as Benjamin Franklin said of his own judgment, to doubt its infallibility. They might well consult the conclusions of Mr. Bertrand Russell, himself trained in mathematics, the most exact of the sciences. He points out<sup>26</sup> that it is impossible to prove the ultimate validity of anything by induction since it is impossible to prove by induction the validity of induction. On the other hand, while insisting on the limitations of the *a priori* method, he acknowledges that within its limits there is greater evidence for it than for the principle of induction. Of course, as our logic books tell us, the two principles should go "hand in hand." As in the case of all things standing in a reciprocal relationship, a sweeping judgment of value should always be avoided. Neither the foundation of a building nor the structure erected upon it is more important than the other, since they belong together. To which of the two a certain person at a certain time should direct his attention depends on circumstances. Thus, the natural scientist finds induction his more congenial method on account of the nature of the subjects with which he deals; but he must constantly supplement it with the *a priori*. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the subjects dealt with by the political thinker are of an essentially different character.<sup>27</sup> This in the end is the real reason for the conclusion of those who, like John

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<sup>26</sup>*The Problems of Philosophy* (London, 1921), pp. 109, 115.

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, 1927), p. 7: ". . . the difference between facts which are what they are independent of human desire and endeavour and facts which are to some extent what they are because of human interests and purpose, and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be got rid of by any methodology."

Stuart Mill and James Bryce,<sup>28</sup> deny the possibility that political science may be an exact science. "If I thought," says Mr. J. B. S. Haldane,<sup>29</sup> "that science . . . could be applied to politics, I should become a politician." This being true, the scientific and inductive method ought not to be exaggerated beyond the point of being supplementary to an equally important method, which in many respects and in many instances is the more congenial method for the political thinker.

So far, caution has been suggested to those political scientists who are attracted by the method of natural science. Similar caution may be counselled in connection with the attractions of scientific exactness.

There can be little doubt that the emphasis of the "new politics" is of this sort. It is manifest from the frequency with which "measurement" is suggested, such as in a phrase like the "mensurability of political phenomena." It is seen in the insistence on the importance of the establishment of "standards" and on "measurable results." It stands out in the sort of awe with which "biometry" and "anthropometry" are mentioned. It is apparent in the reverence for numbers and the regard for statistics. It is indicated by the designation of the desirable objects of political study as "specific," "minute," "microscopic," and even "invisible."

Only one of the presidents of the learned association which has been mentioned seems to have taken a stand against this sort of thing. His is a voice crying in the wilderness, but it is none the less emphatic. A "great menace to creative thought in America today," says Mr. Charles A. Beard,<sup>30</sup> "is research as generally praised and patronized, the peril of substituting monocular inquiries for venturesome judgments, the peril of narrowing the vision while accumulating information. . . . By making success in some minute and unimportant academic study the gateway of admission to the profession, we admit to our fellowship students with no claims whatever to capacity for independent thought, venturesome explanation, or stimulating speculation."

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<sup>28</sup>*Cf. Merriam, op. cit.*, p. 226.

<sup>29</sup>*Loc. cit.*

<sup>30</sup>"Time, Technology, and the Creative Spirit in Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, xxi, pp. 8-9. February, 1927.

The danger which is here urged and the caution which was earlier counselled may be in a degree supported by a brief examination of the process and notion of measurement. Since it is possible that students of the social sciences do not on a large scale give their attention to such matters, a brief description may be attempted in connection with simple linear measure.

If a good housewife desires from a shop a yard of ribbon or cloth, she naturally expects, in making a purchase, for a certain length to be measured off. In practice, she would, of course, be satisfied with an approximation to the length ordered, varying from the distance between the tip of the nose and the end of the extended arm to the distance between two gilt-headed tacks on the counter or the length of a wooden yard stick or even the length reeled off by a modern machine. If the good woman, possibly as the wife of a student of the "new politics," should demand absolute accuracy, she would find herself involved in a number of difficulties. Passing by the variability of the thing measured, she would encounter a number of possible variations in connection with the standard of measurement. She would learn that the merchant, in order to give her an exact yard, would have to furnish a length equal to a standard which may be furnished to the state in which she lives by the Government at Washington. This length is, or should be, equal to a standard maintained at Washington.<sup>31</sup> This yard length, she would find, is in turn determined by its relationship to another standard length known as the meter. This length is determined from a piece of platinum-iridium alloy containing apparently slight admixtures of iron, rodium, and ruthenium. This is kept surrounded by ice in a large tube at the bureau of standards in Washington. Its exactness, our good lady would learn, is determined in relation to a similar bar of alloy maintained in the same conditions at the International Bureau of Weights and Measures at Sèvres near Paris.<sup>32</sup> This standard meter was derived from a platinum

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<sup>31</sup>*Cf.* Ogg and Ray, *Introduction to American Government* (3rd Ed., New York, 1928), p. 550.

<sup>32</sup>In order to gain access to it, three keys, in the possession of individuals in different parts of the world, must be simultaneously employed. The writer visited the Bureau some two or three years ago in the course of studying international organization. A high official of the Bureau

meter deposited in the Archives of State in Paris and known as the Meter of the Archives. This length was constructed so as to equal one ten-millionth part of the quadrant of the earth's meridian. This distance was computed from a measurement of the arc from Dunkirk to Barcelona. It is heartening to think that science has made such strides that this measurement, though making certain refinements such as those connected with the curvature of the earth, with its flattening at the poles, and with the length of a pendulum swing in Peru, has since been proved to have been inaccurately made.

Our housewife may doubtless be excused if she is impressed by the detailed care with which a system has been constructed for the purpose of giving her exact measure in her purchases. It is doubtful whether her husband, the student of the "new politics," ought so easily to be impressed. He should recognize that the variations in the substance measured, the difficulties involved in the application of standards to the thing measured and to each other, the inaccuracy in establishing the final standard, and other similar things all reduce the possibility of absolute exactness, but that these are as nothing compared with the arbitrary and dogmatic character of the assumption that a certain standard is final. For example, if in the process of calibration, it is found that the meter at Washington and the meter at Sèvres are not the same in length, it is assumed that the meter in Washington has changed in an amount equal to this difference, though even a non-scientist may see that in any ultimate sense the best that can be said is that a change has taken place in the relationship between the two meters. Accordingly, it is clear that in the last analysis the effort is to be not exact but practical. If in the example it could be assumed that in fact the Washington meter remained unchanged, the system may be seen in the interests of practicability to result in great inexactness. Scientists, if questioned, readily admit this. A physicist, when recently asked about this replied: "Oh! yes, what we do is 'jump the game.'" Fairness, therefore, ought to constrain the

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recounted the details here set out. He made no mention of the arbitrary character of the assumption that the Bureau's meter does not change. For further details, see Hallock and Wade, *The Evolution of Weights and Measures and the Metric System* (New York, 1906). pp. 45 ff.



disciples of the "new politics" frankly to recognize that they are advocating in connection with social affairs a method which "jumps the game." The eclectic may for this reason be slow enthusiastically to embrace this "new politics"; for he will feel that the history of thought affords ample evidence of the fact that disastrously confused thinking always results, outside the realm of the so-called practical, from an analogous jumping of the game.

This essay, it may be repeated in conclusion, intends no derogation of the scientific method and of exactness. It merely suggests reasons why they should not be overestimated. It cautions against an insistence on method so great as inevitably to result in regarding the gathering of information as an end in itself. It suggests the danger of viewing knowledge from the standpoint of an almanac, one of which in recent weeks does violence to a famous dictum of the modern founder of the scientific method by urging on a counter display: "Knowledge is power; get yours here!" This essay concludes that the teacher of political science, at least as contrasted with practitioners, ought in his teaching and in the research for which he is responsible to deal principally with such matters as have an easily comprehended relation to the fundamental principles and problems in the study of the state. This effort to avoid over-emphasis and to reduce to a minimum the likelihood that the acquisition of information will be regarded as an end in itself is sure to meet with objection. It may be urged that unless "original contributions" to knowledge are emphasized, the only alternative is an attitude of passivity and a deterministic insistence that there is "nothing new under the sun." It may be replied that there is a new note as well as an old note, a note ringing out to modernist and fundamentalist alike, in a phrase from the famous Virginia Bill of Rights of George Mason, who speaks<sup>33</sup> of the transcendent importance of "a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."

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<sup>33</sup>*Constitution of Virginia*, Art. I, Sec. 15.

## SOME HISTORICAL AND RECENT TRENDS OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES<sup>1</sup>

BY L. L. BERNARD

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Sociology did not come suddenly into existence in American educational institutions, as the result of a few master minds, as we have sometimes supposed and as those master minds perhaps believed. The sociological storm was brewing for some decades before it finally struck our universities with a good deal of force around about 1890. The history, economics, political science, and philosophy craft, which were much agitated in the nineties lest they might be upset by the flurry, have long since rearranged their rigging and are running smoothly and rapidly before the gale. If philosophy is partly an exception, it is probably because her quaint Aristotelian canvas is not able to push her unwieldy galleon bulk without foundering. But even the philosophers are speculating about a change in their theory of design and may ultimately come into the port of the present instead of loitering among the metaphysical isles of the past.

The sociological storm of the early nineties, like many another catastrophic occurrence, has so strongly claimed the attention of the old sailing masters that they have rarely looked behind it to see the gathering signs of the weather. In fact the good old classical souls who ruled the social sciences in the eighties were by no means meteorologists of the social science atmosphere any more than they were close and efficient students of men and institutions. The men they knew

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<sup>1</sup>Read before the Southwestern Political and Social Science Association, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, April 21, 1928. The present paper is a preliminary survey, prepared because the large amount of new data seems to justify presentation, since final publication in book form will necessarily be delayed until relatively complete data are in. Investigation into the matter is still in process, and I wish to bespeak the coöperation of all who have received my requests for information in providing me with facts regarding the history of sociology which they have in their possession or within their reach. In many cases it is not possible for me to get at these data except through such help.

best were the mythical "economic men," "natural men," and "equalitarian men," that they had imported earlier in the century and their philosophy of human behavior was hopelessly intellectualistic.<sup>2</sup> They were largely armchair philosophers, who studied men and institutions in books. They had copied the humanistic methods of the classical scholars of the renaissance who, surrounded by teeming, passionate, striving life everywhere, turned to the Greek masters to find out what they had said about human nature and human affairs and failed to raise their eyes from the classic page to look out upon the world as it lay before them, to make observations of their own, to write new books to supplement those of their Greek masters. Such always is the classical method. Even until this hour the classicists have pleaded with us from behind their spectacles that culture comes only from books, and preferably from very old books written in foreign languages.

Sociology arose as a protest against this spirit of classicism. It preached a crusade for the study of men and their affairs rather than merely the hypothetical men of books. Unfortunately at first it had arrayed against itself not only the classicists in literary culture but also the classicists in the older social sciences as well. Vico, in the early eighteenth century, himself a profound student of the classics, had fought classicism in history and had developed the theory of the philosophy of history as a method of studying the meaning of human affairs from historical facts and beliefs. Before him men had been content merely to write literary narratives of what they chose to record or found recorded. In the next hundred years the spirit of Vico entered into the minds of a host of great philosophers of history—Voltaire, Turgot, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Herder, Goethe, Hegel, and Comte, to mention only some of the more outstanding names. These men were the forerunners of sociology by virtue of the fact that they sought the mainsprings of human motives and the logic of human institutions in human events themselves. In Saint-Simon, Hegel, and Comte this movement came to be sufficiently standardized and organized that the last of these gave it the name *sociology*. The fact that in the hundred years since the day of these men sociology

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<sup>2</sup>William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. I.

has deserted the breast of its fostering mother, the philosophy of history, and has sought its nutriment elsewhere—originally from the first green fruits of anthropological data, which did so much to give Spencer and his school indigestion, and later from the rich store of contemporaneous data which have latterly been matured by census takers, surveyors, case recorders, and a host of other agencies—signifies nothing more than that in our time sociology is growing up and requires a steadier and more substantial diet.

I have referred to Saint-Simon, Hegel, and Comte in particular as forerunners of sociology in the United States. The Saint-Simonian cult was largely responsible for the religious-humanitarian motivation which led to the establishment of something like one hundred and fifty experimental Owenite and Fourierian utopian colonies in this country between 1825 and 1875. While this movement was not theoretical sociology, it was a sort of practical experimental sociology, however crude, naïve and uninformed with regard to fundamental facts of human nature and social economy it may have been. It was a part of the general trend of the times to seek for a more vivid and vital contact with social reality.

On the theoretical side we behold two sociological movements arising in this country before 1850, neither of them strictly academic. One made its appearance in the old South and the other in New England. In New England the Hegelian transcendentalism and the Saint-Simonian humanism of LeRoux, Fourier, and Lamartine fused into a new transcendentalism that adapted itself nicely to the New England tradition and conscience. This new philosophy, largely transplanted from Europe, found its most effective leadership in Emerson and the Concord group, and gradually applied itself to the doctrinaire aspects of practical issues, especially to that of anti-slavery, in the hands of such men and women as Margaret Fuller, Phillips Brooks, Gilbert Parker, and William Lloyd Garrison, in the middle of the last century. Late in the nineteenth century it gave moral support to the New England crusade against the high tariff policy and the New Imperialism following the Spanish-American War. This movement was in its early development closely bound up with religion, especially with Unitarianism and Congregationalism. It mixed mysticism with practical human affairs, or rather



supported practical propaganda with mystical and metaphysical sanctions. In its maturer development it was perhaps the driving spirit of social reform which produced the American Social Science Association, the National Conference of Charities and Correction, the American Prison Association and similar powerful organizations. It too was sociological only by grace of its appeal from the armchair to human events and by virtue of its interest in humanitarianism and reform, however doctrinaire that interest at first may have been.

The southern sociological movement was primarily Comtean, and secondarily Aristotelian. It was the only one of the three to apply to itself the term *sociology*. It, like the other two movements, had its origin and sanction in the local situation, although its underlying theory was drawn from abroad. It was not so much the *Positive Philosophy* as the *Positive Polity* that influenced the southern leaders of this movement. There was something in the Comtean hierarchy which called forth a peculiarly sympathetic response in the breasts of the leading philosophers of the southern movement—Chancellor Harper, Dew, Fitzhugh,<sup>3</sup> Hughes,<sup>4</sup> and Ross.

Slavery was under vigorous attack from the transcendentalist philosopher-reformers of the North and the doctrinaire Rousseauan democrats of the South, and these philosophic spokesmen of the new South found a significantly apt defense of their peculiar paternalistic system in a rival sociological system, that of Comte, tempered with Aristotle. Comte's theory of the Positivist social order is that of a hierarchy of the intellectual and spiritual élite, not wholly unlike that of the Catholic Church, except that it was to be secular instead of clerical, and the "pope" of the new order was to be guided by the Positivist philosophy, or science, instead of by theology and metaphysics. The outcome would of necessity be a paternalistic, benevolent system which would, as applied to local American conditions, justify slavery, take care of the slave, and promote the best interests of society by providing an opportunity for the élite to serve society untrammelled by sordid economic cares. All this is duly emphasized by the southern

<sup>3</sup>William E. Dodd, "The Social Philosophy of the Old South," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, XXIII:735-46.

<sup>4</sup>Henry Hughes, *Treatise on Sociology, Theoretical and Practical*, 1854.

philosophic apologists in their treatises, which not only bear the term sociology in their pages, but also make appeal to the authority of Comte as their sanction.

But these three movements did not put sociology into the universities. These fortresses of culture were still held and stoutly defended by the classicists.<sup>5</sup> However, in the seventies and eighties even these sacred strongholds began to yield to the profane and insidious attack of those who hungered after an understanding of the meaning of things human. Guizot, in France, had lectured on the history of civilization and Hegel and other German professors had held forth from their academic rostra on the philosophy of history. The lectures of these men, published in book form, inspired certain American professors of the subsequent generation to venture into theorizing.<sup>6</sup> Soon after 1839 Guizot's *History of Civilization in Europe* was taught at Harvard.<sup>7</sup> As early as 1846 there was a "Professor of Logic, Rhetoric and Philosophy of History" at the University of Michigan. The Reverend Daniel D. Whedon, A.M., occupied the chair and gave a course in Philosophy of History.<sup>8</sup> A course in the "Philosophy of Social Relations," or "Ethics of Society," was introduced in the School of Moral Philosophy at the University of Virginia

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<sup>5</sup>In 1878, Professor Benjamin Pierce (mathematics) of Harvard proposed a plan for the introduction of a chair in "social science" in some university, which would give the field a trial and presumably demonstrate its value to other institutions. But apparently no obliging institutions came forward, and the subject continued to be taught more or less incidentally, here and there, in connection with other subjects. In December, 1885, James, Wayland, and Sanborn were appointed as a committee of the American Social Science Association to draw up a list of topics suitable for the content of such a course. The resulting list appears to have been essentially the outline of Sanborn's course at Cornell University. The effect of this published outline was to concentrate attention upon the field and to give to it greater definition. See F. L. Tolman, "The Study of Sociology in the Institutions of Learning in the United States," *Amer. Jour. Sociology* VII:799-800.

<sup>6</sup>Herbert Baxter Adams states that "this valuable work (Guizot's *History of Civilization in Europe*) . . . has probably been used more than any other textbook for advanced or senior courses in American colleges." *The Study of History in American Colleges and Universities* (1887), p. 99.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 91.

in 1850-1851, by Professor William H. McGuffey, editor of the McGuffey readers.<sup>9</sup> It was really a course in the philosophy of history and bore the subtitle of "Progress of Society." Ferguson, Guizot, Taylor, and McCinnon are mentioned as readings but with emphasis upon Guizot. The following year Grimke and De Tocqueville were added to the list. This course continued until 1858. After 1854 Professor Edward Tuckerman, botanist, gave annually a course of twelve lectures in the philosophy of history to the senior class at Amherst College, and during part of this time used Guizot's *History of Civilization*.<sup>10</sup> In 1865 Professor Perry is said to have treated social science in connection with political economy at Williams College.<sup>11</sup> Two courses, "The History of Civilization," based on Guizot, and "Social Science," based on Carey, were included in the senior year of the English course at the University of Pennsylvania, for the year 1869-1870. This is the first time the term social science appeared in the Pennsylvania catalogue, or, perhaps, in any other. The instructor was Robert Ellis Thompson of the Department of Mathematics.<sup>12</sup> A course on the "History of Civilization" was also introduced at De Pauw University in 1870 and was changed to "History of Civilization and Sociology in 1890-1891."<sup>13</sup> Something much more like sociology appeared in the catalogue of Syracuse University for the year 1872-1873, under the title of "Tribal Migrations and International Law." "The History of Civilization" appeared as a separate course in this university in 1873-1874.<sup>14</sup> From the opening of Cornell University in 1868, Professor William D. Wilson taught a course in the "Philosophy of History." This course continued until it was supplanted by a course in "Social Science" by Sanborn in 1885.<sup>15</sup> In 1873-1874 the School of Moral Philosophy, of the University of Virginia, with Noah K. Davis as professor, announced

<sup>9</sup>Data furnished by Dr. F. N. House, University of Virginia.

<sup>10</sup>Adams, p. 74.

<sup>11</sup>Tolman, p. 824.

<sup>12</sup>Data furnished by Dr. James H. S. Bossard, University of Pennsylvania.

<sup>13</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Lester M. Jones, De Pauw University.

<sup>14</sup>Data furnished by Professor Oscar Wesley, Syracuse University.

<sup>15</sup>Adams, pp. 134-35; also data furnished by Professor J. L. Woodward, Cornell University.

a course on "Political Economy," based on Mill's and Bowen's texts, and adds that "Fundamental questions in sociology are also considered." This plan continued at Virginia until 1881, when it was replaced by a course on the "Process of Historical Change" in the School of Historical Science under Professor Holmes. The sociological phases of the course had the preference and investigated "the laws and movements, the growth, decay, and constitution of societies, in the different stages of social development." No text was used. This course continued with little change down to 1897, when Professor Holmes died and the course was dropped.<sup>16</sup>

In 1876-1877 President Laws of the University of Missouri introduced a course entitled "Social Science," based on Lieber's *Civil Liberty* and Spencer's *Sociology*.<sup>17</sup> President Folwell of the University of Minnesota established a course in the "History of Civilization," based on Guizot in 1878.<sup>18</sup> The catalogue of Louisiana State University for 1878 states that the philosophy of history rather than the facts are emphasized in the department of history.<sup>19</sup> In the catalogue for 1881 Guizot's *History of Civilization* is listed as text in the department of history and English literature, and Colonel William Preston Johnston, the president, is mentioned as the teacher.<sup>20</sup> Instruction in the philosophy of history was introduced at Bryn Mawr College in 1885.<sup>21</sup> By 1887 or earlier, Adrian, Franklin, Heidelberg, Hope, Napa, Trinity, and Wellesley colleges and the Universities of Illinois, Indiana, and Kansas were using Guizot's *History of Civilization* as a text.<sup>22</sup> In the years 1885-1886, President William Preston Johnston of Tulane University began a course entitled "Philosophy of History and Political Science," in which he made use of Guizot, Tyler's *Anthropology*, Spencer's *Sociology*, and Maine's works.<sup>23</sup> Professor Charles Woodward Hutson of the University of Mississippi became so interested in giving his students some so-

<sup>16</sup>Data furnished by Dr. F. N. House.

<sup>17</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri.

<sup>18</sup>Catalogues of the University of Minnesota.

<sup>19</sup>*Loc. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

<sup>20</sup>*Loc. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>21</sup>Adams, p. 225.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 278-85.

<sup>23</sup>Catalogues of Tulane University.



biological and anthropological backgrounds that he produced a book, now largely forgotten, entitled *The Beginnings of Civilization*, published in 1887.

It was in these years also that applied sociology or social problems first came to be taught in our universities. In 1880 the Harvard Divinity School offered, under the instruction of Reverend G. A. Gordon of Milwaukee, a course of lectures on charities and reforms.<sup>24</sup> In the same year Professor Peabody began to deal with social reform in his courses in practical ethics at Harvard. There were other instances of similar courses appearing in various universities within this and the following decade. For example, Professor Dunster offered at the University of Michigan, in 1881-1882, a course called "Social Science" which reviewed various theories of society from Plato to Fourier, discussed such social problems as poverty and crime and their prevention, and the administrative treatment of the defective classes—apparently a very inclusive and thorough course for its time.<sup>25</sup> The School of Political Science was established at Columbia University in 1880 and Richmond Mayo-Smith occupied the chair of Political Economy and Social Science, emphasizing very largely social statistics. Here he gave a course entitled "Social Science" in the eighties.<sup>26</sup> In the middle eighties a course in the Political Science Department of the State University of Iowa dealt with such social problems as "Education, Crime, Pauperism, Socialism, Communism, and Immigration."<sup>27</sup> In 1884 Reverend S. W. Dike gave a course of lectures at Andover Theological Seminary on the "Family Social Problems."<sup>28</sup> Elective courses in "Social Economics" were offered at Andover Theological Seminary in 1887 and at Yale Divinity School in "Christian Ethics" in 1892.<sup>29</sup> Similar courses were introduced at Hartford Theological Seminary in 1888 and at the Chicago Theological Seminary in 1890.<sup>30</sup> Johns Hopkins established

<sup>24</sup>Tolman, p. 823.

<sup>25</sup>Tolman, pp. 819-20.

<sup>26</sup>Adams, p. 81.

<sup>27</sup>Data furnished by Dr. E. B. Reuter, State University of Iowa.

<sup>28</sup>Tolman, p. 825.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

courses in "Philanthropy" as early as 1887.<sup>31</sup> In 1885 a course called "Social Science," dealing with problems of social maladjustment, was offered by Professor Sanborn of Cornell University, under the stimulus and patronage of President Andrew D. White.<sup>32</sup> Professor Sanborn was one of the last of the Concord sages and had been secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Charities and of the American Social Science Association.<sup>33</sup> The work was carried on in 1888-1889 by Mr. C. A. Collins, who gave a more sociological trend to the work.<sup>34</sup> In 1888-1889 Professor Roland P. Faulkener of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, gave a course entitled "Statistics of Population," which is said to have had a truly sociological approach.<sup>35</sup>

But the first of these courses actually to bear the word sociology in its title was, I believe, that introduced by Sumner at Yale in 1875-1876, based on Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, then appearing in installments.<sup>36</sup> That it was not so different from some of the other courses being offered in other universities at about this time is indicated by the fact that it was an integral part of a three-term course in political and social science then offered at Yale. It is also reported that sociology was taught by means of lectures, perhaps by the president, at the University of Arkansas as early as 1884-1885.<sup>37</sup> The first entirely separate course bearing the title sociology was given at Indiana University in 1885, due to the encouragement of David Starr Jordan, and this university has had courses under the same title continuously to the present time.<sup>38</sup> It was the first time, so far as I know, in the history of the world, that such a course was listed in a university catalogue and given, unless the course of lectures at Arkansas may be shown to merit priority. "Christian Sociology" was

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 804.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 803.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 803; also statement of Dr. James H. S. Bossard.

<sup>36</sup>Data furnished by Dr. J. G. Leyburn, Yale University.

<sup>37</sup>Data furnished by Dr. A. W. Jamison, University of Arkansas.

<sup>38</sup>Data furnished by Dr. U. G. Weatherly, Indiana University.

taught at Trinity College, North Carolina, in 1888-1889, by President J. F. Crowell.<sup>39</sup>

Evidence is not wanting that the way of the innovator was not always easy in these early attempts at sociology or pre-sociology. Sumner paid the price of his temerity in introducing the work of the reputedly godless Spencer. He was attacked inside and outside of the university and retained his position only by virtue of the foresight and loyalty of the alumni. He gave up the use of Spencer and discontinued his course for a few years, after the controversy of 1881.<sup>40</sup> In 1886 the professor at Virginia saw fit to state, in the announcement of his course, that "All systems are interpreted; no ideal constitution is contemplated. The course is descriptive of the processes by which experienced results have been obtained; not speculative in advocacy of theoretic dreams." Apparently textbooks were avoided, but the description of the course seems to indicate that the professor at least had access to Spencer. In 1897, the last year in which the Virginia course was offered, the following reassurance is offered in the announcement: "Comte, Spencer, Ward, DeGrey (De Greef?), Giddings, Fairchild and others treat the subject from an entirely different point of view."<sup>41</sup>

But the demand for a sociological interpretation of human phenomena was becoming ever more insistent in the universities of the time, and by the late eighties most of those worthy of the name apparently had some such course, although it was invariably more or less camouflaged in title and kept in good company by being offered by the president or the professor of philosophy. In fact, the various social sciences were not at that time ordinarily developed as separate units, but were usually taught by the same man. In the smaller institutions this man also taught philosophy, and the social sciences were regarded as extensions of philosophic subject matter, where they contended for a hearing with metaphysics, logic, ethics, and the evidences of Christianity.

When the storm broke in 1890 and 1891 there was really no reason why the academic wiseacres should have been taken

<sup>39</sup>Tolman, p. 824.

<sup>40</sup>Harris E. Starr, *William Graham Sumner*, p. 363.

<sup>41</sup>Data furnished by Dr. F. N. House.

by surprise, although most of them apparently were. There were plenty of weather signs for those who had out a weather eye. Not only had there been these numerous extra-mural and academic approaches to sociology, growing more numerous in the eighties; but the professed literature of the subject had also grown very considerably since the time of Comte's publications. Spencer's *Study of Sociology* had gained wide publicity in the United States through its serial publication in the *Popular Science Monthly* and later in book form. Ward had brought out his *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883, and, although it had not been generally read, it had reached the key men in the social sciences. Letourneau's *Sociology* had appeared in English translation in 1881. Spencer was known to be collecting volumes of data for a great work on the Principles of Sociology, and some of this material had already been published. Lewis H. Morgan had brought out his sociological studies of the American Indians, and his *Ancient Society* had made a great impression at home and abroad, almost as profound as the studies of Tyler and Maine. John Fiske had been for some fifteen years applying Spencerian and Darwinian principles of evolution to the reinterpretation of religion, mythology, philosophy, history, and politics. Other writers abroad were dealing with the data of anthropology and ethnology from a sociological viewpoint and the results of their studies had reached the United States and had created a profound impression. The little book by Professor Hutson of the University of Mississippi is one evidence of this fact and an echo of their work.

Perhaps the most immediate influence leading to the introduction of sociology as such into the curricula about 1890 was the return of a number of young economists and historians from Germany to teach in American universities, after having studied in the German institutions. There were Henry W. Farnum of Yale, Simon N. Patten of Pennsylvania, Lindley M. Keasbey, later of Texas, Herbert B. Adams and Richard T. Ely of Johns Hopkins, John R. Commons of Indiana University, Albion W. Small of Colby College, to mention only a few of those who later became leaders.<sup>42</sup> Besides these were a few men like George D. Herron of Grinnell College who had inherited

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<sup>42</sup>Howard W. Odum, *American Masters of Social Science*, pp. 192-3.



the spirit and outlook of the English Social Reformers and Christian Socialists. The German social economics of that day was as much applied sociology as it was economics and much of it had as much of the spirit of Christian Socialism, although perhaps more fundamentally grounded and tested, as the English Reformers themselves. Many of the present generation of social scientists have forgotten or never knew that both Commons and Ely made academic ventures into "Christian Sociology" and related welfare movements about this time. Both have left volumes which testify to this early interest. Commons especially had his academic difficulties in these days because of his supposed "radicalism," and although both he and Ely have long since turned to more scientific and less reformistic interests, the traces of their early training still show in their work and outlook. Johns Hopkins in particular in those days was preparing to become the mother of sociologists, although she never gave birth to sociology itself. Both Ely and H. B. Adams were friendly to this viewpoint and subject matter and occasionally invited Lester F. Ward, who already in 1889 was a sort of tradition, to lecture before their seminars. The years of 1889-1891 saw in training in this institution such future sociologists as Albion W. Small, Frank Wilson Blackmar, Amos G. Warner, and Edward A. Ross. Thorstein B. Veblen had spent some time there after his graduation at Carleton College in 1880, but took his Ph.D. at Yale in 1884.

The establishment in earnest of courses in sociology began in 1889, when Small introduced a seminar in what was really Christian Sociology at Colby College.<sup>43</sup> Professor Blackmar, being called to the University of Kansas in the same year, established the first department—"History and Sociology"—in the country bearing the title sociology. He taught the "Elements of Sociology," beginning February, 1890. No fewer than five universities and colleges began instruction in sociology in this year, 1890.<sup>44</sup> Professor Mills, a student under Sanborn at Cornell, introduced a course entitled "Social Sci-

<sup>43</sup>A. W. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *Amer Jour. of Sociology*, May, 1916.

<sup>44</sup>Data furnished by Dr. F. W. Blackmar, University of Kansas.

ence" at Vassar,<sup>45</sup> and Beloit College<sup>46</sup> established a course in sociology the same year. Giddings, upon being called to Bryn Mawr in 1888, had established courses in what would now be regarded as applied sociology. In 1890 he introduced a graduate course entitled "Modern Theories of Sociology."<sup>47</sup> Loos organized a graduate seminar in the subject at Iowa, following largely in the tradition of Aristotle.<sup>48</sup> Simon N. Patten, going to Pennsylvania as professor of economics in 1888, began to teach courses which were perhaps as truly sociology as economics in content, but the title sociology did not appear in the Pennsylvania catalogue until 1891-1892, when Frederick W. Moore offered a course entitled "Elements of Sociology."<sup>48a</sup> This year, 1891, was even more fruitful than 1890, for John R. Commons introduced a course in sociology at Oberlin<sup>49</sup> and Giddings became lecturer in sociology at Columbia. Samuel G. Smith, minister of a People's Church in St. Paul, was intrusted by the careful regents with the introduction of sociology at the University of Minnesota in this year.<sup>50</sup> Dr. Edward Cummings offered "Principles of Sociology," developed largely from the political science viewpoint, at Harvard in the same year and continued to give the course until he was succeeded by Professor Carver in the teaching of the subject in 1900.<sup>51</sup> Brown University, acting on the initiative of President Andrews, introduced three courses in sociology in 1891-1892, under the direction of Professor George G. Wilson.<sup>52</sup> It was in the spring of this year also that Professor David C. Wells gave his first course in sociology at Bowdoin College.<sup>53</sup>

The growth of sociology in the next few years was somewhat less rapid. However, in 1892 a department was established at Chicago and separate courses in sociology were in-

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<sup>45</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Herbert E. Mills, Vassar College.

<sup>46</sup>Data furnished by Professor L. V. Ballard, Beloit College.

<sup>47</sup>Tolman, p. 814.

<sup>48</sup>Data furnished by Dr. E. B. Reuter.

<sup>48a</sup>Data furnished by Dr. James H. S. Bossard.

<sup>49</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Newell L. Sims, Oberlin College.

<sup>50</sup>Catalogue of the University of Minnesota.

<sup>51</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Thomas Nixon Carver, Harvard University.

<sup>52</sup>Data furnished by Dr. James Q. Dealey, Brown University.

<sup>53</sup>Tolman, p. 824.

stituted at De Pauw University,<sup>54</sup> Dartmouth,<sup>55</sup> Ripon,<sup>56</sup> and Grinnell<sup>57</sup> colleges. In the following year Stanford University introduced four courses: "Statical Sociology," based on Spencer, and "Dynamic Sociology," based on Comte and Ward, by E. A. Ross, and "Social Pathology" and "Charities and Corrections," by Amos G. Warner.<sup>58</sup> Miami University introduced a course on "Pauperism and Charity Organizations" with President W. A. Thompson as teacher. He also gave a course in "Socialism."<sup>59</sup> In this year also sociology was introduced at the University of Illinois in the Department of Economics under the instruction of Dr. David Kinley, now president.<sup>60</sup> Other institutions reporting the introduction of sociology in this year are Auburn Theological Seminary, Smith, Union (Pennsylvania), and Wheaton (Illinois) colleges.<sup>61</sup>

Altogether a total of at least seventeen entries is in evidence for 1894-1895. In this year "Sociology" appears as a senior elective in the Department of History and Political Science at Syracuse University,<sup>62</sup> and Charles H. Cooley introduced his first course at Michigan under the patronage of Henry Carter Adams, an economist of the newer school.<sup>63</sup> In this year also Pennsylvania established work in sociology permanently under Samuel McCune Lindsay,<sup>64</sup> Tulane University,<sup>65</sup> Goucher College (now called),<sup>66</sup> Cotner College,<sup>67</sup> Central

<sup>54</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Lester M. Jones.

<sup>55</sup>Data furnished by Dr. E. B. Woods, Dartmouth College.

<sup>56</sup>Data furnished by Professor A. F. Fehlandt, Ripon College.

<sup>57</sup>Data furnished by Dr. G. P. Wyckoff, Tulane University.

<sup>58</sup>Data furnished by Dr. W. G. Beach, Leland Stanford University, and Dr. E. A. Ross.

<sup>59</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Read Bain, Miami University.

<sup>60</sup>Data furnished by Dr. E. C. Hayes, University of Illinois.

<sup>61</sup>Bernard, pp. 168-73.

<sup>62</sup>Data furnished by Professor Oscar Wesley, Syracuse University.

<sup>63</sup>Data furnished by Dr. C. H. Cooley, University of Michigan.

<sup>64</sup>Tolman, p. 823.

<sup>65</sup>Data furnished by Dr. G. P. Wyckoff; Catalogue of Tulane University.

<sup>66</sup>Data furnished by Dr. T. P. Thomas, and Dr. Ivan McDougale, Goucher College.

<sup>67</sup>*The Cotner Collegian*, Vol. XXVI, No. 5, October 27, 1927, pp. 1, 3.

Pennsylvania College,<sup>68</sup> Bucknell University,<sup>69</sup> Pacific Theological Seminary,<sup>70</sup> Grand Island,<sup>71</sup> Lake Erie,<sup>71</sup> Marietta,<sup>71</sup> Midland,<sup>71</sup> and North-Western<sup>72</sup> colleges and Northwestern University<sup>71</sup> and the University of Utah<sup>73</sup> also initiated courses in this year. This year is also noteworthy as one in which a leading Catholic educational institution, The Catholic University of America, introduced the subject of sociology into its announcements. However, no courses in sociology were actually given at the Catholic University until in 1897 when Dr. William J. Kerby returned from his studies in Europe and began his work.<sup>74</sup> The Tulane course was for graduate students and was given by John R. Ficklen, professor of history. It was entitled "Studies in Sociology" and was based on the works of Spencer, Ward, and Kidd.<sup>65</sup> It appears to have been the first straight course in sociology in the South.

The first course in sociology at the University of Oregon was taught by Dr. Frederic G. Young in 1895.<sup>75</sup> In this year also courses in sociology were introduced at the University of Washington,<sup>76</sup> Montana State College,<sup>77</sup> Alma College,<sup>78</sup> Cedarville College,<sup>79</sup> Lombard College,<sup>80</sup> Meadville Theological Seminary,<sup>80</sup> Missouri Valley College,<sup>80</sup> and Wittenberg College.<sup>81</sup>

Sociology was introduced at the University of North Dakota in the year 1896-1897,<sup>82</sup> and three southern colleges estab-

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<sup>68</sup>Tolman, p. 829.

<sup>69</sup>Data furnished by Dr. D. M. Mann, Bucknell University.

<sup>70</sup>Tolman, p. 831.

<sup>71</sup>Bernard, pp. 168-73.

<sup>72</sup>Data furnished by Professor W. H. Heinmiller, North-Western College.

<sup>73</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Owen F. Beal, University of Utah.

<sup>74</sup>Data furnished by Dr. William J. Kerby, The Catholic University of America.

<sup>75</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Frederic G. Young, University of Oregon.

<sup>76</sup>Bernard, p. 172.

<sup>77</sup>Data furnished by Dr. J. Wheeler Barger, Montana State College.

<sup>78</sup>Bernard, p. 168.

<sup>79</sup>Tolman, p. 829.

<sup>80</sup>Bernard, p. 170.

<sup>81</sup>Data furnished by Dr. C. T. Pihlblad, Wittenberg College.

<sup>82</sup>Data furnished by Dr. John M. Gillette, University of North Dakota.



lished the subject: Baylor University under the title of "Social Science";<sup>83</sup> Asbury College (Kentucky), with the title of "Christian Sociology," using a text by Wilbur F. Crafts;<sup>84</sup> and Hendrix College (Arkansas), with the straight title of "Sociology." In the North and Middle West, the Yale Divinity School,<sup>85</sup> Heidelberg University,<sup>87</sup> Shurtleff College,<sup>88</sup> and Washburn College<sup>89</sup> added courses in sociology this year.

The first course at Ohio State University was called "Sociology and Statistics" and was offered in 1897-1898.<sup>90</sup> In this year also the University of Arkansas introduced two courses in sociology, "Principles of Sociology" and "Problems of Social Growth."<sup>91</sup> Buchtel College<sup>92</sup> (now the University of Akron), Butler University,<sup>93</sup> Centre College of Kentucky,<sup>94</sup> Central University of Iowa,<sup>95</sup> Hope College,<sup>96</sup> Mount Holyoke College,<sup>97</sup> University of South Dakota,<sup>98</sup> West Virginia University,<sup>99</sup> and the Woman's College of Maryland<sup>100</sup> entered the list of institutions offering sociology. This was a total of eleven colleges for this year, the largest number since 1894.

The University of Wisconsin had no course in general sociology until 1898-1899, when B. H. Meyer introduced the somewhat unusual title of "Elements of Sociology, Modern Social Thought and the Psychological Sociologist." However, Professor Ely had given a course entitled "American Charities

<sup>83</sup>Data furnished by Dr. W. P. Meroney, Baylor University.

<sup>84</sup>Data furnished by President W. L. Nocifier, Asbury College.

<sup>85</sup>Data furnished by Professor Theodore Bergen Manny, Hendrix College.

<sup>86</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Jerome Davis, Yale University.

<sup>87</sup>Bernard, p. 169.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>89</sup>Data furnished by Dr. L. A. Halbert, Council of Social Agencies, Kansas City, Mo.

<sup>90</sup>Data furnished by Dr. J.E. Hagerty, Ohio State University.

<sup>91</sup>Data furnished by Professor A. W. Jamison.

<sup>92</sup>Data furnished by Dr. H. B. Hawthorne; also Tolman, p. 829.

<sup>93</sup>Bernard, p. 168.

<sup>94</sup>Tolman, p. 827.

<sup>95</sup>Bernard, p. 168.

<sup>96</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>97</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 173.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*

and Crime" as early as 1895 and Amos Warner and F. H. Wines had offered similar courses sometime previously. In this same year F. G. Sharp and Ely had offered "Social Ethics" and Sharp had a course on "Readings in German Social Philosophy."<sup>101</sup> In the same year New York University scheduled an "Introduction to Sociology"<sup>102</sup> and the Universities of Alabama<sup>103</sup> and Nebraska,<sup>104</sup> and Illinois Wesleyan<sup>105</sup> and Nebraska Wesleyan<sup>106</sup> universities, as well as Eureka College,<sup>107</sup> Susquehanna University,<sup>108</sup> Coe College,<sup>109</sup> and the Theological Seminary of Virginia,<sup>110</sup> introduced the subject. In this year also a half year of sociology was given at Richmond College under the general heading of "Social Science," which it shared with "Political Economy."<sup>111</sup> Sociology had been preceded at Coe College by a course in the "History of Civilization" (based on Guizot) and the "Philosophy of History" (based on Hegel) in 1895-1896 and by "Labor Problems and Christian Socialism" in 1895-1896.<sup>109</sup>

In 1899-1900 G. W. Dyer introduced a course at Vanderbilt University,<sup>112</sup> and seven other institutions, widely scattered over the country, viz., Oxford College,<sup>113</sup> Pacific University,<sup>114</sup> Roanoke College,<sup>114</sup> the State College of Washington,<sup>114</sup> Union Theological Seminary,<sup>114</sup> the University of the Pacific,<sup>115</sup> and Wofford College,<sup>116</sup> began instruction in the subject.

<sup>101</sup>Data furnished by Dr. E. A. Ross, University of Wisconsin.

<sup>102</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Rudolph M. Binder, New York University.

<sup>103</sup>Tolman, p. 826.

<sup>104</sup>Data furnished by Dr. George Elliott Howard, University of Nebraska.

<sup>105</sup>Bernard, p. 169.

<sup>106</sup>Data furnished by Professor E. Glenn Callen, Nebraska Wesleyan University.

<sup>107</sup>Bernard, p. 169.

<sup>108</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>109</sup>Data furnished by Dr. L. E. Garwood, Coe College.

<sup>110</sup>Tolman, p. 831.

<sup>111</sup>Data furnished by Professor Rolvix Harlan, Richmond College.

<sup>112</sup>Data furnished by Dr. E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University.

<sup>113</sup>Tolman, p. 830.

<sup>114</sup>Bernard, p. 171.

<sup>115</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>116</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 173.

In 1900 Charles A. Ellwood established a department at Missouri.<sup>117</sup> In the year of 1900-1901 sociology was also introduced at Central University of Kentucky,<sup>118</sup> Cornell College,<sup>119</sup> Franklin and Marshall College,<sup>120</sup> Tabor College,<sup>121</sup> Adelphi College,<sup>122</sup> Dickinson College,<sup>123</sup> John B. Stetson University,<sup>124</sup> Washburn College,<sup>125</sup> and Florida State College.<sup>126</sup> In this last institution the professor was almost a faculty, for his title read "Professor of Biology, Chemistry, Sociology, and Experimental Psychology."<sup>126</sup> The number of institutions introducing sociology each year in the period between 1889 and 1900 is as follows: 2 in 1889, 4 in 1890, 6 in 1891, 5 in 1892, 7 in 1893, 17 in 1894, 9 in 1895, 8 in 1896, 11 in 1897, 11 in 1898, 8 in 1899, and 10 in 1900—a grand total of 97 in twelve years.

The first separate department of sociology was, of course, that established in 1892 at the University of Chicago. This soon grew into two nominally separate departments in the same university, one in sociology proper under the headship of Professor Small and the other in Ecclesiastical Sociology, in the University of Chicago Divinity School, under the administration of Dr. Charles R. Henderson.<sup>127</sup> The department at Columbia was founded in 1894,<sup>127</sup> and that at Missouri in 1900.<sup>128</sup> A department in Applied Christianity, which was really Christian Sociology, was established at Grinnell College, under Dr. George D. Herron, in 1894.<sup>129</sup> After 1900 the number of separate departments of sociology increased somewhat

<sup>117</sup>Data furnished by Dr. C. A. Ellwood, University of Missouri.

<sup>118</sup>Bernard, p. 168.

<sup>119</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>120</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>122</sup>Tolman, p. 828.

<sup>123</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 829.

<sup>124</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 827.

<sup>125</sup>Bernard, p. 172.

<sup>126</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Raymond Flavius Bellamy, Florida State College.

<sup>127</sup>A. W. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, May, 1916.

<sup>128</sup>Data furnished by Dr. C. A. Ellwood.

<sup>129</sup>Data furnished by Dr. G. P. Wyckoff.

more rapidly. In 1909, nineteen institutions reported separate departments of sociology.<sup>130</sup>

Sociology came later, on the whole, to the southern than to the northern college and university curricula. I have here records of only seventeen southern institutions offering courses by 1900 and no record of a separate department. Texas Christian University, then located in the same city as Baylor University (Waco), introduced a course in General Sociology in 1901, with W. L. Ross as teacher.<sup>131</sup> Tulane University re-established the subject after a lapse<sup>132</sup> and Leland University (colored)<sup>133</sup> and Ouachita College<sup>134</sup> established it for the first time in this year. Millsaps College introduced a course in 1902,<sup>135</sup> Louisiana State University,<sup>136</sup> and Wake Forest College<sup>137</sup> followed in 1903. In 1904 George A. Bucklin taught two courses at the University of Oklahoma, one being "Elements of Sociology" and the other "Practical Social Problems."<sup>138</sup> In this year a course was also introduced at the University of Chattanooga.<sup>139</sup> In 1905 three southern state universities added sociology to their curricula. One of these was the University of South Carolina.<sup>140</sup> Sociology, under another name, was probably first introduced at the University of Texas in 1905, when Dr. Lindley M. Keasbey became chairman of the School of Institutional History.<sup>141</sup> Sociology has been taught at the University of Florida since the founding of that institution in 1905.<sup>142</sup> In that year Dr. David Y. Thomas went to Florida from Hendrix College, where he had formerly taught the subject. In 1906 a separate department was established at the University of Oklahoma under the direction of Professor

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<sup>130</sup>Bernard, pp. 168-73.

<sup>131</sup>Data furnished by Professor Paul Baker, Texas Christian University.

<sup>132</sup>Bernard, p. 171.

<sup>133</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>134</sup>Tolman, p. 826.

<sup>135</sup>Bernard, p. 170.

<sup>136</sup>*Ibid.*; Catalogues.

<sup>137</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>138</sup>Data furnished by Dr. J. J. Rhyne, University of Oklahoma.

<sup>139</sup>Bernard, p. 172.

<sup>140</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>141</sup>Data furnished by Professor E. T. Thompson, University of Texas.

<sup>142</sup>Data furnished by Dr. L. M. Bristol, University of Florida.



Dowd, who had been at Wisconsin. In this latter year a course on "Educational Sociology" was established at the University of Virginia, and was the first course in that institution to bear the name sociology, although the subject had been taught for several years.<sup>143</sup> In the year 1908 sociology was added to the curriculum at the University of Mississippi and a separate department was established in 1927 under the chairmanship of N. B. Bond.<sup>144</sup> Sociology was also introduced at the Mississippi A. and M. College in this year by Professor D. C. Hull,<sup>145</sup> and at Carson and Newman College,<sup>146</sup> Maryville College,<sup>147</sup> and the State University of Kentucky.<sup>148</sup> The University of Georgia followed in 1909.<sup>149</sup>

One of the most interesting facts about this movement of 1890 is that it was not preconcerted. There was no national meeting or correspondence to promote the offering of courses. I have no incontrovertible evidence that it was in any definite or tangible way connected with the revolt of the new German trained economists and historians, with the social viewpoint, against the older classical economists and historians, which occurred about the same time; but I have no doubt that the movement received much moral support from this revolt. The way of thinking which led to the establishment of sociology in the universities was simply "in the air," so to speak. The various more or less sociological movements which I have already recorded, the growth and popularization of the great British scientific movement from about 1860 onward, the publications of Spencer, Ward, Morgan, and Fiske, and perhaps above all the spirit of the returning doctors from the German universities, who brought with them the ferment of the new social science humanism, made the adoption of sociology inevitable. My correspondents, writing even at this late date of the early establishment of sociology in their universities, betray the fact that they knew nothing of what was going on

<sup>143</sup>Data furnished by Dr. F. N. House.

<sup>144</sup>Data furnished by Dr. N. B. Bond, University of Mississippi.

<sup>145</sup>Data furnished by Dr. Alfred Benjamin Butts, Mississippi A. and M. College.

<sup>146</sup>Bernard, p. 168.

<sup>147</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>148</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>149</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 172.

in other universities at the time. Small, in his *Fifty Years of Sociology*, published in 1916, shows that he had no conception of the breadth and extent of the movement at the time he was founding his department. Sociology as a formal subject was simply a general response to the demands of the thought of the times for greater completeness and richness, just as the earlier practical movements had come in response to the demand for completer and richer living and for a larger humanitarian element in religion.

The growth of sociology in the universities after 1892 was slow for more than two decades. There were many reasons for this tardy development. One of these was that, almost immediately after its establishment it got itself into jurisdictional disputes. The older social sciences and the classics had never been especially friendly and they were perhaps somewhat critical of the sociological pedigree. They even twitted the sociologists with their hybrid name, derived from both the Greek and the Latin. As late as 1909 an economist wrote me that he had little use for the subject, doubting even if there was such a thing, stating as evidence the fact of its hybrid origin.<sup>150</sup> Others accused it of being a sort of bastard descendent of the philosophy of history. Others still were content to say, of philosophy and theology and leave off the history. Almost everywhere it was regarded as being largely up in the clouds, and, however contradictory some of the accusations may appear to us now, it was said that sociology was a hodge-podge, that it was reformist and propagandist, that it was abstract and metaphysical, that it was taught by ex-preachers, that it had the illusion of a messiahship, that it was anti-religious, cynical, destructive, etc. Perhaps it was all of these things, in different places; for, as has been said above, it was a rather spontaneous response to the needs of the times and lacked organization and standardization. It had no trained teaching personnel, but was compelled to draw its professors from all sorts of men and prepossessions.

In the nineties the sociologists were themselves much puzzled as to how they should define their subject. Some believed it was a sort of general discipline, including all the other

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<sup>150</sup>Professor Metcalf, Tufts College.

social sciences as special phases. This view, of course, stimulated further the antagonism and fears of the other social sciences. Other professors were content to think of sociology as a sort of philosophy of the social sciences, holding that it brought together and generalized the findings of all social sciences whatever. This view regarded such subjects as criminology, philanthropy, demography, etc. as special social sciences, like economics and politics, which were associated administratively with sociology only by accident. It held that the only real sociology was general or theoretical sociology, and there was much speculation among these people as to whether social psychology was sociology or a separate subject. Some even began to hold that sociology was really social psychology, or psychological sociology, as they then called it, and this viewpoint still has its adherents among those who have descended from the viewpoint of the cult of the philosophy of the social sciences. Small, who passed through these stages of thinking, came about 1910 to hold that probably sociology itself would ultimately pass out of existence, when it had fulfilled its mission of harmonizing and correlating the work of the other social sciences.<sup>151</sup>

Both of these theories looked to the other social sciences a good deal like a threat at a dictatorship by sociology and the late nineties and the first few years of the new century were filled with controversies between sociologists and their brethren. It is interesting to note, however, that as soon as the sociologists got down to work at some tangible problems, instead of spending their time theorizing and writing controversial articles about the place and justification of sociology, this bitterness died down, and today little or nothing is heard of it. There are, let us hope, only a few sociologists, economists, political scientists, etc. left today who believe that there are any natural provinces for any of the social sciences. Their scope or field is a matter of historical growth and determination and has been fixed by such accidents as the interests of the promoters, administrative convenience or necessity, the neglect of other departments, the existence of problems unsolved, and the like. All of the social sciences now overlap and there is constant interflow and interchange of subject

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<sup>151</sup>A. W. Small, *The Meaning of Social Science*, 1910.

matter between them. What is sociology in one department may be economics, history, political science, philosophy, or ethics in another. The belief that the sciences have natural and absolute domains of their own is a relic of the old metaphysical theory of natural law, which held that the universe had a ready-made code which the scientist merely deciphered, and that this code was divided into certain subdivisions or chapters, each of which must be deciphered by a specialist in a particular science. We now realize that all scientific laws are relative and that they are constructed by the scientists themselves as formulas designed to give perspective to their world of phenomena, and that the scientists constantly revise these laws as their perspective changes, and vice versa. The sociologists have been among the first to see this fact, which is somewhat to their credit. In keeping with this fact, the workers in all of the social sciences have labored in whatever field they have found problems worth solving. In looking over a list of the doctoral dissertations in the several social science departments of a great university covering the last thirty-five years one frequently cannot decide from the titles alone in what department the candidates did their work.

From the beginning there has been in sociology, as in every other social science, perhaps in all sciences, two great lines of interest—the theoretical and the applied. In the early days practically all of the sociologists had strong humanitarian interests, and they did not always separate their wishes from their knowledge. The views of the theoretical sociologists were strongly colored by their humanitarian motivation. Ward's central idea was the promotion of social progress through scientific discovery and education. In his early days Small dabbled persistently in civic reform activities and taught courses on reform movements. He never lost his interest in the struggle for social betterment. Giddings' first teaching overlapped this applicational field and the motivation which led him into sociology probably came from humanitarian stimuli received through journalism and his contacts with Carroll D. Wright. He also has not yet become wholly a theoretical sociologist, in the same sense in which a chemist or physicist disregards the practical applications of his subject to such civic problems as bridge building and sewage disposal for the sake of his theoretical investigations. The



same may be said of practically all of the older sociologists. Only the newer generation of sociologists has in a considerable measure so specialized itself in teaching and investigation that it leaves to the legislator and the social worker the task of making the world better, while it provides, or offers to provide, these apostles of the common welfare with the data with which to do their job.

But it is interesting to note that neither the public nor the social worker is ordinarily much in sympathy with this division of labor, now so well recognized as existing between the physicist and the construction engineer, or the bacteriologist and the public health official. Perhaps this is due in part to the history of sociology and in part to the fact that it deals so intimately and directly, instead of remotely, with human adjustment problems. Many, if not most, of the early sociologists were ministers and probably were led into sociology because of their humanitarian interests. Sumner, Small, Henderson, S. G. Smith, Hayes, Studeenberg were among these. Others, like Ward, Cooley, Veblen, Patten, Ellwood, Vincent, and Dealey had something of the transcendentalist or other religio-reformist background. Only a few, like Giddings, Blackmar, Weatherly, Ross, and Thomas, seem to have been led on by more intellectual motives, and in some cases the humanitarian impulse was strong even here.

But, however paradoxical it may seem, sociology in the nineties was accused of being unduly theoretical, abstract, even vague. This was largely due to the fact that the holders of academic positions were largely engaged in controversy incident to the problem of justifying their existence to a fairly hostile academic world. But it was also in part the result of the fact that many of the early sociologists had been trained in philosophy and theology and were more familiar with the manipulation of words and concepts than they were with the topography and logic of concrete facts. To be sure such practical sociologists as Warner, Wines, Henderson, and Barrows, inside and outside of universities, were producing practical work excellent for their time. But most of the literature was largely conceptual. Before the end of the century the influence of Spencer had largely passed. His organic analogy had proved to be the sword upon which he fell and then his anthropological generalizations finished him.

Ward's theory of the social forces and psychic factors was his great stumbling block. Toward the end of the nineties the French sociologists, particularly Tarde, LeBon, and Durkheim, had a great vogue with most American sociologists, especially with those in whom the neo-Hegelian tradition was strong. Among some of our breed their concepts still linger as sweet music. But for the most part we have passed into a new era, that of direct investigation, in which borrowing from abroad and from the past is at a minimum. Some of us still cling to the social forces and psychic factors theories in the form of instincts, interests, or wishes, but this line of attack is really as dead as the traditional door nail, and only inertia, courtesy, poor logic, or senescence prevents us from perceiving the fact. We are now more interested in building up a science of facts than a philosophy of concepts, and the way to achieve our objective is through research. And, as sociologists, we know this.

This need to do original investigation instead of being content with logical or pious speculation was apparent to the older group of sociologists, even in the nineties. The trouble was that most of them were not trained in its methods and did not know how to carry it on. However, it is interesting that practically all of them made some sort of a stab at it in some sort of way or other. After the jurisdictional disputes died down somewhat the great watchword with the theoretical sociologists was "methodology." The word was, perhaps, sweetest as a morsel in the mouth of Small, to whom it apparently meant two things: (1) Dividing up the field of social science, among the several social sciences, for working purposes, and (2) collecting a vast number of sociological concepts to serve as pigeonholes for the storage of facts.<sup>152</sup> I doubt if Small ever had any very adequate notion of how to go about gathering the facts that were to be pigeonholed, unless indeed it was to take them from the books of other writers. His contempt for statistical methods was equalled only by his ignorance of this phase of methodology. The bias against statistics has been one of the traditions at Chicago, which only now seems in the way of being overcome. Small's notion of methodology was, therefore, logical rather than technological.

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<sup>152</sup>See *The Meaning of Social Science*.

Giddings was also much interested in concepts in the middle of the late nineties, as his books published at that time amply demonstrate. His *Inductive Sociology*, published in 1901, may be regarded as an attempt at the statement of a system of logical method for sociology. Its failure to secure a considerable following was in keeping with the trends away from this type of methodology. Giddings was not unacquainted with statistical methods and his subsequent publications have shown an increasing emphasis upon this method of investigation.

A somewhat similar attack upon methodology was the struggle to discover social laws which would be of comparable validity with those of the exact sciences. Giddings' *Elements of Sociology* (1898) bristled with such laws, and Ross, in his *Foundations of Sociology* (1905), summarized the tendency and stated its most significant results. This venture in methodology was doubtless a worthy one, but its sponsors were attempting to make bricks without straw. The laboratory method of the exact sciences could not be used in social investigation and they had not yet accumulated sufficient data for formal statistical generalization, the only other source from which social laws can be adequately induced. They were actually making their social laws either by analogy with those of other sciences or by informal statistical generalization, which is always a dangerous procedure. Small rightly characterized this process as "impressionistic conceptualism." There are still some belated attempts in sociology to take seriously the making of concepts and of social laws, but most sociologists are now persuaded that if they get the facts the concepts and laws will take care of themselves. This does not, of course, mean that storage concepts do not have their uses: but they also have their dangers, when they become fetishes and shibboleths and ritual.

The earliest fruitful methods used by sociologists were perhaps the historical and the statistical. Warner's *American Charities* (1895) and Wines' *Punishment and Reformation* (1895) were two very able examples of the use of these methods in combination. Henderson made more use of the historical than of the statistical method, but he was not averse to the latter. Mayo-Smith and Carroll D. Wright did excellent work for their day with simple statistical methodology.

Wright's *Practical Sociology* (1899) was a very serious attempt at the use of induction as a basis for sociology. The very complexity and the relative scarcity of social data in most fields of behavior has up to the present time rendered the application of this method, in its more complex phases, less productive than we may ultimately expect to find it and than it has already become in some phases of economics and public health. But it is steadily growing in use and in refinement of technique and is not being abandoned.

The most fruitful recent developments in the technique or methodology of investigation have been the case method and the survey. The survey is really a community or social case method, while the ordinary application of the term case is to the analysis of the behavior of an individual in some definite situation. A third meaning of the term case is the selection of an illustrative example of behavior or condition from documents, descriptive records, literature, art, etc. The traditional method of utilizing the case has been to select those cases which would illustrate a hypothesis already held by the writer and thus increase its acceptability to others by the principles of volume and continuity of suggestion. This is a method as old as history and older, and cannot be called scientific. Another method, as old as Herodotus and Aristotle, the theory of which was set forth by Vico early in the eighteenth century (although he did not mention it by name), is to fill the mind with a great many cases and then by a process of informal statistical generalization, or by analogy, to construct a hypothesis, which may be further tested by the consideration of new cases. This method is inductive, but so far its application has been limited to informal statistics, as it must be until a vast number of cases can be collected for formal statistical generalization. Of course the case method can also be used in the collection of materials for the testing of hypotheses already formed, whether by the speculative thinker (on the basis of informal statistics or by analogy) or in traditions, beliefs, etc.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>153</sup>For a more detailed discussion of these methods as employed in sociology, see "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist*, April, 1928.



The survey method in particular also goes far back in history. We recall how David was punished for making an investigation into the numerical strength of his kingdom. William the Conqueror used it as a method of punishing others. John Stow wrote a book on the survey of London in the seventeenth century. Practically all of the statistical work in sociology in the nineties was based on the United States census and state and local government and institutional reports, with all the limitations incident to the use of such sources. Late in the nineties and early in the present century Henderson's students in Chicago began to study local areas and specialized groups in the great city. I suppose the work of Booth, Rowntree and others had influenced him, for he often spoke with appreciation of their methods and urged his students to imitate them. This was the beginning of the use of the survey for purposes of sociological generalization, which has become so characteristic of the department at Chicago and which Henderson's former students have greatly refined as to procedure in recent years. No doubt the academic use of the survey method was also much stimulated by its application in the first decade of the century by various civic associations, by departments of city governments (especially in Cleveland, Ohio), and by various church bodies, and by the Russell Sage Foundation, and later by other foundations and civic organizations.

The use of the case method in connection with anthropological materials was first employed extensively in this country by Sumner and Thomas. As a method of sociological investigation it had one great defect, that since the data were taken from primitive peoples the conclusions did not always apply to our own social order. Outside of the Yale school and a few anthropologists this method is no longer used largely. Thomas brought the method over to the utilization of contemporaneous data and placed it on a much firmer foundation, especially in his *Polish Peasant* and later studies. Cooley and Baldwin, although not the originators of the individual case method, made good use of it in the study of their own children for purposes of psychological generalization regarding the development of personality in the psycho-social environment. The various social service agencies particularly have developed

the case record to a high degree of perfection, and the academic departments of sociology, taking a leaf out of their book, have improved the method of case analysis and recording for purposes of sociological generalization. The department at Chicago, following the example of Thomas and of the social service agencies, has led in the development of this method as in the academic use of the survey. These methods are now being employed by sociological investigators throughout the country to supplement statistical investigation. Recent grants of funds from research institutions have made the rapid development of all these methods of investigation a reality.

One other method, which may be characterized as the use of the social case method on a vast scale, is the extensive observational method, most conspicuously developed by Ross. While there are well known dangers incident to the use of such a method, it also has certain values. It is the only procedure yet devised for getting a concrete sociological picture of a whole people.

In recent years there has been a very rapid growth of sociology in our educational institutions, but in no sense an unsound one. This, and the distribution of research funds, have in some cases changed the earlier ranking among the departments of sociology. For a long while the departments at Columbia and Chicago stood out preëminently. In the main they have stood, since 1900, for relatively distinct types of sociological investigation. Columbia has emphasized the more general types of studies, especially the historical and statistical; while the tendency at Chicago has been toward detailed analyses and interpretations of local social situations, following the early lead of Henderson and Thomas. The students of the two universities who have become heads of other departments have largely perpetuated this dichotomy, although the division is by no means absolute.

The recent decline of Columbia has left Chicago temporarily in the ascendancy. But departments in other universities have been growing. North Carolina particularly has come to the front in the South. Wisconsin has long been known as the third department in the country. The universities of Pennsylvania, Southern California, Washington, and Michigan, and Ohio State University, have recently shown a tendency to growth both in insight and in power. In the South, besides

North Carolina, Vanderbilt, Tulane, Oklahoma, Virginia, Texas, Baylor, and Mississippi are showing renewed strength and development in sociology. Growth in teaching and investigational personnel and in enrollment has been marked in all of these institutions.

One final development in recent years, which I think has been of considerable importance as a trend in sociology, has been the separation of social technology from sociology proper. The growth of training schools for social workers has not only provided better technical preparation for social work, but it has also enabled the departments of sociology to concentrate more adequately upon investigation as a means to the development of a science of sociology comparable to the other sciences. To a considerable degree sociological investigation must be free from the immediately practical or applied motive, just as is the case with investigation in the field of physics, if the findings are ultimately to be of the greatest value for purposes of application and social control.

## MR. BALDWIN'S SECOND MINISTRY

BY WILLIAM THOMAS MORGAN

*Indiana University*

The stolid Englishman is becoming thoroughly pessimistic. In the Far East China is in revolt against British imperialism, and Japan has never been entirely cordial since the Washington Conference; India boycotted the Parliamentary commission sent from Westminster to study the existing government, and Egypt is chafing under British authority; Downing Street is much perturbed at the decline of English economic influence in Russia and Hispanic America; Anglo-American relations are perplexing. At home the Briton finds more than a million constantly out of work, with six of the leading industries in a languishing state; while the Government spends close to a million a week for poor relief, the British people squander an equal amount each working day for liquor. Were the premier less philosophic in temperament, he might well exclaim with the mercurial Dane,

"The time is out of joint; O cursed spite,  
That ever I was born to set it right."

Norman Angel has stressed the indecisiveness of modern wars, and raised the question whether in the end the conqueror might not suffer quite as much as the vanquished. For seven years after Waterloo, England passed through a severe industrial depression, during which period political reaction probably reached its greatest heights in British history. For more than a year after the armistice, Britain appeared to prosper. Then came the speedy collapse with its terrible specter of unemployment upon an unprecedented scale; unemployment even for those heroes who fought to make the world safe from autocracy; unemployment that has continued with slight abatement until today, and has been accompanied by social degradation, for as Carlyle has so aptly said, a "man willing to work, and unable to find work, is, perhaps, the saddest sight that fortune's inequality exhibits under the sun."



As a result of these conditions, the organ of the radical Laborites asks with some asperity whether England did not win the war only to lose the peace.

Few periods in all English history have been sadder than this third decade of the twentieth century. For the laborer the year 1927 began in a feeling of absolute despair, tinged with sullenness; he was bitterly disillusioned by the profound depression accompanying the collapse of the general strike and the miners' strike. The year ended in a holiday season of such acute physical discomfort as the English have rarely experienced, when it seemed that the very planets in their course were conspiring against the British poor.

Why should such long continued industrial depression as cannot, perhaps, be paralleled elsewhere among the greater European powers, continue in Merrie England a decade after the war? It is a depression, moreover, which stands in such marked contrast to American prosperity as to invite the envy of British labor, whose feelings have been strengthened by serious diplomatic muddling on the part of English and American authorities. Many factors unquestionably entered into producing the present economic crisis. Experts will differ quite as much among themselves in assigning importance to these factors as they have in determining who began or won the war, for as George Eliot has remarked there would be two opinions about a cracked bell if the bell could hear itself. The loss of world markets must be placed among the first of the causes for England's plight. Few people realize the extent to which the United States has displaced England as the world financier, and monopolized the markets of Hispanic America. British economic experts know, but they are whistling to keep up their courage. Commerce is, indeed, the life blood of their nation, but few people have sensed the magnitude of the income British capitalists drew before the war from foreign investments, which were largely disposed of during the exigencies of the world conflict.

The serious loss of their world markets and so many of their foreign investments was aggravated by the insolvency of many of their former customers, and by a falling exchange upon the Continent at the moment Great Britain was making arrangement to pay her debt to the United States. Making

it possible for the pound to look the dollar in the face so increased the cost of production that British traders found it exceedingly difficult, because of a generally depreciated currency, to compete in the markets of the world. With the United States, alone, could they have competed on equal terms; but here they encountered an obstacle of Himalayan proportions in the American tariff—protective in theory, but largely prohibitive in practice.

Influential as all these factors have been in producing the industrial crisis, part of the responsibility for its seriousness and long continuance must rest with the British ministry, which has displayed few signs of constructive leadership since the armistice. For a season thereafter, a natural optimism in the allied countries was strengthened by the obvious signs of prosperity. When the Utopian picture began to fade, Lloyd George, the Coalition prime minister, found himself embarrassed by the overwhelming majority presented to him in the Victory Election of 1918, and by the factious attitude of the wilder men among the "Die Hard" Conservatives. An economic depression and a diplomatic crisis in the Near East disclosed the fact that the inimitable Welshman had few loyal followers who would assist him in carrying out the more reasonable half of his electoral slogan to "make England a land fit for heroes." A reorganized Conservative party forced him out, and in the ensuing election the Liberals, badly rent by internal strife between the Asquith and Lloyd George factions, fell off so badly that a rejuvenated Labor party became for the first time "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition."

The Conservatives, having won a decisive victory, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, who had arranged for the payment of the English debt to America, became prime minister after ill health forced Mr. Bonar Law to resign. Economic conditions steadily grew worse, and diplomatic relations with France developed into one crisis after another until the inexperienced premier, sensing perhaps something of his own futility, appealed to the country on the issues of imperial preference and moderate protection. The results were disastrous to his party, which found itself outnumbered in the Commons by the combined force of Liberals and Laborites, who forced Mr. Baldwin's resignation, and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald formed the first Labor government in the history of Great Britain.

During his ten months of office, in which he was dependent upon the Liberals for his majority, Mr. MacDonald was able to do little to alleviate the terrible gloom which was settling down over British affairs both foreign and domestic. He did something to improve relations with France and Russia, but he had slight success in lessening the number of the unemployed, although he did settle an epidemic of strikes without bringing the laboring classes to the apathy of despair. The Zinoviev letter precipitated an election in the autumn of 1924, which returned the Conservatives to power with more than two hundred majority over both their rivals, but left the Laborites nearly four times as numerous in the Commons as the Liberals now reunited, although perhaps not happily, under their two leaders.

## II

Mr. Baldwin returned to 10 Downing Street a disillusioned, if not a wiser man. For more than three years he has controlled the destinies of the English people, backed by so large a majority as to render futile any real opposition on the part of the Liberals and Laborites. What has he to his credit? Probably very little, except a reputation for unbroken calm, which may soon give way to one for "muddling through." Diplomatic relations with France have somewhat improved, but Japan remains quite cool; trade relations with Russia are thoroughly unsatisfactory; Anglo-American relations are certainly not what they used to be, and seemed for a time headed toward a crisis over naval disarmament, from which the ministry has been saved, it seems, by the sweet reasonableness of the American Senate.

The record of the Government in domestic affairs is still worse. Unemployment has for the past four years remained practically stationary at something over a million. Mr. Baldwin has failed to treat unemployment as a serious national problem, unless perchance it was in the election canvass of 1923, in which the response was distinctly discouraging to so timid a statesman. At any rate he has not since essayed any constructive policy to remedy this curse of England, which threatens to become chronic. His ministry has steadfastly

refused to face the seriousness of an indefinite continuance of the dole. To the layman, it seems at least practicable to utilize a small portion of the vast army of the unemployed to inaugurate a modest scheme for internal improvements, such as the construction of motor highways, improved dock facilities, electrification of the railways, an extension of the scheme of small allotments, and the clearing of the most disgraceful slum areas by the erection of decent homes which the laboring classes can afford to rent.

It is particularly puzzling to understand why it has been found impossible to utilize some of the labor of the unemployed to construct houses for their own class, who so badly need them. The Government has, to be sure, emphasized the hostility of the trades unions toward any endeavor to construct even workingmen's cottages with unskilled labor. The unions under such conditions might have been compelled to listen to reason. The time, moreover, has been more than ample to train skilled men for the building trades instead of permitting them to eat their hearts out in enforced idleness. Neither has the ministry seriously attempted to curb the excessive profits of contractors and distributors of building materials. It boasts of the construction of the millionth house under the system of government subsidies, but it has never clearly specified how many were actually for rent, and how few even of these were sufficiently inexpensive to be rented by the laborers in the slum areas. It is generally known, however, that the majority of the houses built prior to 1924 were for sale rather than for rent, and that a large proportion of those most recently constructed are far too expensive for the slim pocket-books of the day laborers. The lowest paid workers and the jobless, therefore, must continue to live in the slums, many of them, indeed, in basements, as became evident when some fifteen were drowned like rats in their sub-cellar bedrooms in London suburbs when the Thames suddenly overflowed its banks during the frightful floods of the Christmas time.

Despite the continuance of widespread unemployment, Mr. Winston Churchill insists that more people are employed in England today than in 1914, but that the kingdom has now some three-quarters of a million more workers. This last statement suggests that inexorable economic pressure has



forced into the ranks of the wage earners no inconsiderable per cent of what used to be termed the leisure class. In the face of the great unleavened mass of the unemployed, the ministry is allowing the school system to pour into the labor market every year close to half a million boys and girls over 14, who either drive older persons out of positions or themselves in time become the recipients of the dole. There are, in fact, many young men of 21 in England who have never learned to work because they have been unable to find a job. Labor pleads for raising the age of compulsory school attendance to 16, but the Secretary of the Board of Education vetoed the suggestion because it would cost £8,000,000 a year for the first few years, considering it better, presumably, to pay out this amount in doles than for education! Nothing, perhaps, more clearly reveals the average Englishman's distrust of mass education, which stands in such sharp contrast to the implicit faith of the average American, who thinks it a general solvent or sovereign specific for all the ills of social and political life. The middle class Englishman of the twentieth century still accepts Pope's dictum of the eighteenth,

"A little learning is a dangerous thing;  
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring."

Meanwhile the vicious circle continues to operate, steadily producing more recipients of the dole—all in the sacred name of economy. With the labor market overcrowded, it would seem that the least the ministry could do for these young people would be to train them adequately for spheres of influence as emigrants in the greater England beyond the seas.

During the last year, the Baldwin ministry has passed three important measures: the Trade Disputes Act, the Unemployment Insurance Act, and the one granting the franchise to women between the ages of 21 and 30. Although the objective in each case seems eminently desirable, the method of doing it seems almost to be inspired with a desire of creating a maximum of resentment. The Conservatives were obliged to pass some remedial legislation to protect society from the dangers of a general strike in the future; it was politically necessary, perhaps, for Mr. Baldwin to throw a sop to the Die Hards in the form of a law limiting the political activity of trades

unions, but it would have been better to do this after a thorough discussion with the trades unionists themselves, and perhaps upon the basis of suggestions from their leaders. Passed as it was without consulting them, they accepted it as a gage of class warfare, and it has had the effect of cementing the wide differences among the diverse following of Mr. MacDonald.

This act may actually produce a Liberal-Labor combination to fight the coming elections. Some regulation of the political activities of trades unions was unquestionably needed, but it was scarcely necessary to antagonize the very class which in the end should benefit most by it. The measure may well be a "lighthouse erected by men of vision," as one writer terms it, but it will be very difficult to convince labor that a law drafted without its knowledge or approval, and forced through the Commons without adequate consideration, can have much virtue in it.

The Unemployment Insurance Act likewise had behind it the best of intentions. Some drastic changes in the system of doles was manifestly imperative, unless the Government wished to encourage pauperism, but the importance of the measure demanded far more careful consideration than it received before being presented before the Commons. It was certainly highly desirable that more of the responsibility for the support of the unemployed should be taken out of the hands of the local authorities. Local control was not lessened by the bill, which was more concerned with petty economies than with really constructive reforms. By cutting practically in half the benefits to young unmarried persons, it was hoped to save nearly two million sterling every year. Something of economy appeared indispensable, moreover, as close to half a million men over 65, together with their wives if they, too, had reached that age, became eligible at the beginning of this year for a weekly pension of ten shillings. This would involve an outlay of nearly twelve million pounds a year, although some Conservatives expected some relief from unemployment, believing that many over 65, with their little pension coming in, would cease work.

However worthy these two measures may be, they have been accepted as concrete evidence that the Die Hard contingent is in the saddle, and is interested only in grinding the faces of

the poor. Politically, at any rate, it seems unwise to antagonize those who hold the balance of power at the polls. Certainly it is unsafe, decidedly unsafe, for any but a thoroughly united party to attempt this, and it is abundantly evident that the Conservatives are not united; in truth many have questioned whether Mr. Baldwin is master of his own household in these later days.

The passage of the measure enfranchising women from 21 to 30, showed much uncertainty among the Conservatives. The premier apparently committed his party to the measure without sensing the bitter opposition it would encounter from the irrepressible *Die Hards*. Almost at once some of the more popular periodicals began to refer to the "flapper franchise," and the powerful syndicate controlled by Lord Rothermere emphasized the danger of further diluting the electorate with more than five million young women before the nation had been able to educate politically the vast unleavened lump enfranchised in 1918. Attention was also called to the fact that such an addition to the electorate would cause the women to outnumber the men in 70 per cent of the constituencies; that whereas the men now outnumbered the enfranchised by three million, this new measure would give the women a majority of two million votes. Lord Rothermere demanded a reconsideration of the measure, which led to recriminations between the editor and premier, in which the latter for once lost something of his poise, giving the former an excellent opportunity to score at his expense. For a while glorious uncertainty existed in the Conservative ranks over this bill, but at last women have been granted the suffrage upon exactly the same basis as men, although until the end the *Die Hards* hoped against hope that the House of Lords might defeat the measure.

The budget of 1928 might also be ranked as one of the major accomplishments of the Conservatives in the past year, for in it Mr. Churchill has apparently tried to emulate his great rival, Lloyd George, whose budget he has apparently followed to the extent of trying to shift the burden of taxation from the shoulders of the active producers of wealth, and at the same time transfer some of the responsibility for the relief of unemployment from the local to the central authorities. It is at least a serious endeavor to stimulate decaying industries

and end the intolerable burden of unemployment. In the face of so aggravated economic conditions, it is too early to pass judgment upon the measure, but it is clear that Mr. Churchill has attacked these problems boldly.

### III

While the trades disputes and franchise bills were before the Commons, it was obvious that the party leaders had not been able to agree. Nevertheless, they were thrown into the legislative hopper to be threshed out. Those in charge of the former measure seemed at times hopelessly incompetent to guide it through the Commons in the face of the embattled Laborites, and were soon compelled to take refuge in cloture. Although the party was more or less committed to the reform of the House of Lords, as it has been in fact ever since 1911, a poorly prepared measure was unexpectedly sprung upon an alarmed house. Even the ministry did not appear to be of one mind in the matter, and the bill encountered a perfect storm of opposition, even from the Conservative ranks. Seventy members of the House of Lords protested so vigorously against proceeding with the reform until the party could unite upon a more satisfactory measure, that the measure seems to have perished. Yet the reform of the upper house is eminently desirable in the face of the fact that 22 per cent of that body never attend and 21 per cent do practically all the work.

The same unfortunate nervousness appeared in Mr. Baldwin's management of the coal strike. His political enemies insist that had he handled this properly, the general strike would never have occurred. Seemingly things slipped from his grasp during the early days of the coal strike, and occasionally after that. The miners will believe to the end of time that he played them false, and that he was primarily concerned in protecting the financial interests of the coal operators, a suspicion which is measurably strengthened by his later failure to insist upon a fundamental reorganization of the industry, which anyone familiar with the coal trade realizes that it badly needs. Foremost among the employers with a vision for the future is Sir Alfred Mond (just elevated to



the peerage as Lord Melchett), who has brought forward concrete suggestions for improving the conditions of industry. His suggestions have fallen upon deaf ears.

The same blissful state of uncertainty pervades other fields. For a score of years the Prayer Book of the Established Church has been undergoing revision. Last December the revision was completed, and the Conservative Party in general believed that it would be sanctioned by Parliament without any difficulty. Although it passed the Lords, it was thrown out by the Commons by a majority of 35 votes, and its defeat loosed a flood of recriminations which has done the cause of religion and the Church of England great harm. It seems almost impossible to believe that people at all familiar with the history of Anglo-Catholicism should have expected the efforts of those who fashioned the new Prayer Book to win the support of both Dissenters and Anglo-Catholics. In recent weeks a revised version of the new book was defeated in the Commons by a larger majority than before, although this majority was largely made up of Dissenters drawn from Scotland, North Ireland, and Wales. The fatuity of the premier is strikingly evident in the fact that he allowed one of his own cabinet to lead the fight against the deposited Prayer Book. Has the convention of unity and ministerial responsibility become an anachronism of the Constitution, so that the premier may declare any issue, however vital, an "open" one, and allow the ministry complete freedom of action?

This same doubtful note prevails throughout the ministerial policy, even to questions of foreign affairs. The diplomatic breach with Russia was precipitated, not by Sir Austen Chamberlain, the foreign secretary, who probably did not desire it, but by the same irresponsible Evangelical, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, the Home Secretary, who destroyed the chances of the Prayer Book. The failure of the naval disarmament at Geneva was due, not to the foreign secretary nor the admiralty, but rather to the proverbial bad boy in English politics, the blithe chancellor of exchequer, Mr. Churchill. The termination of the trade agreement with Russia closed for a time one of the most profitable markets still open to England, and the failure to agree upon a policy of naval disarmament may have started a naval rivalry, more

than slightly reminiscent of the Anglo-German competition thirty years ago. For a season intelligent English and American people were greatly disturbed at this possibility; particularly the English, who feel that such competition would make their burden of taxation positively ruinous, and outcome of any possible war absolutely disastrous to Great Britain, and probably to the United States, as well. From such things as these, the man in the street is beginning to wonder who really directs the politics at Westminster, if anyone!

The absence of unity and efficiency in the cabinet became so grievous that some months ago so wise and so loyal a supporter of the Government as *The Times* felt called upon in a leading article to demand a drastic revamping of the ministry at the earliest opportunity that fresh, vigorous blood of a more progressive hue might be introduced. The opportunity came with the resignation of Lord Cecil, in itself a protest against the British stand at Geneva. His place was filled by the appointment of Mr. Ronald MacNeill, a buoyant youth of 65, who stands with all his six feet four as one of the most confirmed of the Die Hards. *The Times* made no attempt to conceal its own deep disappointment over the promotion of Mr. MacNeill, who has since taken refuge in the upper house as Lord Cushendun. Furthermore, such progressive organs of the Conservatives as the *Spectator* and the *Sunday Observer* are greatly pained at the lack of constructive leadership within their party. They complain of the premier's apparent deafness to the voices of the more liberal elements of the party, and his ability to ignore rather grave breaches of ministerial decorum by Lord Birkenhead and Mr. Churchill, which threatens to drive the younger Conservatives into the camp of the enemy.

Meanwhile, Mr. Baldwin smokes on and his party drifts. Occasionally, when the pressure becomes too great, he escapes to the Continent for a long holiday until the "grousing" subsides. As another appeal to the country becomes imminent, he takes refuge in platitudes, and talks of going to the country on his record. Yet, it is safe to say that in recent years no ministry possessed of so substantial a majority has so little to its credit. It is obvious from the by-elections that the country is rapidly tiring of the premier's Olympian calm. Fear of strenuous naval rivalry with the United States is

ever present in the minds of the thinking classes. Labor is fighting with its back to the wall, and the Liberals for their very life. At a recent election at Northampton, Labor wrested the seat from the Conservatives, who found themselves in a minority of 10,000 in a three-cornered fight. The same thing is occurring elsewhere with monotonous regularity. Since the last general election, the Conservatives have lost eleven seats, and gained but one; since the beginning of the year they have lost six. The apathy of the Conservative voter is now a constant factor as is evident from the recent elections at Holborn and Marylebone, while the Laborites are able to keep up despite economic depression and the operation of the new Trade Disputes Act. Mr. Baldwin has failed to enforce discipline in his party, or to pass promised legislation; he has been equally unsuccessful in ending unemployment or securing economy; and his actions have been marked by an opportunism and pusillanimity rare in the history of a nation, which in the past century has boasted a Peel, a Disraeli, and a Gladstone.

#### IV

If Britain seems to be tiring of Baldwinism, whom and what does she want? If the premier's recent actions seem to indicate that he is in a chronic state of coma, the British populace appear equally befuddled when it comes to a consideration of his successor. There is Mr. MacDonald, an able statesman, whom the Laborites support, though without any unusual enthusiasm; the Conservatives boast two "first-class brains" in Lord Birkenhead and Mr. Churchill; finally there is Lloyd George! All four are distinctly able statesmen. Unfortunately, the British, and particularly the English, distrust from the bottom of their souls brilliant men. Possibly it is but the outcropping of an inferiority complex, which may very well be a direct result of the dilution of the electorate in the past decade. Lord Birkenhead, although a legal luminary of the first magnitude, will probably never be premier. He is too brilliant to bear with less gifted colleagues; his peerage also stands in his way, and he is highly unpopular, even in his own party. The rôle of prodigal enacted by brilliant, versatile, but unstable Mr. Churchill is too fresh in the memory of

the Conservatives for them to accept him at once as their leader. However, it must be remembered that he is ambitiously attempting to live up to his ancestry, and he seems to have done well with his present budget.

In case the country should decide to repudiate Conservatism, whom will they follow? In such a case one's thoughts turn irresistibly to the dynamic war premier and to the highly respected Labor leader. Lloyd George's brilliance, opportunism and lack of consistency have made him "suspect" by a considerable portion of the British people. His party is small and badly divided; what is more it has split over Lloyd George himself, as an influential group of Liberals have never forgiven him for taking the premiership away from his own superior, the late Earl of Oxford. Neither are they able to forget his ambiguous policy as the head of the Coalition ministry during the war, and his accumulation of an enormous personal election fund. Unquestionably he has split his party in twain, with such important figures as the aged Earl of Rosebery and Viscount Grey definitely withdrawing from his leadership on account of his private election fund. The action of these men brought the Tory organ, the *Morning Post*, to say that Lloyd George had no alternative but to withdraw from the Liberal Party, and join hands with his Socialist brethren in the Labor Party. But does the Welsh wizard desire to go over to the Laborites? If so, will they receive him?

The indications are clear that Lloyd George does not wish to destroy the integrity of the Liberal Party, for he has, during the past year placed in the hands of the party organization a fund sufficient to provide for the upkeep of the national headquarters for three years, and at the same time place 500 candidates in the field for the next election. This will enable the party to contest any constituency in which the Liberals have the slightest chance of personal success, or of deciding the result in a triangular contest. Should he be able by this method to secure as many as eighty seats, he might well hold the balance of power as Parnell did a half century ago. His chances have probably been improved by the death of Lord Oxford.

In all probability, however, Lloyd George would not be entirely averse to a Liberal-Labor understanding, provided his



own party were granted some freedom of action. Some of the Liberal papers are already coquetting with Labor, since plans for the coming election have been getting under way. The Annual Conference of the Union of University Liberal Societies very recently expressed the pious hope that such a combination might be effected, a hope that was echoed by a correspondent of the Labor organ, the *New Statesman*.

Will Labor accept Lloyd George's coöperation? Under normal conditions, certainly not! But conditions are far from normal. Financially the Laborites are now in the doldrums. The long industrial depression and the coal strike have bled them white. Even if they are able to hurdle successfully the barriers placed in their way by the Trades Disputes Act, and get 5,000,000 members to "contract in," they will be hard put to finance candidates even in the constituencies where they have a reasonable assurance of success. The thoughtful leaders among the moderates are thoroughly desperate. The Conservatives have already struck at their very life by the Trades Disputes Act, and are now threatening to disfranchise those in receipt of poor relief. Should the Die Hards triumph at the next election, they may pass such laws as will ruin entirely the political organization of Labor, and by a drastic reform of the upper house, put it beyond the power of the Laborites to carry through Parliament in this generation any of the thorough-going reforms so dear to their hearts. Much as they may dislike Lloyd George, they feel that it is absolutely imperative that the Tories be defeated in the next election. Lloyd George's election fund, therefore, might well appear to be their salvation.

Furthermore, it is barely possible that the popular press, at least that part of it controlled by Lord Rothermere, may go plump for Lloyd George and a progressive policy. Lord Beaverbrook likewise has never been particularly friendly to Mr. Baldwin, and may decide to reenact the rôle he played in the 1923 election of "hamstringing" the Conservatives. The attitude of the Berry syndicate is unknown, and is more baffling than ever since it has acquired Lord Burnham's staid old *Daily Telegraph*. Labor has always had a poor press, and trades union leaders have gnashed their teeth in vain as their followers turn from the unattractive *Daily Herald* to the blatant pictorial papers published by the syndicates. These

"picture papers" are destined, perhaps, to play an increasing rôle in the political life of the lower orders, who have been taught to read without being trained to think.

Labor leaders may rejoice at the possibility of assistance from the Liberal treasure chest and possible aid from the attractive sheets of the Rothermere and Beaverbrook syndicates. Should the Labor leaders decide to coöperate with Lloyd George at the election, would their followers carry out their mandate at the polls? This is, to the mind of the writer, extremely doubtful. The English laboring man is nothing, if not independent. He may hate Mr. Baldwin, but he has distrusted Mr. Lloyd George since he accepted the headship of the Coalition ministry. The Socialists had begun to think of the budget of 1909 as a long step toward the nationalization of the land and "Socialism in our own time," but the Welsh premier did little in his own ministry toward carrying out the budget. Moreover, while he was leader of what was essentially a Conservative government, Lloyd George made caustic references to the Socialists. In March, 1921, he spoke of them as the "New Peril." "It calls itself Labour," he said, "but it is really Socialist. . . . Socialism is fighting to destroy everything that the great prophets and leaders of both parties labored for generations to build up."

Can the Laborites forget or forgive this? Perhaps. Mr. Lloyd George's attitude during the general strike, and afterwards in the coal strike was eminently to the liking of the Socialists. More recently he has fought shoulder to shoulder with them against the Trades Disputes Act, and is suspected of being in sympathy with the Socialistic project for the nationalization of the mines. He has also come out for extensive land reforms very much akin to nationalization, and the Liberal Party has recently fathered an extensive industrial programme. The entire matter in the end, perhaps, resolves itself into two questions: can Mr. Lloyd George swallow the program of the Labor Party? Can the rank and file of Labor endure this agile, acrobatic politician?

Despite the recent pronouncement of Mr. Maxton and Mr. A. J. Cook, the Labor Party tends to become less Socialistic. Although six times its chairman, Mr. Philip Snowden has resigned from the Independent Labor Party, the left wing of

Labor. In the face of strenuous objections from the same body, Mr. MacDonald insisted upon voicing his objections to the boycott that the politicians in India recently inaugurated against the Parliamentary commission, which investigated political conditions in that land. In its recent meetings the Labor Party has emphasized its moderation, and its intention to carry out its reforms by the ballot, rather than by revolution. Mr. Snowden's defection was due to his profound distrust of the Labor programme, particularly to the two shilling surtax on all unearned incomes in excess of £500. Mr. Herbert Smith, president of the Miners' Federation, said at a party conference last autumn, "We are going to fight through the ballot box instead of through women's and children's stomachs."

Labor, therefore, seems to be drawing toward Lloyd George at the same moment that the Liberal Party is making a wide appeal to the people with their extensive and well-written "Industrial Report," which has recently appeared. Each party needs the other. Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. MacDonald would nicely supplement each other, and would make the greatest debating team England has seen since the golden days of Cobden and Bright. Their coöperation would be difficult, but far from impossible, especially since Mr. MacDonald has been rather uneasy over the antics of the left wing of his party. Politics has known, indeed, far stranger bedfellows than the volatile Welshman and the dour Scot, for after all are both Celts. It is a little short of arrant nonsense to suggest that Lloyd George cannot return to power. If Mr. Churchill could box the compass from "near" Socialist to Conservative and Socialist "bear-baiter," why cannot the much more lovable war premier go from Conservative to Radical? Recent by-elections, particularly that at Lancaster, suggest that he may.

If a Liberal-Labor combination fights the coming election against the Conservatives, it will be one of the most interesting elections in British annals, especially so since the carrying through of the "flapper franchise." Political life in the provinces has been in a state of suspended animation for three years. Even at Westminster attendance has been fitful, and the members listless. A blight has settled over parliamentary deliberations. Britishers, however, insist upon taking their

politics as well as their religion seriously, and they will not long endure this state of affairs. By the middle of next year, the masses may have the opportunity of saying at the polls with what patience they have endured Mr. Baldwin's stoic calm, and the recalcitrancy of his followers, who even on the eve of an election, show a disposition to get out of hand over the tariff issue. Some three million of "flappers" may well decide the issue. What a joke that would prove to be at the expense of the proud Englishman, who has always prided himself upon being master of his own house?



## MARKETING ARKANSAS' PERISHABLE FARM PRODUCTS\*

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It will not be the purpose to discuss in this paper the marketing of other than a few of the leading fruits and vegetables produced in Arkansas. The marketing problems are of practically the same nature and vary in a similar manner in the case of each commodity.

In the main, this paper will be confined largely to three phases of the marketing of fruits and vegetables: (1) The cost of distribution; (2) Uniformity of distribution; (3) The adjustment of supply to demand.

The term "perishable farm products" is here used to include only fruits and vegetables.

### SCOPE OF THE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRY IN ARKANSAS

Small fruits and vegetables are grown throughout the entire state. Some sections of the state grow more than other sections. However, approximately 65 per cent of all farms in the state produce some fruits or vegetables for market. At the same time, less than 20 per cent of those producing fruits and vegetables for market receive the major portion of their income from this source. Consequently, the fruit and vegetable industry, while constantly tending to become more specialized, is at present, depending on the type of the individual commodity, more or less on the basis of supplementary cash crops.

Certain commodities, such as peaches, apples, and grapes, show a greater increase in the rate of specialization on the individual farm and by areas than in the case of strawberries, cantaloupes, and watermelons. Other commodities, such as potatoes, onions, spinach, and radishes, show a smaller rate of

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increase toward specialization either on the individual farm or by areas.

However, in the case of practically every commodity the rate of increase in acreage or production from 1910 to 1925 was greater than was the number of farms producing the various commodities. In other words the increase in production was the result of an increase in production on the farms already in the business and not as the result of an increase in production through an increase in the number of farms. As pointed out, the rate of increase in specialization as between types of commodities does not vary in the same proportion. The cost of getting into the production of any one commodity and the extent to which labor-saving machinery may be employed largely governs the rate of specialization.

The cash income from fruits and vegetables forms approximately one-fourth of the total cash income of the Arkansas farmers. The income varies from year to year but with the exception of the last few years, the general trend of the income from this source has been upward.

While fruits and vegetables form approximately one-fourth of the total cash income of the Arkansas farmer, it was only within the last fifteen years that the income from this source has become important. There was practically no trade with this type of goods under the self-sufficing type of agriculture. Not until the more recent development of large cities was there any extensive farm commerce in fruits and vegetables in Arkansas.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRY IN ARKANSAS

The fruit and vegetable industry developed in Arkansas, first for supplying local markets and later more distant markets.

Prior to the World War, the development of the fruit and vegetable industry had been only at a nominal rate. During the war, prices of these products rose very high. Production was stimulated. From 1915 to 1920, Arkansas increased her acreage of small fruits and vegetables approximately 100 per cent. An even greater increase took place in other states of

the South. Large areas were planted to various fruits and vegetables, especially apples, peaches, grapes, and potatoes. States far removed from consuming centers that prior to the war had never engaged in the production of these crops, during the war put on intensive campaigns to increase the acreage of the various fruits and vegetables. Those fruits and vegetables that came into bearing before the close of the war or in the period of inflation were very profitable.

As fruits and vegetables began to enter more largely into the channels of trade, there developed a highly complicated system of marketing involving many agencies such as the local shipper, commission man, wholesale man, jobber, retailer, transportation and refrigeration agencies and still other agencies together employing thousands of people engaged in handling perishables.

Owing to their perishability and the increase in the distance to market, the change from a producer to a consumer type of marketing to a highly commercialized type of marketing had a much greater effect upon the marketing problem of perishables than in the case of staples and semi-staples.

#### COST OF DISTRIBUTION INCREASES

Not only has the system of marketing become more complicated as a result of increased production, but the cost required to pay for the services of the various agencies has been steadily increasing until today a larger proportion of what the consumer pays is required to pay the cost of distribution and handling charges than ever before.

The cost of marketing perishables has increased at a greater rate than the cost of marketing other farm products. The cost of marketing is indicated by the difference between retail and farm price. From 1900 to 1914 the farm price of foods increased 28 per cent while the retail price increased 58 per cent. In the same period the farm price of perishables as a class rose approximately 50 per cent, while the retail price of perishables rose 72 per cent. For a time during the war the farm price rose more rapidly than the retail price, but this situation lasted for only a short time during the period from 1917 to 1919. Following the war the margin between the retail and farm price continued to widen and at a more rapid

rate. Consequently, the margin between the farm price and retail price is greater now than at any other time. From 1910 to 1917 the retail price of food products increased 70 per cent. In the same period the farm price rose 45 per cent. Products for which the farmer formerly received, on an average, 50 per cent of the retail price, he is now receiving less than 40 per cent of the retail price.

Arkansas peach growers went into the production of peaches on the basis of receiving approximately 50 per cent of what the consumer paid for peaches. From 1920 to 1926, inclusive, they received only 30 per cent of what the consumer paid. In 1926 they received less than 25 per cent of what the consumer paid.

The retail price of Arkansas grapes in 1926 declined soon after the season opened from 30 cents per basket to 25 cents per basket, a decline of 16 per cent. The farm price declined from 20 cents per basket to 15 cents per basket, a decline of 25 per cent. Not only was the full amount of the decline in the retail price passed back to the farmer but the percentage decline in the farm price was relatively greater than the percentage decline in the retail price. Before the season ended the retail price of grapes declined to 20 cents per basket while the farm price declined to 13 cents per basket, or to only 46 per cent of the retail price.

The retail price of grapes was determined by supply and demand. The price the farmer received was determined to quite an extent by the cost of distribution. The increase of 71 per cent in the retail price of food products within the last few years indicates that the supply has not been greatly out of proportion to the demand.<sup>1</sup> In fact, as indicated by the recent threatened boycott of the meat industry by Boston hotels, the consumer does not know that the farmer is passing through one of the worst depressions ever experienced by farmers in any period. The consumer realizes that he is paying 71 per cent more for food products than he paid before the war but he does not know who gets the added 71 cents. To the farmer it makes all the difference in the world as to who receives the increase in the retail price. The farm price is the retail price less the cost of distribution. The increase in the retail price was so largely

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<sup>1</sup>Bureau of Labor Retail Prices.



consumed by the increase in the cost of distribution that the farm price is only 46 per cent above the pre-war price, though the retail price is 71 per cent above pre-war. Thus while the farmer is interested in the retail price he is even more interested in the cost of distribution.

The retail price of Arkansas sweet potatoes on October 15, 1927, in Chicago was 41 per cent above the retail price in 1913. The price received for sweet potatoes by farmers in Arkansas on October 15, 1927, was 30 per cent below the farm price of 1913. Practically the same difference as in the case of sweet potatoes existed between the retail price of apples in 1913 and in 1926. In 1926 approximately 50 per cent of our grapes, 72 per cent of our radish, 65 per cent of our sweet potatoes, 80 per cent of our watermelons, and 70 per cent of our apples were required to pay costs of distribution. In other words, the farmer received about one-third of the retail price of these various commodities. Had the farmer received the same proportion of the retail price that he received prior to the war, the Arkansas farmer producing fruits and vegetables would have been exceedingly prosperous.

#### SOME EFFECTS OF INCREASED PRODUCTION UPON THE PROBLEM OF MARKETING

As a commodity becomes commercialized and as the distance from the producer to the consumer increases, the adjustment of supply to demand is more difficult. Consequently, fluctuations in the price of fruits and vegetables appear to be more violent than in the case of staple and semi-staple farm products. The farm price of Arkansas strawberries in 1927 in a week's time fluctuated from an average of \$2.80 per crate to a maximum of \$1.75 above and \$1.60 below. The wide degree of fluctuation in fruits and vegetables makes it difficult for the farmer to know the value of his products, thus reducing his bargaining power and adding greatly to the cost of distribution.

Another factor tending to increase the cost of distribution of fruits and vegetables resulting from the commercialization is the loss through decay. While the seasonable variation in

the price and the actual expense involved in getting the perishables from the producer to the consumer have greatly increased as the volume of production increased, perhaps the greatest burden of all lies in the proportion of the products that never reach the consumer but decay either in the field or while passing through the various marketing processes. In 1926, 25 per cent of the cantaloupes and 30 per cent of the watermelons produced in Arkansas were left in the field. Another 10 per cent was condemned or destroyed in the wholesale market as unfit for human consumption.

#### CONTRACTION OF THE MARKETING AREA

On the average, as the production of a perishable commodity expands, contrary to the usual assumption, the marketing area contracts. This is due to the increase in competition from other areas and from home-grown products. Other areas take up the production of a commodity when it is proven profitable. Consequently, the marketing area of any one producing area is shortly confined to a section in which the particular producing area has an advantage in the way of transportation costs. The area into which Arkansas grapes were shipped in 1926 was considerably smaller than in 1924, though we had twice the volume in 1926 that we had in 1924. Competition from California tended to drive us out of western and southwestern markets, while in Missouri and Iowa there was a distinct tendency to wait for home grown.

Contraction of the distribution area also occurs as any particular commodity takes on large proportions or becomes commercialized, for the distribution must be concentrated in large cities where large shipments can be handled.

As the production of apples changed from a home orchard affair to a specialized type of production the shipments tended to be concentrated into large cities. Small towns and cities not having storage facilities received fewer apples than under the home orchard type of apple production. The result has been that the purchasing power of apples has declined during the last twenty years despite the fact that the increase in production was not in keeping with the increase in population. Shipments were concentrated on certain markets and while these markets were oversupplied, there were actually fewer apples produced per capita in recent years than formerly.

For 1926 the average retail price of Arkansas peaches in one of the leading stores in St. Louis was \$2.65 per bushel but in the same period the average retail price of peaches in Fayetteville, Ark., from the same orchard area averaged \$3 per bushel. With the large volume of production it was necessary to concentrate production in larger markets. There was not time adequately to spread or distribute into the smaller towns and cities within the distribution area. This tendency has caused a decrease in consumption in small towns and an increase in consumption in the larger towns. The greater the volume of production of perishable commodities the greater appears to be the tendency to concentrate that commodity into the larger markets to the neglect of the smaller markets.

There are other factors of somewhat less importance affecting adversely the price and the returns to the farmer for fruits and vegetables, such as a lack of standardization of grades and packs among growers in the same area and competing areas, inefficient methods and practices of handlers and inadequate terminal facilities.

#### SUMMARY OF THE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE SITUATION

The outstanding problems of the present system of marketing fruits and vegetables appear to be as follows: More fruits and vegetables are produced than we market. Those we do market fluctuate so violently in price from day to day that the farmer is never certain of the market value of his products or the price they will bring at any given time. A great loss from deterioration and decay occurs between the farm and consumer. The margin between what the farmer receives for his products and what the consumer pays is so large that the average price received by the farmer is relatively low. The distribution area for any one producing locality following the period of development tends to decline rather than expand, due to competition, declining prices and commercialization of the product. A constantly increasing larger proportion of what the consumer pays is being required to pay the cost of distribution, thus leaving a constantly decreasing proportion of what the consumer pays going to the farmer.

Looking at the system as a whole in the light of these problems, it appears that the science of commodity distribution as

applied to Arkansas fruits and vegetables has failed to keep pace with the science of production.

#### THE PROBLEM OF MARKETING

The problem of marketing as applied to fruits and vegetables in Arkansas is as follows: To market the products under a normally expanding volume of production in such a way as to cause the products to sell for the highest continuous price the largest possible proportion of the amount paid by the consumer returned to the farmer. Thus, the problem tends to reduce itself more or less to the problem of securing lower costs of distribution, which in turn involves, (1) a uniform distribution, and (2) adjustment of supply to demand. This makes necessary an analysis of, first, the distribution, second, the costs, and third, the relation of supply to demand.

One of the first steps in analyzing the fruit and vegetable marketing situation is to locate all the producing areas that move all or a part of their products in the marketing area under consideration. It is also necessary to determine which of the producing areas is the determining factor in the market.

The marketing area for fruits and vegetables of practically all the states west of the Mississippi is restricted to the upper Mississippi Valley section. Competition for the markets of the upper Mississippi Valley is in most instances primarily competition between the states west of the Mississippi.

There are some exceptions to this general statement. The volume of production of potatoes in New Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas has more to do with the price received for sweet potatoes by the farmer in Arkansas than the volume of production in Arkansas. New Jersey potatoes enjoy market preferences in Chicago and even in Kansas City. Likewise Tennessee potatoes compete with Arkansas potatoes for these markets and also for the Minneapolis and St. Paul markets. Shipments of sweet potatoes from Texas do not compete directly with shipments from Arkansas except in the case of the California and Oregon trade. The effect of the production of potatoes in Texas on the price of potatoes in Arkansas is due largely to the fact that Texas cities form an outlet for Arkansas potatoes, and in recent years Texas has increased the acreage of potatoes and largely supplied Texas cities.



## RELATION OF COST OF PRODUCTION TO MARKETING

It is not absolutely necessary to obtain cost of production data in making a marketing analysis study of a particular commodity. If, however, one looks at the marketing problem of a state or section as a whole from the point of view of the effect in determining the most profitable combination of the various fruits and vegetables to be produced in that area, it is essential to secure cost of production data.

In Arkansas the problem is not only one of analyzing the marketing situation in and of itself but to determine the combination of enterprises that will pay best with all factors, such as the cost of production, ability of a particular commodity to fit into the production of other commodities or the type of farming in such a way as to give the greatest total returns, considered.

There might be a commodity which, from the standpoint of the per unit value and other factors affecting transportation and selling costs to the extent that marketing would be less of a problem relative to the factors of production. The per unit value of dairy products, for instance, enables dairy products to be shipped long distances and also consumes a smaller proportion of the consumer's price than in the case of other commodities. However, the extent to which dairying fits into the system of farming as a whole must be considered. The same situation is largely true in the case of strawberries.

The cost of production between states of any one commodity is of less significance than competition as between commodities in any one area. Texas, for instance, may have a comparative advantage in the cost of producing sweet potatoes relative to Arkansas. On the other hand, producing sweet potatoes in Arkansas may be on the basis of the least disadvantage. Consequently, Arkansas would continue to produce sweet potatoes even though at a higher cost than Texas. On the other hand, the cost of producing sweet potatoes in one section in Arkansas in competition with other commodities in that section may place sweet potatoes at a comparative advantage, depending on the type of farming, and in another section make the production of sweet potatoes impossible, due to the type of farming, though the production per unit may be the same in each case.

In the case of radish, the southwestern district of Arkansas has a much higher cost of production and yields lower returns to the farmer than is the case of the northeastern district, but due to the fact that radish fit better into the system of farming in the southwestern district than in the northeastern district, radish have increased in the southwestern district and decreased in the northeastern district. Likewise the cost of selling, due to the proximity to markets, is lower in the northeastern district than in the southwestern district. The extent to which they fit into the system of farming rather than that of cost of production or marketing cost enables the southwestern district to continue to increase its acreage in radish.

The case in connection with radish serves further to illustrate the effect resulting from joint cost in comparison to straight cost in the production of a commodity. The land in radish is used for cotton as is the equipment and there may be little else for the labor to do. Consequently, radish do not interfere except in a very minor way with growing of cotton or other crops. So long as radish bring a return above the cost of materials and marketing they will continue to be grown as there is practically no cash outlay.

The larger the percentage of the retail price required to pay the cost of marketing relative to the farm cost of producing a commodity the greater will be the need for economies in marketing, especially in a period of declining prices. Marketing charges are more or less fixed charges. They do not vary from year to year. In a period of declining prices, or in the case of a sudden price decline, the commodity which normally consumes a large proportion of the retail price to pay the cost of marketing, will return the producer proportionately less than in the case of a commodity in which normally the marketing costs consume a relatively small proportion of the retail price.

The grape industry in Northwest Arkansas is an example of a commodity in which the selling cost consumes a larger proportion of the retail price than the farm cost of production. Consequently, the future of the grape industry depends primarily upon securing lower costs of selling. In 1925, 56 per cent of the retail price of Arkansas grapes was required to pay the selling costs. There was found to be a very small degree

of variation in the cost of producing grapes. The coefficient of variation of the total cost of producing grapes on forty-three farms involving 488 acres of grapes was 41. The variation was considerably higher in the case of individual items entering into the total cost of production but it is felt that the variation in the total cost of producing grapes on these farms was exceedingly small considering the different conditions under which grapes were produced. A further study of the cost of producing grapes that year showed that there was some opportunity to effect economies in the farm cost of production but the opportunities in this direction were definitely limited.

The total cost of producing grapes was 13.8 cents per basket. The marketing cost totaled 16.9 cents per basket the same year. The return to the farmer was 13.2 cents per basket. The yield per acre in 1926 was 20 per cent above the five-year average. Labor at harvest time was plentiful. It is felt that the farm cost for this year was made under exceedingly favorable circumstances. Similarly, the grape industry depends primarily upon reducing selling costs.

The cost of marketing is affected by competing areas, storage facilities, type of commodity, whether produced as a supplementary or specialized crop, the manner in which the commodity fits into the type of farming, and the proportion which the marketing cost of a commodity normally forms of the retail price.

#### UNIFORMITY OF DISTRIBUTION

The price of sweet potatoes is, on the average, practically the same for all markets throughout the consuming area regardless of whether one had a heavier supply than another. The price of grapes at the beginning of the shipping season in any one town is dependent primarily upon the supply in that town. As the season advances, however, or as the supply increases, prices throughout the consuming area are dependent largely upon the price in the primary market. Consequently, the problem is largely a problem of preventing oversupply in the primary market and getting as uniform a distribution throughout the consuming area as is possible.

In 1926 the jobber's price of grapes on a certain day in St. Louis was 19 cents per four-quart basket. On the same

day the price of grapes in Peoria was 24 cents per four-quart basket. There were three cars of grapes unloaded in Peoria on this date and four cars on the previous day. Six days later the jobber's price in St. Louis was 18 cents per four-quart basket. On the same day in Peoria the jobber's price was 20 cents per four-quart basket. Only three cars were unloaded in Peoria on this date and two cars the day before. Peoria was offering the farmers in Springdale, Ark., the same price as St. Louis, though the supply in Peoria was less than it was six days previous. On the first date the price in Peoria was made on the basis of the available supply. On the later date the price was made on the basis of supply or the price in the primary market. Had the distribution been such as to prevent an oversupply in St. Louis, the price in Peoria and other cities would have been maintained on the basis of the supply in Peoria and other cities. Once the primary market was oversupplied the price was made on the basis of the price in the primary market.

On the face of the situation, it appears as though the grape supply had exceeded the demand at a price at which grapes were profitable to the farmer, yet there were more cities and towns in the consuming area involving a larger population than those receiving our grapes that did not receive any grapes.

In 1926 there were fourteen local organizations shipping grapes within an area of twenty miles in addition to many individuals selling to truck buyers or consigning to brokers, in which case every selling agency was a competitor with every other selling agency for markets. Each was shipping into markets without knowing or caring as to where the other shipped or the supply in the market to which he was shipping.

The situation can best be illustrated in connection with watermelons. One day during the watermelon marketing season in 1926, jobbers in Sioux City, Iowa, received by noon on a certain day, twenty-six carloads of watermelons. Sioux City nominally consumes six carloads of watermelons per day. The price, of course, was demoralized, in fact, the watermelons did not bring freight charges. Upon examination it was found that only two cars of watermelons came from any one town. Each town and each individual was shipping independently of the other.



The situation with reference to grapes and watermelons appears to be a result of our failure to distribute the supply between markets rather than a surplus production. Any surplus is largely due to improper allocation of supply between markets. This in turn was due to a lack of efforts to so organize the marketing of the crop of grapes and watermelons to insure and allow maximum returns—a lack of intelligent distribution.

While the cost of production has risen and consumes a larger proportion of the retail price than formerly and there is no semblance of uniformity of distribution as between markets, the problem of adjusting supply to demand is equally as important.

In the case of many commodities, as a result of the expansion during the war, when prices were abnormally high, production apparently has reached the point at which the demand is not sufficient to maintain prices that will cover the cost of production. The problem of adjusting supply to demand in our fruits and vegetables is perhaps the most important problem confronting the farmer producing these commodities.

A farmer summed up the distribution situation in Arkansas quite adequately in speaking of the distribution of the 1926 watermelon crop when he said, "The distribution was perfect. Every market was glutted throughout the entire season, and the farmer paid for the privilege of giving his watermelons away."

#### ADJUSTMENT OF SUPPLY TO DEMAND

An attempt was made to analyze the adjustment of supply to demand and the resulting changes in price in a study of Arkansas strawberries in the Minneapolis-St. Paul market and trade area. To do this it was necessary to analyze the distribution costs of strawberries from the shipping point to the consumer. Mr. O. J. Hall, now assistant in the University of Minnesota, at that time field assistant in the Department of Rural Economics and Sociology, University of Arkansas, covered the strawberry deal in the Minneapolis-St. Paul district for 1926 and secured the data used in making the analysis of the market situation for strawberries. The data and discussion concerning the marketing of new strawberries in the Min-

neapolis-St. Paul market and trade area is taken practically verbatim from Mr. Hall's unpublished report.

Figure A compares on a percentage basis the cost of the distribution of strawberries per crate based on specific f. o. b. prices.

The first cost of distribution occurs at country shipping points which goes in payment for loading, inspecting and bracing strawberries. The amount that is paid for these services varies according to the method of sales employed. Shipping point services in Arkansas were primarily by three types of organization; the track buyer, the coöperative shipping association, and the American Fruit Growers Association. There is not a great deal of difference in the cost of the services of the three organizations for loading, inspecting, and bracing. On the average about 2 per cent of the price paid by the consumer is required to pay shipping point costs. The measure of success of shipping point agency is not determined primarily by the costs of their services in loading, inspecting, and bracing. The shipping point agency might charge a higher price per crate or secure a higher commission for these services, yet in the end by securing a better price for the product actually prove to be less costly to the grower than a shipping point agency that charged a lower rate for shipping point services but through inefficiencies its selling organization secured a lower price. The lower the price, the larger the per cent required to pay the shipping point costs.

The second item of cost of distribution of Arkansas strawberries is transportation. On a comparative basis with other states shipping in our season and into our markets, it appears that we are at a disadvantage in freight rates relative to Tennessee except to points west of the Mississippi.

The volume of production of strawberries produced in 1927 was below a normal crop and the price was relatively good. Under this situation freight rates were not oppressive. Under normal production with prices lower, the cost of transportation will be much greater.

There are many problems bearing on refrigeration that need adjusting. Minneapolis and St. Paul dealers found that the top layer of strawberries in practically every car was not properly refrigerated. This appeared to be the result of insufficient icing and the poor condition of the refrigerator car.

The opportunity for lowering the cost of transportation depends largely upon the extent to which the growers know the facts of the situation and make their demands in the matter effective.

There were three types of brokers handling Arkansas strawberries in the Twin City market. The independent broker, the associated broker, and the representative type of broker. The function of the broker is to bring the seller of carload quantities of a commodity and the buyer of such quantities together to consummate the sale. The wholesaler may not know where he can secure strawberries of a certain grade and variety; the shipper may not know exactly where this grade and variety is wanted; the broker's function is to know both of these things throughout the shipping season and to perform this service for his clients.

The brokerage charge is the first cost after transportation in the distribution of Arkansas strawberries. The charge fixed by brokers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul trade area for finding a buyer for Arkansas strawberries was 5 cents per crate. This broker's charge is a fixed amount that does not vary with the price that is received for berries. The broker does not own the product and hence does not buy for speculative purposes.

Possibilities of reducing the brokerage charge depends to some extent on the buyer being a regular customer of the broker, thus reducing the amount of telephoning and telegraphing which is necessary to consummate the same. In other words, the well established broker with a well established clientele is able to effect economies over a small or more recently established brokerage firm.

Under the present system of distribution no important reduction in the brokerage charge may be expected. As the various brokers are able to reduce their costs in making sales, it is hoped that the competition will lower the brokerage charge. Sufficient reduction will come slowly and at no fixed time in the immediate future.

Another type of service rendered the strawberry growers in Arkansas in the Minneapolis-St. Paul trade area was through the wholesaler. Wholesale receivers are those who purchase fruits and vegetables in car lot quantities and who

sell the commodity to other firms selling to retailers. Wholesalers may also sell to retailers. The wholesaler is the chief customer of the broker, buying in car lot quantities, purchasing the commodity and acting as an agent who will find a buyer. In the Minneapolis-St. Paul trade area the wholesaler's or jobber's function is largely rendered by the same organization. This is due to some extent to the size of the trade area. In the St. Louis trade area a higher degree of specialization is apparent. There the function of each agency is separate and distinct.

Sixteen per cent is the most common margin taken by the wholesale-jobbers of the Twin City area. The size of the sale affects the margin. If the wholesaler can sell an entire car of strawberries to four or five customers he will be relieved of the extra labor of handling and selling numerous sales of smaller size. The length of time required to make the turnover also affects the wholesaler's and jobber's margins. The longer the money is tied up in the transaction the greater will be the margin.

Drayage cost from the car to the marketing section of the city consists of unloading from a car to a truck or wagon or to the marketing and unloading at the dealer's place of business. This charge is usually estimated at 5 cents per crate. This is not considered as being absorbed in the margin charged for handling and selling the berries.

The margin taken by the dealer who handles small volumes and who extends credit to his customers and performs trade service is larger than that taken by brokers. The margin taken by the Twin City dealers hovers close to the cost of actual service performed. Due to the present methods of distribution, as affected from the shipping point, no material reduction in these costs may be expected.

Retail stores, as seen in Figure A, form the most expensive step in the marketing of Arkansas strawberries. On the average, they consume nearly as much as all the other factors of distribution.

The retail sales of strawberries in the Twin Cities area are in units of one quart each. Consequently, it is necessary to take a larger margin as the size of the sale decreases.



Many retailers maintain both a delivery and credit service and are obliged to take a margin that sustains any losses which may occur from the failure of their patrons to pay.

The losses from waste or decay are also an important factor in determining margins. Commodities that are highly perishable require a great deal of care to keep them in good condition. Strawberries have to be taken from their windows at night and placed on ice. They must also be worked over for the next day before going back on display.

A commodity which has small margins, as in the case of strawberries, is quite often used as a leader. Consequently, there is a wide margin in the price between competing stores as a result of certain stores using strawberries as a leader. This intensifies competition and tends to confuse the public as to the price of strawberries.

There is a tendency to place the retail price of strawberries sufficiently high so as to take care of the fluctuations in the wholesale price. The dealers are almost obliged to make their day-to-day prices of such margins as to take care of the anticipated fluctuations in the jobber's price.

The following table gives the percentage taken by retailers in the Twin Cities when they paid various prices for our strawberries.

#### RETAILERS' MARGINS IN THE TWIN CITIES

Per cent of purchase price added to deter- mine sale price	Price Paid for Strawberries						Total
	\$3.00	\$3.50	\$4.00	\$4.50	\$5.00	\$5.50	
15%—19.9%					1		1
20%—24.9%	4	2	3	2	4	1	16
25%—29.9%	2	2	2	2			8
30%—34.9%		1	1	1			3
35%—39.9%		2					2
40%—44.9%	1						1

When an average is taken from the sum of the number of each class times the mid-point of the classes, 26.2 per cent is obtained. A more representative figure of the per cent margin taken would be an average that was weighted by the volume that was sold at these various prices.

On the average, the lower the purchase price the greater the mark-up will be.

The retailer's margin in the secondary markets in the Twin City area was also obtained. The margin which was taken by the retailers in the secondary markets was 89 per cent higher than the margin taken by the Twin City retailer.

While retail stores form the most expensive step in the distribution of Arkansas strawberries, the services are numerous and difficult.

Reduction in the margins taken by retailers will likely result from lower costs of operation, increased sales of strawberries and a reduction of the lag between the change in the retail and wholesale price.

From the study of the services rendered by the various agencies in the market and the charges made by these services, it is found that the cost of these services is composed largely of four factors—labor, management, rent, and communication costs. Uncollected accounts and drayage also enter heavily into the total cost. Labor is by far the largest item of cost. Approximately 40 per cent of all the costs is made up of city labor.

City labor is approximately 125 per cent higher than in the pre-war period, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Rents, according to the same source, are approximately 60 per cent above the pre-war level. High rents are in part the result of high cost of labor. It is not expected that these costs will decline in the immediate future. Prices paid for city wages always lag and are lower in periods of inflation than farm wages or the prices of other commodities and other services. In the periods of deflation city wages lag and are higher than farm wages and the price of farm commodities. Consequently, it is not to be expected that the cost of distribution per unit of strawberries will decline very much in the near future. If city wages should decline, it would be a result of unemployment which, in turn, would mean a decrease in the demand for berries. Thus, while the cost of distribution may be expected in the future to decline as city wages decline, accompanied with a decline in city wages will likely be a decline in the demand for strawberries. As a result, the proportion of the retail price required to pay cost of distribution should remain practically the same.


From the standpoint of the grower, it is felt that he must look elsewhere for economies in marketing. In other words,

he must look to a closer adjustment of supply to demand which will enable the agencies to perform their services more efficiently and at the same time prevent violent fluctuations in the price of the commodities and maintain a more uniform price throughout the season and throughout the consuming area.

While the demand is determined by a multitude of causes, to many of which it is impossible to affix a value suitable for means of statistical measurement, it is possible to determine sufficiently accurately for practical purposes the effect of given supply to the demand.

From the *Market News*, published by the Federal Bureau of Markets, the arrivals and unloads by states or origin by days for the Minneapolis-St. Paul markets was obtained using the

FIGURE A



Comparison of costs of distribution to consumers, of berries in per centage of the specific F.O.B. prices

As the price declines the proportion taken by the selling cost rises

average minimum Minneapolis-St. Paul price in order to obtain a computable basis, the demand thus indicated may be determined relative to the supply.

The price to wholesalers per twenty-four-quart crate of Klondike and Aroma strawberries sold in Minneapolis in May, 1927, declined as the number of cars increased. The decline, however, was not abrupt but rather gradual.

A study was made of the representative retail stores in Minneapolis and St. Paul to determine the relationship of volume to the retail price or to the price to the consumer. Data were obtained on the number of crates they sold when the prices were at different levels.

The data were tabulated by two different methods. The first method consisted of listing, under each sale price, the number of crates that were sold at that price, tabulating all of the stores in this tabulation, and then of arriving at the average or representative volume sold by a typical store at that price, by dividing the number of crates listed under each price by the number of stores reporting for that figure. The other method consisted of taking a certain price as unity, a price that was found on all data sheets from cash store, and finding, in terms of this figure, the relative amounts sold at the other prices. An average was taken from the resulting figures and curves plotted from them. The retail price declined much more rapidly as the volume increased than did the wholesale price. The retail price was much more sensitive to supply and demand.

Figure 1 shows the relation of unloads of Arkansas strawberries to the wholesale price in Minneapolis for the month of May, 1927. The data represents the price per crate on the basis of the number of unloads. The crate group averages are fairly close to the regression line except at extremes.


The chart indicates that if the berry growers produce and ship into market a volume of strawberries that the market cannot move until a certain lower price level is reached, then the grower has to expect these relatively fixed charges to be paid first before he will receive any of the retail price. The lower the retail price the greater the proportion consumed by the selling costs and the smaller the proportion received by the grower.



Another example of the effect of supply on demand and the resulting effect on the returns to the farmer is seen in the case of grapes sold in the Minneapolis market during the month of August, 1926. Minneapolis wholesalers paid 30 cents per four-quart basket on the day that six cars were received but paid only 18 cents when eighteen cars were received. When freight and commission charges were deducted, the grower had left 18.6 cents per basket, or \$614 per car when six cars were received. When eighteen cars were received the shipper had left after paying freight and commission, 7.6 cents per basket, or \$251 per car. Under these conditions it is obvious that it would be best to ship only ten cars per day to Minneapolis and dispose of the remainder at any other market where they would add anything at all to total returns, or even leave the remainder in the fields. Otherwise the farmer is simply paying for the privilege of giving them away.

The adjustment of supply to demand in such a way as to prevent the short time surpluses is largely a matter of organizing the distribution of a commodity in such a way as to eliminate competition between individual growers, individual shippers, and competing regions. In other words, the problem comes back to where we started. To secure a uniform distribution and adjustment of supply to demand the producers themselves must necessarily place the marketing of fruits and vegetables on a business basis.

No. I



A decline in the price to the consumer was not followed by a corresponding increase in consumption, except as a result of a very large decline in price, a decline which made the returns to the grower unprofitable.

**RETURNS TO GROWERS FOR VARIOUS SHIPMENTS OF  
GRAPES TO MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, AUGUST, 1926**

Cars Shipped per day <sup>1</sup>	Wholesale price per Basket	Deductions per Basket Freight and icing	Commis- sions <sup>2</sup>	Per Basket	Per Car	Total return to Shipper
6	30	9	2.4	18.6	614	3684
10	28	9	2.2	16.8	554	5540
14	21	9	1.7	10.3	340	4760
18	18	9	1.4	7.6	251	4518

<sup>1</sup>Cars of 3,300 crates.

<sup>2</sup>At 8 per cent of the selling price.

To place the fruit and vegetable industry on a more business-like basis does not mean, as some have thought, abolishing the present system. Neither does it mean, as others have thought, retaining some of the features of the present system but abolishing or substituting coöperative marketing associations for the private middleman. Nor does it mean as still others have thought that of regulating the system and practices by law in the hope that unfair practices would be eliminated and simplification of the process would take place.

While the present system is complicated, it has been clearly demonstrated under the present organization of society that products can be more cheaply marketed by division of labor and specialization than by so-called direct marketing, as was the case when the trade was almost entirely of a local character. It has also been clearly demonstrated that when one agency such as coöperatives and middlemen attempt to perform the service formerly performed by the other, little, if any, savings have resulted. It is recognized that there is much to be done in the way of regulatory practices by law. The problem, after all, however, is not merely one of regulating or reducing the processes or services, but of finding more efficient ways of performing the processes or services.

To lower the cost of distribution through securing a more uniform distribution and a more adequate adjustment of supply to demand means not only avoiding a congested market, protecting our primary markets and carefully guarding against overloading markets, but it means vastly more. It also means establishing brands that stand for something in the market, advertising where it will pay, building good will

except as a result of a very large decline in price, a decline which made the returns to the grower unprofitable.

with the trade, developing market preferences, analyzing the market possibilities for an earlier or later variety, developing new uses for the particular commodity, determining at what price and under what conditions substitutes are used, elimination of unfair business practices, organizing market information, increasing storage facilities, especially in small towns, developing coöperation between areas shipping the same commodity in the same season, or in short, placing the fruit and vegetable industry on a more businesslike basis.

Three definite lines of action are essential for further development of the fruit and vegetable industry.

First, it is necessary that the farmers get themselves into a position where they can eliminate needless competition among individual farmers and those of other localities and to otherwise perform the functions essential to the success of any business having something to sell under present-day conditions. This means organization; organization, not necessarily with the idea of eliminating or performing the services now performed by others but of enabling those best prepared to perform the services to perform the services more efficiently. To have a jobber and retailer in a city handle ten cars of a commodity in a certain length of time when one car is all that the city could consume without waste and price demoralization indicates a greater lack of efficiency on the part of the shipper than on the part of the jobber and retailer. To ship a commodity which has no standing in the market or for one community to ship a commodity to a certain market when another community has already supplied that market or for one community to ship a poor quality of a product into the same market with another community shipping a good quality product without the difference indicated by inspection officials, indicates a lack of knowledge of business principles on the part of the shipper, regardless of how the commission man handled the transaction.

Secondly, additional market information more timely disseminated by the United States Department of Agriculture is needed. We do not know enough, well enough in time enough. Much has been accomplished in recent years in this connection by the Department of Agriculture. Closer coöperation on the part of the shipper with the department is essential.



Thirdly, there is need of coöperation in research work among the educational institutions in the various Southern States in marketing. While a great deal has been said about the marketing of farm products, yet there is no subject in which really helpful information for the farmer is more lacking. The problems connected with marketing are in most instances region wide. What affects one state affects another. States far apart shipping a certain commodity in the same season have much in common. To secure adequate information on the problem of marketing is so large and leads into so many ramifications and so many markets that no one state can secure adequate information on the marketing of a product which may be produced in several states. The production of any one commodity in any one state may determine the price for all other states and again the production in any one state may have little influence on the total supply and consequently little to do with determining prices. As competition develops between areas for markets, dumping by those in one area may be practiced, with a demoralization of prices resulting in other areas, when by coöperation a better price for all may be obtained.

Whatever else needs to be done, the matter of the growers through their local associations coöperating with a central association in the same area and the central association of all areas coöperating through an executive committee is absolutely essential. This coöperation is not with the idea of the farmer taking over functions performed by others unless they can perform them more efficiently, nor of doing away with the present processes but more with the idea of enabling the present processes to be performed more efficiently. In the last analysis it means coöperating for the purpose of securing better trained and more intelligent personnel; personnel more capable of directing the processing and the flow of products through the market channels from the producer to the consumer.

So far as the biological or physiological factors are concerned, there is practically no limit to the expansion of our fruits and vegetables. The limiting factor is the problem of distribution. The improvement of the distribution system of fruits and vegetables holds out for the South a constantly ex-

panding source of income. Effort spent in improving the system is really effort spent in helping the farmer to increase the volume of business. This means supplementing his income, which, in the South for all time, has been below that incidental to a representative standard of living. At the same time it means providing the basis for an increased business activity for every enterprise in the South.

## THE ELECTION OF 1928

BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

*University of Texas*

President-elect Hoover is about to embark for South America. Governor Smith is resting in seclusion in Mississippi. The sovereign people has returned to its daily tasks, and the newspapers have an abundance of space for events more commonplace than politics. It is remarkable, no doubt, that the tumult and shouting of a stupendous national campaign should so soon die down and that the American democracy should so quickly accept and forget the results of a gigantic presidential election. Politicians and students of politics, however, cannot forget so easily, and they are now pondering over the result of the contest and its possible and probable effects on future governmental policy and the American party system. The phenomenal registration, the tremendous popular vote, the exceptional electoral and popular majorities are all subjects for speculation. As one editor has remarked: "the explanation and the analysis of this most interesting and astonishing election provide material for a year of discussion by the politically minded." Already, however, many an off-hand diagnosis is being made. For one thing it is being said that the American voter has at last awakened and that democracy yet lives. The Republican Party, it is alleged, has become in truth a majority party and for the first time indeed a national party. On the other hand, the Democratic Party, in spite of its large popular vote, seems to be nationally dead, and, at last, perhaps, out of its wreck will grow up a realignment of the whole party system upon a basis of honest difference of opinion and interest. Above all the Solid South has been broken, which is taken by some to mean a two-party system in the South.

A knowledge of party history and political precedents, however, leads one to be cautious in emphasizing too sharply the apparent truths of the moment. Exceptional as the results of this election may seem, it is probably safe to say that nothing revolutionary in the party system has occurred and that by

1932 "normalcy" in a large measure will be restored. Certainly this election does not represent the termination of any mighty struggle between opposing economic forces such as battled for supremacy in the elections of 1800, 1828, 1860, or 1896. The election of 1912 made for a greater upheaval than that of 1928, yet its wounds were soon mended and its issues largely forgotten.

As Senator Norris has maintained, the campaign of this year was based upon false issues, and, it may be added, issues which will prove ephemeral. These issues have been termed "the three P's—Prosperity, Prohibition, and Prejudice." Many real issues were touched upon during the campaign, such as: farm relief, water power, the tariff and corruption, but the positions assumed by the two great parties in regard to these questions were difficult to distinguish, and if the hearts of the American voters could have been opened on election day one or more of the "three P's" would probably have been found written on most of them.

Interwoven with the false issues were the personalities or imagined personalities of the candidates, which no doubt played a part in many decisions at the polls. Hoover was pictured as the expert for whom all the political reformers since Plato have been looking. An eminent engineer no doubt he has been, and an efficient administrator he has been also, but his economics and his political theory have been questioned in some quarters. Certainly, his national and international experiences are of some value. Hence, on the whole, it is probably safe to say that he is the best qualified man the Republicans have placed in the presidency for many a day. In the minds of the voters, however, his expertness, his dryness, his protestantism, and his familiar American origin carried most weight. Moreover, it is claimed that the organizing genius of Hoover made possible for the Republicans a most effective campaign organization.

However, it is probably true that in the matter of personality men were rather repelled by Smith than attracted to Hoover. Smith's attack was personal. He let his personal light shine and he exposed too greatly the inner workings of his mind. One had to admit that he was a past master at politics, that his record as a governor was excellent, but many



voters thought that his experience had been too greatly localized. He knew nothing of national affairs. He treated the South as though it did not exist—and he failed to understand the farm problem. Moreover, he was a Catholic and a wet, two facts which seriously disqualified him in the minds of many people to uphold the constitutional provisions for religious liberty and prohibition. His metropolitan and immigrant origin and his affiliation with Tammany Hall in addition caused other prejudices to operate against him. And lastly, Smith failed to consider the effect of his campaign speeches being conveyed by radio to all parts of the country, for he spoke always to his immediate audience.

Regardless of the relative weight of these popular impressions, it was difficult to prophesy the result of the election. Both a close decision and a landslide were apparently possible. Candidates, campaign managers, political war-horses and professional prognosticators were confused and uncertain. It seemed assured that Hoover could muster up an electoral majority more readily than Smith, but there were the increased registrations, the new women voters and the augmented list of doubtful states for which no account could be rendered. The brass collar of party regularity among all voters also was evidently cracking. Only the *Literary Digest* poll made a really accurate prophecy, but nobody could quite bring himself to foresee the situation pictured by it. Now, however, the die has been cast. The election returns are at hand and some analysis of them is possible. A close examination of these statistics and some comparisons with the statistics of past elections yield information that is instructive.

The increased registration and the record-breaking popular vote should first be considered. Of the total population of the United States some fifty-six million persons have reached the voting age. For various reasons many of these are not qualified to vote. Some are aliens; others are prevented from voting by a number of disqualifying provisions differing from state to state and including of course such restrictions as literacy tests and small tax paying exactions. Perhaps most of those disqualified in any given election are so, however, because they have failed to register. Exact registration statistics are not available. The estimated total for 1928 published in the *New York Times* for October 28, was 43,084,257.

William T. Page, clerk of the House of Representatives, a close student of election figures, set the number of potential voters at 45,000,000, which is something like 14,000,000 more registrants than in 1924. This increase was not confined to any particular states or sections. Reports of increased registration from all parts of the country indicated that it was universal. On the basis of this increased registration, known of course before the election, a greatly augmented actual vote could be foretold. Competent persons, including Michelet, the secretary of the Get-Out-The-Vote-League, agreed that the actual vote would be around 38,000,000 or 70 per cent of all persons of voting age. This was in sharp contrast to the actual vote of 1924 which was approximately 29,000,000 or 52.5 per cent. Incomplete returns indicated that the aggregate vote for the two major candidates was 36,000,000. Adding to this the 1,500,000 votes cast for minor candidates, the resulting total is 37,500,000. When all returns are reported the final aggregate will, therefore, be close to 39,000,000. This total is astonishing and runs not far below the estimated registration total of 43,000,000. The greatly increased registration and the small disparity between it and the actual vote most assuredly indicate that the American electorate was aroused and that American democracy from the standpoint of head-counting at least is by no means dead. If 39,000,000 votes were actually cast then the 70 per cent vote is actually exceeded. A complete return may somewhat lessen this percentage but there seems to be little question as to its varying much from this figure.

But the 70 per cent should not make for too much encouragement so far as a permanent increase in the voter's interest is concerned. Investigation shows that the percentage of potential voters who actually voted in the successive presidential elections of the past seventy-two years has steadily declined. There have been crest elections during that time when the curve has mounted, but each successive crest has been lower than the previous one. For the eighteen-eighties the average was 83 per cent. For the eighteen-nineties it was 80 per cent. For the first four elections of the twentieth century it was 68 per cent. In 1916 it rose to 70 per cent. In 1920 it dropped to 50.9 per cent. The 70 per cent of the election of 1928 marks it as a peak election, but past experience

holds out little hope for a permanent increase in the voter's interest in the future.

The general effect of this increase of votes obviously was greatly to increase the total votes of each of the candidates far in excess of any of their respective predecessors. Hoover's total stands now at approximately 21,000,000 and Smith's approaches 14,500,000. Hoover thus exceeded the Harding total by 5,000,000 and the Coolidge total by 6,000,000. Smith also surpassed Cox and Davis by practically the same respective increases. Smith's total, the largest Democratic vote in history, has been capitalized by his supporters, but relative percentages rather than totals are significant. It must be emphasized that Hoover polled according to present indications something over 60 per cent of the popular vote. Even if the final totals give him no more than that he will have the Harding percentage of 1920, which surpassed even that of Roosevelt in 1904 by 3 per cent. In the past seven presidential elections only Cox of the Democratic candidates polled as little as 40 per cent of the popular vote. It is noteworthy that in those elections even Woodrow Wilson received less than 50 per cent both in the returns of 1912 and 1916. The decline in the Democratic percentages is, therefore, more significant than any recent increase in the Democratic popular vote. The Democratic Party is definitely a minority party, a status which even Smith's vote cannot change. At any rate, that vote has decisively removed Smith from the national political stage.

But popular votes are not electoral votes. Hoover's electoral vote, it must be remembered, is far in excess of his nation-wide popular vote. The popular election in a number of states was exceedingly close. This was particularly true of the great states of New York, Illinois, and Texas. These states alone could have given Smith ninety-four additional votes. Indeed a relatively few more popular votes would have made Smith's electoral minority look somewhat better. But of course this contention works both ways, for in the words of Mark Sullivan, "If Hoover had received 275,000 more votes, geographically distributed in the right way, he would have carried every state in the Union. Fifteen hundred more votes would have given him Rhode Island; 14,000 more would have given him Alabama; 21,000 more Massachusetts; 25,000 more Arkansas and so on." But these are idle speculations. They

serve a purpose only in illustrating how remote the electoral vote may sometimes be from the popular vote.

It is more profitable perhaps to consider the causes for the vastly augmented popular vote or rather some particular items which helped to pile up the 10,000,000 extra votes cast in this election. Increased voting took place everywhere, but was the percentage of increase uniform throughout the Union? It has been seen that 52.5 per cent of the adult population voted in 1924 as against the 70 per cent of 1928. The difference between these figures of course represents the increase or 17.5 per cent. Sectional or state interest in the election may in part be gauged by seeing what states and sections exceeded the 17.5 per cent. The South presents itself at once as the section where the percentage of increase should have been highest. The South, however, showed some remarkable variations. In the six Southern States which gave their electoral votes to Smith there were in every case increases but with very wide differences. Louisiana presented the largest increase with 50 per cent, Alabama and Arkansas followed with 30 per cent, Georgia close behind with 28 per cent, but Mississippi and South Carolina trailed far behind with 5 per cent and less than 2 per cent, respectively. The Mississippi poll tax requirement, which exacts as the condition for voting the payment of the tax five months before the holding of the National Convention and nine months before the national election, explains her case in part, whereas South Carolina has a ten-year registration system. These two states, however, are probably the most die-hard Democratic states. Perhaps the Democrats in both states saw no danger of a Republican victory and hence as usual refrained from voting. It is noteworthy, however, that the relative increase of Republican votes in both states was larger than that of Democratic votes. In Mississippi the Republican gain was almost twice the Democratic. Probably many Democrats were overconfident, or what is nearer to the point, too displeased with their party nominee to vote its ticket, but still too Democratic to vote for Hoover. However, it must be strongly emphasized that the increased vote in Texas which has a poll tax requirement similar to that of Mississippi, was no more than that of the latter state, and still the Democratic vote in Texas was 22,000 less than the vote for Hoover, and



145,000 less than the Democrats polled in 1924.\* These figures, incidentally, should constitute a source of worry for orthodox Texas Democrats.

To continue with the increased vote percentages, it is in order to examine the three states of the formerly Solid South, other than Texas, which gave their votes to Hoover. In both Virginia and Florida the increase was 50 per cent over 1924. In North Carolina it was 20 per cent. This phenomenal increase in Virginia represented a Republican vote, since the Democratic vote of 1924 hardly more than remained intact. In Florida the Democrats fared somewhat better. But in North Carolina as in Texas the Democratic total was actually less than that of 1924. These facts serve to show how profoundly this election rocked the six Smith states of the South to be sure, but even more profoundly the four Hoover states. A veritable revolution no doubt took place in the four at least. What the permanent effect will be is a matter for conjecture.

But what of the new voters in other states? A glance over the total popular votes by states outside the South both for 1924 and 1928 will disclose no particularly phenomenal increase of voters except in five states. Three of these states were considered highly doubtful during the campaign and were peppered with campaign ammunition from both political armies. These states were New York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. The New Jersey vote represented an increase of 40 per cent over that of 1924. The Massachusetts vote was 35 per cent higher than in 1924. The New York vote 25 per cent higher. Here in these three states particularly the hard fought battle between the forces of Prosperity and Anti-prohibition took place with results that are well known. Two other states, soundly Republican usually, made remarkable increases, Pennsylvania with an increase of 30 per cent and Vermont with an increase of 25 per cent. Evidently the Republicans in these states were stricken with a panic lest a miracle happen and destroy these age-long strongholds of their power. It may be asked why the increases were not so great in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and the farm states to the west. The answer is in part that in many of them politics

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\*The Ferguson-Butte contest in Texas in 1924 brought out an exceptionally large vote.



is a hard fought game between a Republican party which is usually dominant in national elections, and a strongly organized local opposition, either Democratic or Farm-Labor. An analysis of the political shifts in these and other states will be considered later.

The increased vote which has been under consideration was confined as has been seen to a relatively few states so that its power was minimized so far as its effect on the electoral college was concerned. This was, however, not true of the new women votes, which were widely distributed over the whole nation in such a manner that, even had they been small, they would have had an effect upon the result in all closely contested states. Unfortunately no figures for the woman vote of the nation are available. Of the 10,000,000 new votes of this year, it has been estimated that the women contributed from 4,000,000 to 6,000,000. Whatever the figure is it is no doubt large, and it is possible and highly probable that the women carried some doubtful states.

It is alleged that the women this year disobeyed the command of St. Paul to obey their husbands. In a book, just off the press, by Frank R. Kent of the *Baltimore Sun*, entitled *Political Behavior*, the contention is presented that the introduction of women into politics has not changed and will not change its complexion; that women's tendency was to fall into the political grooves worn down by their male relatives. The author, however, is reported to have changed his views on the eve of the election, for he was probably convinced that women are more successfully moved by moral and religious issues than are men. It is true certainly that women are more numerous in the membership of some of the powerful protestant denominations and that they are responsible for many of the so-called uplift activities of the day. Is it true, however, that there are more staunch prohibitionists among women than among men? In a recent poll on the subject of prohibition conducted by the *Outlook* among its subscribers, it was found that the largest percentage of ardent prohibitionists were among women of 45 or above, which women are apparently the most active politically. The largest number of anti-prohibitionists on the other hand were the *men* under 45, but men over 45 were shown to favor or oppose prohibition in

about equal numbers with women under that age. Also the *Literary Digest* poll, which was alleged to have included far more men than women, predicted election results that are nearest those realized. That women are prohibitionists, therefore, to a much greater extent than men, and that their motive for voting for Hoover in many closely contested state elections was to preserve the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act are questions of doubt. Women, it is said, voted for Hoover because his name had been associated with movements beneficial to women, children, and the home, but this probably has been exaggerated. It is quite possible that husbands, fathers, male prohibitionists, and male protestants had ideas quite similar to those of their wives as to the qualifications of Governor Smith.

But enough of this matter. There are other questions to consider and one has to do with what happened in the seven border states. These extend from Delaware to Oklahoma. All voted for Hoover, but none showed remarkable increases in voting. In three of them which voted for Coolidge in 1924—Delaware, Maryland, and Missouri—Smith polled a larger vote than did Davis in 1924, due to their wet leanings, no doubt; but Hoover maintained a safe lead. In the other four—West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Oklahoma—the Smith totals were less than the Davis totals in 1924. Davis was a son of West Virginia and in the other three prohibition and the religious issue seem to have decided the issue.

Another and more important consideration involves the farmer and the industrial worker, elements to which Governor Smith made an extended appeal. Many of the leaders of farmers' organizations supported him including Senator Norris of Nebraska who bolted the Republican Party in an attempt to swing farmers' votes. Ex-Governor Lowden was only luke-warm in his support of the Republican candidate. Moreover, Governor Smith was heralded as the friend of the city worker, as an advocate of progressive policies beneficial to the laborer. For a long time the possibility of creating a farmer-labor party has been a topic for discussion. Many Liberals professed to see in Governor Smith a leader who could hasten the realization of such an alignment and who

could build upon the work accomplished by Senator La Follette in 1924 when the latter in his campaign for the presidency polled many votes in a number of states on the basis of such a coalition.

In the election of 1924 La Follette obtained a large popular vote in at least twenty-five states. In twelve of these, all west of the Mississippi River except Wisconsin, a much larger vote was cast for La Follette than for Davis, but of course none of these states except Wisconsin was able to give La Follette enough popular votes to destroy the Republican plurality. In the thirteen remaining states the La Follette vote was larger, but it in no case exceeded that of Davis. Eight of the latter states lay east of the Mississippi River and constituted the industrial states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois. The question to be decided is whether or not Smith absorbed a goodly portion of this vote in all or any of these twenty-five states.

The *Literary Digest* poll, a safe guide as to election results, contained statistics indicating the trend of the bolting vote in all states. It showed that in the twelve states first mentioned above a larger number of La Follette voters intended to vote for Smith than for Hoover. In Wisconsin, Oregon, and Wyoming the indication was that these voters were dividing two-to-one in favor of Smith. In the remainder the Smith lead was considerable except in Minnesota, Iowa and two or three other states, where the La Follette vote was fairly equally divided. In the thirteen remaining states, most of which were industrial, the poll indicated in some cases a greater shift of La Follette's vote to Smith. In New York it was at the ratio of four to one in Smith's favor; in Massachusetts three to one; and two-to-one in Connecticut and Illinois. Ohio and Pennsylvania gave many more La Follette votes to Smith than to Hoover. The two outstanding farm states in this second group—Kansas and Nebraska—divided the La Follette vote approximately equally between Smith and Hoover.

While the *Literary Digest* poll shows only a tendency a comparison of the election statistics of these twenty-five states for 1928 with those of 1924 indicates in most cases a much larger gain of votes for Smith than for Hoover. In Ohio,

where no great increase in voting took place, Hoover did little more than hold the Coolidge vote of 1924, while Smith combined the Davis and La Follette totals with that of the new votes. In Massachusetts also the Republicans merely held their own, whereas Smith apparently polled most of the increase, an increase which was sufficient for him to carry the state. In this state, unemployment, the anti-prohibition sentiment, and the large foreign element probably carried the day. The prosperity doctrines of Hoover, on the other hand, presumably carried New York and New Jersey by narrow margins. It may be added that in Rhode Island the Republicans actually lost 8,000 votes in comparison with 1924.

In these Northeastern States also are situated most of the great cities. Of the fourteen largest six went to Smith. New York City was to have been expected; Cleveland voted for La Follette in 1924; St. Louis was wet; Boston, wet, foreign, and Catholic; and finally Hoover's prosperity talk failed to win Newark. In the remaining eight Hoover cities the vote was close except in Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Los Angeles.

These indications in the farm and industrial states and in the great cities are important. Their indecisive character may be partially explained. General discontent for one thing was not as great as in 1924. Prohibition and religion seem to have divided the radical but Protestant vote in the farm states. Moreover, for want of a La Follette and a special farmers' party traditional Republican loyalty in those states to an extent seems to have reasserted itself. Most of all, perhaps, Smith's farm remedies were not as convincing as they might have been. In the industrial states, on the other hand, Hoover's statistics of prosperity and religious prejudice served to hold Republican support in line even if Republican gains over 1924 were not great. At any rate, Smith, while he accomplished much in holding together the La Follette vote, did not effect the realignment desired by Liberals, nor did he appreciably hasten the coming of a Farmer-Labor Party of first-rate dimensions. It is to be noticed also that Smith, while attempting to win both farmer and laborer, leaned too far in attempting to appease capital and business.

In analyzing the presidential election, however, the Congressional election should not be forgotten, the result of which,



while it reflects the Hoover victory, it not as decisively a Democratic defeat. The disorganized state of the Democratic Party, indicated in the presidential election, will be reflected, however, in the Democratic following in both Senate and House, which will be hopelessly divided on such questions as prohibition, farm relief, power control, and tariff. It is, however, important to note, on the other hand that the large Republican majorities in both houses may prove as unwieldy and embarrassing as those of 1920. The congressional leadership of the President-elect has yet to be proved as indeed his leadership has to be proved in the affairs of administration. Upon this much, no doubt, will depend.

In a parliamentary system of government Governor Smith might have remained on as a minority leader. In our system he is afforded no such opportunity. If the Democratic Party is to be reconstructed, which it undoubtedly must be if it is to remain as a vital factor in American politics, a new leader will have to be found. Since the removal of Woodrow Wilson, that leader has been sought in vain. Upon no significant issue apparently, can the southern, western, and eastern wings of the party be united. The Democrats as usual remain after this election, for the time being at least, a minority party. If the truly available leader is found for 1932, a large number of the bolters of 1928, particularly in the South, will be recovered, but without a real issue and unless the Hoover administration signally fails, Democratic national recovery is not in sight. This is to be seriously regretted, for a democracy in which there is lacking an effective party of the opposition is a democracy the health of which needs attention.

## BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

*University of Texas*

Gruening, Ernest, *Mexico and Its Heritage*. (New York: The Century Company, 1928, pp. xix, 728.)

In this volume representing enormous labor and great research Mr. Gruening has not been satisfied with "hearsay" evidence but has personally spent about eighteen months out of the past six years in Mexico. From personal interviews with persons in every walk of life and from researches in the libraries of the United States and Mexico this volume is compiled.

The very quantity of this observation and labor has given the author so much material that at times it threatens to swamp both him and his reader, while the volume in question becomes encyclopedic in nature. This is particularly noticeable in the section dealing with politics, where fourteen different states are given from two to twelve pages each. Most readers would prefer a general treatment by such a skillful observer, or else a special study devoted to politics alone.

The book reviewer with historical leanings is inclined to question somewhat Dr. Gruening's interpretation of the Spanish Colonial period. No trained scholar questions that the colonial system of Spain had serious faults, but to emphasize practically nothing but the blunders is hardly fair. After all, and in spite of its corruption, it was a system that held together an empire covering a continent and a half in the New World—to say nothing of other possessions—for some 300 years. Also, one wonders why those important administrative and executive institutions, the *Casa de Contratación* and *Casa de las Indias* are so ignored (the first receives a casual reference on page 19, the latter apparently is not mentioned) whereas the scandals of the private lives of the Spanish kings are given pages of treatment.

Statement as to points of historical discussion are at times given in a categorical fashion, for instance: "The history of this period (1825–1850) is wholly unimportant except as it reveals the extent of national weakness . . ." (p. 51), yet the author himself later discusses the reform movement of 1833 under Valentín Gómez Farías (p. 197 ff.). Also on page 52 is found: "His [Juárez] most inveterate critic among historians wrote, 'He knew no perfidy.'" This obviously ignores the opinions of such writers as R. Planchet, *La Cuestión Religiosa en México*, whose third edition was published in 1927. Many will also be inclined to disagree with the repeated statement that Carranza was a nonentity. In fact, the author's own summary of the Carranza decrees (p. 99) is sufficient to cause a reader to pause in accepting the estimate of the old "First Chief." Most such criticisms, however, will be found to refer to the smaller portion of the book that deals with the period before 1910,

and only emphasize the fact that Mr. Gruening's book deals primarily with recent events and might very properly carry such a title as "Mexico since Porfirio Diaz," rather than the one actually found on the title page.

The reviewer in weighing the book also wonders why such topics as Land and The Church have lengthy historical introductions leading to the Revolution of 1910, whereas no background is given for Education. The author states: "Popular education was unknown in Mexico before the Revolution" (p. 515). Even granted that this is true—and many would not admit it—the general reader would like to know why this new born movement so suddenly became such a lusty youngster.

Mr. Gruening is a frank Liberal who supports vigorously the constructive work of Obregón and Calles, even though he is perfectly willing to criticize such defects as he sees; for instance, the venality of officials and the weaknesses of state administrations. His condemnation of the Roman Catholic Church, while at times qualified, is generally sweeping in its nature.

The typography of the volume is excellent and a distinct compliment both to author and publishers. Mexican names and phrases are handled with unusual accuracy. Only one slip of any note has been observed and that is in the bibliography (p. 684) where the works of Fernando González Roa are listed under "Roa," instead of under "González Roa." The bibliography itself is certainly one of the best accessible to the general English reader. One or two omissions only were noted. Of these Cuevas, Mariano, *Historia de la Iglesia en México*, 5 vols., and the documents compiled by Professor C. W. Hackett on the relations of the United States and Mexico from 1910 to 1925 are the most important.

Due to the numerous subjects treated there is a certain disorganization about the volume and possibly there are few readers who will care to read the whole of it fully. However, it is beyond doubt one of the best treatments of modern conditions in Mexico in the English language. The phraseology is frequently vigorous and striking. The Mexican artists "have sprung from a soil plowed by revolution, wet by its tears, fertilized by its blood" (p. 644-45); and "General Mondragón, lean and wolfish, his black moustaches thin as a rat's tail, was buying large quantities of worthless ammunition and charging it at twice its cost" (p. 302) show something of the writer's ability to use descriptive English. However, his impressionism is probably at its best in the section on the Indian Heritage.

It is to be expected that this volume will have a large sale, for, while overly critical of some phases of Mexican life, and while differing from many people in its interpretations, it is the honest account of Mexico as seen by a capable observer and writer who has worked long and hard and who is a friend of the country and people south of the Rio Grande. The author is to be congratulated on his work by both the general reader and the scholar.

W. H. CALLCOTT

Columbia, S. C.

Soule, George, *Wage Arbitration, Selected Cases, 1920-1924*. (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1928, pp. 298.)

Mr. Soule has not attempted to bring together in elaborate compilation or logical classification the "common law precedents" that have grown out of the settlement of wage disputes. He appears to feel, on the contrary, that the analogy between industrial arbitration and legal procedure has been pressed a trifle too far. Wage arbitrations, unlike court litigation, are not attempts to apply justice on behalf of society as a whole; rather they are instruments of collective bargaining resorted to by both sides of the bargaining process as a way of settling disputes which could not be adjusted satisfactorily by direct negotiation. The arbitrator is not a superior sort of dictator, dispensing justice from on high, but is an agent of the two sides. The very question of what the facts are generally is more intricate and difficult in wage arbitrations than in cases of law, for it involves investigations into economic and social conditions that are often indefinite and difficult to get at and experts may differ regarding the statistical and accounting methods employed. The statutory law of industrial arbitration (the trade agreement) usually gives only a very vague guide for determining the bearing of the demonstrated facts, and in the lack of any long or firm tradition of "common law," the concrete issue is much more likely to be settled in the light of the leanings of the arbitrator than by any reference to precedents of formal justice.

But if industrial arbitration lacks the clearness of fact and the statutory and common law guides of legal procedure, what, after all, is its justification? If the most successful arbitrator is the one who gives to the lion the lion's share, if that award is best that works best, is arbitration anything more than a substitute for trial of strength between the parties?

Perhaps the social saving involved in the avoidance of prolonged disputes is, in itself, sufficient justification of the institution. But Mr. Soule believes that arbitration has a somewhat greater contribution to make. The enlightenment as to the facts, and the reasoning based upon these facts, do influence the future course of wages through the new conceptions of just dealing which they make possible. The hearings provide a means of testing the validity of the feelings on each side. And out of this process there may emerge, not absolute justice (if there is such a thing), but a *more* just and a *more* wise settlement of the divergent interests of different economic and social classes in an industrial society which offers no one royal road to a happy reconciliation of these conflicting interests.

The cases included in the book are drawn from four lines—the printing trades, the packing industry, the railroads under the régime of the late Railroad Labor Board, and the Cleveland garment industry—and cover the period from the end of the inflation in 1920 on through the depression and recovery. A perusal of the arguments made in these cases and of the reasoning and decisions of the arbitrators leaves several impressions in the mind of the reader. Among these impressions are: (a) That we



are still a long, long way from any generally-accepted criteria of a "fair" wage. Our theories of economics and of social justice are too much in a state of flux to make possible the attainment of any nice formulae of justice and equity, ever ready for application. (b) That opportunism is one of the outstanding characteristics of arbitrators. The reasoning finally enunciated coincides with the decision that is made, of course, but a reference to the facts presented creates a strong suspicion in the mind of the reader that the arbitrator realized his job was to reach a solution satisfactory enough to both sides to be workable. (c) That this opportunism of arbitrators is on the whole a social blessing, our industrial society being what it is. (d) That the "cost of living" principle of wage determination, which came into its own during the war because of the rapid advance in prices, has about run its course. Arbitrators and occasionally even representatives of the employers are coming to recognize that there is no good reason for holding the wage-earners to the same real wage during periods of increasing per capita real national income, and are to a certain extent accepting the gospel of wage increases "proportionate to increased productivity." (e) That in wage arbitrations, at least, there is a vital relationship between pure reasoning and strength of numbers. Employers in the New York printing industry, for instance, felt that they had been unjustly treated when wages were not reduced in accordance with changes in the cost of living, predicted that the decision would be injurious to the industry, and were prevented from breaking relations only by the strength of the union. But the acceptance of the agreement, made necessary by the strong labor organization, brought no fatal consequences to the industry. In the packing industry, on the other hand, the agreement and the decision of the arbitrators were repudiated by the employers, wages were reduced, the weak union was defeated, and collective bargaining came to an end. (f) That, finally, a study of arbitration cases is a good way to learn a lot about economic institutions, and is not a bad route to the study of economic theory. Hardly any set of economic facts or theories is foreign to the argument that may be made for an increase or a reduction in wages.

Arbitrators will probably continue to give the lion's share to the lion and the complimentary language to the losing side, but compilations of cases such as Mr. Soule's give an insight into the motives of conflicting groups and the facts of industrial life relevant to the settlement of wages which will eventually bring a greater resort to reasoning, a more scientific approach to the whole matter of wage determination, than we have had in the past.

ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY.

University of Texas.

Haines, Bertha Moser, *The Constitution of the United States*. (New York, F. S. Crofts Co., 1928, pp. xiv, 326.)

Statement in the preface indicate that the author in writing this book had a dual purpose in mind. The book is intended for use in connection

with courses in government in schools and colleges, but at the same time the general reader interested in the American Constitution is kept in mind. It would be difficult to say which is the primary purpose. And why need this be determined? May it not be possible to write in such a fashion that the average intelligent citizen seeking information concerning our fundamental law may be served while at the same time the student of political science may be benefited? An examination of the book shows that Mrs. Haines has succeeded in putting into understandable language some of the more fundamental of the technical problems which a study of the Constitution involves. At the same time she has, in spite of a few instances where misleading statements—most of them trivial in nature—have crept in, given us an interpretation of the Constitution with which no student of the details of constitutional law will materially differ.

Of the three parts, the first and third are probably more useful, both to the student and to the average reader, than is the second. To be sure the second part is, in a sense, the kernel of the book in that it consists of the text of the Constitution, given piecemeal, with brief comments. It would seem that this material is available in most elementary treatises on the Constitution. Nevertheless there is value in having these explanatory remarks under the same cover with the other type of material offered in parts one and three. Part one, which is entitled "The Colonial and Revolutionary Background," consists of a clear-cut and concise description and analysis of the currents and cross-currents of American political life in the decades previous to the adoption of the Constitution with especial emphasis on the events from 1765 to 1789. Perhaps a sensitive British reader would detect here and there a note or pro-colonist bias.

Part three, entitled "The Adaptation of the Constitution to the Needs of the Nation," is perhaps the most useful portion of the book. Of the four chapters in this part, two deal with modifications of the fundamental law. The changes by formal amendment, by statute, by court decisions and through custom are discussed largely in the traditional way but with clarity and simplicity. The last two chapters of the book deal with theories and principles of the American system of government. Four theories or principles, namely: the separation of the powers, the distribution of power between the central and local government, the protection of individual liberty and private rights and the doctrine of judicial review receive attention. One could scarcely wish for a more lucid elementary statement of the problems involved under these four heads than is found in these pages. The author is quite willing to point out certain weaknesses in connection with these principles and theories as, for example, her statements on pages 260 and 263 relative to the disastrous effect of the theory of the separation of powers upon efficient government.

Some of the statements which may be misleading, though not necessarily erroneous, are: (p. 113), "Qualifications for voters for members of Congress . . . vary considerably in the states"; (p. 132), "The term

(direct taxes) has since been held to include income taxes" (no reference to sixteenth amendment at this point); (p. 137), "an unlimited extension of the power of the National Government over the activities of the states has largely materialized"; (p. 151), "The Senate may reject treaties by the required two-thirds vote"; (p. 156), "The American President has served as a model . . . in certain of the new constitutions of Europe"; the implication (p. 176) that the courts have interpreted the republican form of government to include the initiative, referendum and recall.

Each chapter is followed by (1) a list of supplementary readings, (2) subjects for investigation and (3) topics for review. These add to the value of the book for class-room use.

The reviewer believes it would have been better if the writer had, instead of numbering the chapters in each part separately, followed a more common practice and had numbered all of the seventeen chapters of the book in one sequence.

BEN A. ARNESON.

Ohio Wesleyan University.

Fish, Carl Russell, *The Rise of the Common Man*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. xix, 391.)

Nevins, Allan, *The Emergence of Modern America*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. xix, 446.)

American history has become so complex that it is no longer considered adequate to follow the conventional method of presenting it from a political or biographical standpoint and depending on the reader to draw his own conclusions as to what the people were doing or thinking by showing what the government was doing or thinking. Professor McMaster in his *History of the People of the United States* attempted to get away from the conventional treatment a generation ago by studying newspapers to determine what the people were doing. The series, *A History of American Life*, under the editorship of Arthur M. Schlesinger and Dixon Ryan Fox, of which the volumes under review are parts, intends to do the same thing with a broader background and with the benefit of additional scholarship. The judgment to be passed on each volume in the series is naturally largely the judgment to be passed on the purposes of the series as a whole, and I think it will be agreed that such a series was necessary. The editors and authors have recognized the limitations which the plan imposed and should not be criticized for not giving a complete picture of the past.

Professor Carl Russell Fish is well qualified to write of the important and interesting period between 1830 and 1850, the period which he rightfully calls the "Rise of the Common Man." His work shows a careful orientation in the period, and the book shows a careful selection of illustrative material to explain what he considers the primary interests of the people of this period. Admittedly a period of the greatest complexity because of the individualism which prevailed, it was a period in which the common man was attempting to find himself, and Professor

Fish has shown that clearly. He leaves to others the treatment of the reaction of the common man to politics and deals primarily with his economic, social, and cultural life.

Space will not permit a very full analysis of the book, but a few things are worthy of special note. It begins with the chapter, "New Winds" in which the transition following the War of 1812 is shown; then a rapid picture of conditions in 1830, which he calls "Material and Social Inheritance." From that as an introduction he covers the period with a treatment of agriculture, industry, invention and trade, immigration, manners and morals, the politicians, religion, education, art, science and literature, reform and slavery, and manifest destiny. All these subjects are carefully treated and adequately documented. Two chapters close the book, "The End of an Era" and "The Balance Sheet." Finally, there is an excellent critical essay on authorities. Mechanically the book is as nearly perfect as possible. The reviewer noticed very few errors, and those were of no importance. It is provided with an excellent index and eighteen well selected cuts which add materially both to interest and information concerning the period covered.

The history of the United States since the Civil War is so complex that it is admittedly hard to write. The history of the period of reconstruction following the war has been adequately treated in its constitutional and economic aspects by various writers, but the ordinary everyday life of the people has been neglected. It is to fill a need for such treatment that Professor Nevins has planned and executed the volume of *A History of American Life* under review covering the period of Reconstruction.

In spite of the difficulty which his subject and his limitation involve, Professor Nevins has been markedly successful in presenting a picture of the life of the people. He has brought to his task a fine scholarship in the selection of subjects for treatment, and while not sacrificing any of the standards of historical accuracy, he has presented his material in a semi-journalistic style which makes it more interesting to the reader. This is an accomplishment wholly worth while in a series of this nature.

Beginning with a study of the social conditions in the South during the period of Reconstruction, he takes us through from the lowest stage of despair to the recovery just before the close of the period. Included in the book special attention is paid to the industrial boom in the North after the war, urban life and routes of travel, the westward movement and western activities, the agrarian revolt, the moral collapse, the cultural life, the panic year, humanitarian movements, and the book closes properly with a chapter entitled, "Embattled Industry." Altogether a rather dramatic tone is maintained throughout, and a larger degree of unity is maintained than one might expect in an episodic period such as this.

As is to be expected from such authors and editors, the mechanics of the book deserves nothing but praise. The proof-reading is careful, the reviewer having found no errors to speak of. This volume is provided with an excellent set of cuts from contemporary pictures which



add to the interest and value of the book. Besides, there is a very fine critical essay on authorities, and an adequate index. Besides all this, there is ample documentation in the way of footnotes.

This work has interest, historical accuracy, and is mechanically correct; and is altogether worth while.

A. K. CHRISTIAN.

University of Oklahoma.

Kelso, Robert W., *The Science of Public Welfare*. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928, pp. 428.)

This book attempts to present and appraise the principles and practice of public welfare especially as related to governmental functioning. It is designed for "teachers, social workers, charity directors and interested citizens" (preface). It will probably not be wholly satisfactory to any of the four groups. Perhaps it will best serve the needs of the "interested citizen." It is not technical enough for the social worker or charity director and covers too much ground too superficially for the teacher, in addition to being doubtfully founded so far as modern sociological theory is concerned.

The latter criticism is levied against the first chapter particularly. Here we find science defined as a "body of knowledge" rather than as a method of getting knowledge (p. 5), the outworn antithesis between the individual and the state, individual and society, natural and artificial, happy savage and unhappy slum dwelling, etc., appear (pp. 11-18); modern man is held to be physically, mentally, and artistically inferior to ancient man (p. 16); Benjamin Kidd's idea of the development of "othermindedness" as the cue to "progress,"—which is admittedly merely "what we like" (pp. 9, 15); social science is based on the "discovery of the individual" by psychology (Chap. V); and so on. There is an obvious unfamiliarity with the organic view of human nature. However, when he emerges from the morass of theory into the clear waters of historical report, the book is indeed very good.

In the opinion of the reviewer, the best chapters are those on "The Law of Charitable Trusts" (VI), "The Charity Franchise" (VII), "Child Care" (XXII-IV); the poorest, Chapter I, referred to above, and Chapter XXI on "Mental Defect." In the latter, the findings on feeble-mindedness since 1914 are largely neglected, with the result that the reader gains the impression that most mental defect is hereditary. The "far-reaching threat to society" seems a gross exaggeration! Bernheim's work is not mentioned, although considerable attention is paid to care of mental defectives—far more than the social well-being to be derived thereby warrants, in the opinion of the reviewer. It is a hopeless, wasteful, socially worthless job at best.

The historical and theoretical material on poor relief is all available, of course, in such books as Gillin's "Poverty and Pendency," Webb's "English Poor Law Policy," and Devine's "Principles of Relief" and Warner's "American Charities." In view of the many excellent treatises on criminology, the sixty pages devoted to this topic seem unnecessary.

One cannot but note the omission of such topics as Family Case Work, Community Chest Movement, Disaster Relief, Recreation, Child Labor and other social legislation aiming at public welfare (old age and mothers' pensions only are mentioned) such as regulation of work of women (and men), unemployment, accident and sickness insurance, sumptuary laws, etc. In the discussion of the insane, and throughout the book, the development of mental hygiene is almost entirely neglected. Also, the growth and influence of national social agencies is not discussed. If it be pled in bar of these criticisms that these topics are not concerned with public welfare as defined (p. 22),—"the efforts carried on by Government agencies or the immediate substitutes for them,"—it can be justly claimed in rebuttal that many of them are directly the efforts of governmental agencies and that the others are as much "immediate substitutes" as most non-public child-caring, non-public outdoor and indoor relief agencies and private public health trusts.

It must not be inferred from the foregoing that the reviewer considers this book a "total loss." Quite the contrary. It is a well-written volume which contains a mass of valuable information which every good citizen ought to know. It is probably the best single volume to put into the hands of the student who is just beginning his training for social work. But it needs a good deal of supplementing. Especially valuable is the summary statement of "principles of good practice" at the close of the chapters on "Relation between Public and Private Enterprises," "Outdoor and Indoor Relief," "A System of Correction," "Treatment of the Insane," "Care of Mental Defectives," "The Neglected Child," and "The Public Health." The final chapter gives a concise summary of the whole book. Also, the questions appended to each chapter for the stimulation of thought deserve solid praise. The references at the end of each chapter are too few, are not definite (whole books are cited), and are generally undated. The index is fairly adequate. The conclusion of the reviewer is that there is still opportunity for some one to write a survey of the field for beginners in social work that would be more valuable than the present volume. I am sure no one would hail such an achievement with greater delight than would Dr. Kelso himself. But it will probably be some time before it is done.

READ BAIN.

Miami University.

Randall, James G., *Constitutional Problems under Lincoln*. (New York and London: D. Appleton & Co., 1926, pp. xviii, 580.)

Notwithstanding the interest which students of American constitutional history have long taken in the difficult legal problems which confronted the United States Government during the Civil War, Professor Randall is the first to undertake a careful and comprehensive study of the whole subject. It is a task full of difficulties, but the reader will not get far into the book without becoming convinced that the author is admirably equipped for the work. Gifted with judicial temper and clearness of perception, he has acquired a thorough acquaintance

with the background of his problems and a mastery of the technique of the law involved in them. The book is the fruit of fifteen years of research which extended through not only the printed sources but also into the manuscript records of courts and departments.

The administration of Lincoln faced constitutional problems such as had never before risen to perplex a government. It was difficult to find precedents for a crisis of such dimensions. The central problem was to maintain executive efficiency, in order to save the Union itself, without injuring permanently constitutional government. That this was done in the end, despite some lapses and questionable expedients, was due, so Randall thinks, to the fundamental legal-mindedness of the people and to the caution and moderation of Lincoln himself.

It is impossible in a brief review to indicate adequately all his major conclusions. The introductory chapter, which reveals the mind of the historian, shows how social forces condition constitutional growth and existing conditions affect judicial decisions. Secession was, at bottom, a political rather than a constitutional question. The "war powers" in relation to the Constitution and the legal nature of the war itself are then examined. Here was one of the major difficulties, for the Government was forced to adopt a dual theory: first, that the Confederates were rebels and traitors; second, that they were belligerents with belligerent rights. The first was followed in argument and declamation, but the second had to be followed in general practice. This is most clearly shown in the case of captives, both on sea and land, and in the treatment of paroled prisoners after the surrender of the Confederate armies. The attempt to apply the law of treason to Jefferson Davis was almost the sole application of the first theory under the criminal statutes, and it was abandoned from fear of failure. Three chapters deal with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, military rule, arbitrary arrests, and military commissions. As to whether the President or Congress has the constitutional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, Randall regards the Civil War precedents as inconclusive; for though he inclines to the older view that the power belongs to Congress, he points out that under stress of a similar crisis the example of Lincoln may be followed again. As to the use of martial law and arbitrary arrests by mere presidential order, he admits that Lincoln assumed powers that amounted to a dictatorship, and that the acts of Congress were powerless to restrain him; but he shows that after all it was a mild dictatorship without intent to subvert the Constitution. The Indemnity Act of 1863, and the amendment to it in 1866, which was intended to protect officers from prosecution for violation of private rights, he thinks a very unsatisfactory measure though the Supreme Court sustained it on the score of constitutionality. Conscription by the general government he regards as clearly constitutional. Three chapters are given to the subject of confiscation. He points out that these acts involved an extraordinary extension of the doctrine of belligerent powers, questions the majority opinion of the court which upheld them, and shows how easily corruption entered into their administration. Lincoln's

insistence upon the constitutional restraints forced a construction of the act which resulted in the restoration of most of the confiscated property. The chapter on emancipation emphasizes Lincoln's cautious and conservative approach to the problem and contains some interesting information concerning J. Q. Adams's arguments against emancipation under the war power after the British had resorted to it in 1814. One chapter describes military rule in the occupied districts of the South; one is given to state and federal relations in the North; one to the partition of Virginia, for which he finds no just reason; and another to the attitude of the Government toward the press. The last chapter sums up his findings. In the light of English and American constitutional principles Lincoln's government was conspicuous for its irregular and extra-legal methods; the dual nature of the war caused inconsistency in legislation and administration; the Supreme Court exerted no effective restraint upon the President or upon Congress; but there was no permanent damage to civil liberty. He draws an interesting contrast between the methods of Lincoln and Wilson during war-time, showing that the latter, unlike Lincoln, was careful to have the authorization of Congress for the exercise of extraordinary powers.

Because of its spirit of detachment, its penetrating analysis of the tangled legal issues involved, and its lucidity the book is well adapted to college classes. It supersedes all other works on the subject. Its usefulness is further enhanced by an excellent bibliography and a full index.

CHAS. W. RAMSDELL.

University of Texas.

Rodick, B. C., *The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928, pp. ix, 195.)

In this monograph the author examines the doctrine described by the terms "legal necessity" and "legal self-defense" in an attempt to arrive at greater precision in its definition and a more comprehensive understanding of its nature. Dr. Rodick considers the doctrine of necessity in time of peace in connection with the national jurisdiction, the high seas, pacific intercourse of states, and non-amicable modes of redress short of war. His effort is to make a clear distinction between cases in which the plea of legal necessity may properly be employed in extenuation and excuse of acts which ordinarily would transcend the bounds of international law, and those in which such action has only a political justification, if any. Thus, in dealing with intervention, he limits the doctrine to cases "where there has been a continuing danger, directed against the national domain, involving a serious danger to human life, and emanating from a source where there was an absence of governmental authority, or a governmental authority unable or unwilling to restrain such a dangerous agency." Judging by this standard, he refuses to admit as properly within the doctrine the great majority of cases in which it has been invoked.



Necessity in time of war is considered in connection with land warfare, naval warfare and neutrality. In this field also Dr. Rodick applies rigid tests; he would admit the plea only where it can be shown that the law of war has given a prior sanction to its use, and even then he would confine it to very narrow limits. Continuing to a logical conclusion, he denies its proper use in most cases where belligerents in the World War invoked it. Though Dr. Rodick's position is certain to be challenged, he has rendered a considerable service in his effort to establish the limits of a too vaguely defined doctrine.

IRVIN STEWART.

University of Texas.

Dewey, John, *The Public and Its Problems*. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927, pp. 219.)

In this little volume, Dr. Dewey presents what may be described as a pragmatic interpretation of politics. He seeks to apply to public problems such principles as are found stated in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy, Human Nature and Conduct*, and later writings. As might be expected, great emphasis is placed upon results in contradistinction to causes, upon the fruits of action rather than upon generative forces. The public is said to emerge at the point where the conduct of the individual produces indirect consequences which necessitates intervention and control in given particulars by the group of which he is a member. The state is the public organized for governmental purposes for the protection of the interests of all within its jurisdiction. In this connection, the author points out the dynamic nature of social movements and the numerous and involved elements—political, economic, psychological, and accidental—which determine the final result. He rejects the notion that there is a "typical" state; there are and will be many states owing to the diverse conditions which produce them. Likewise the Hegelian conception of state-will is renounced as a metaphysical fallacy. The state is not all-inclusive or omniscient. Its activities are limited to those which are essentially political in character; it functions through and in behalf of finite human beings. The Austinian theory of state authority is next brushed aside. Law is not the command of a superior to an inferior but "the institution of conditions under which persons make their arrangements with one another." Law-makers and officers can do no more than fix the terms whereby associations may operate. This begins to smack of pluralism, but at this juncture pragmatism again comes to the front. There can be no pre-determined limits of state action; whether a doctrine of regulation or *laissez faire* is to be accepted will depend on the circumstances of each case.

Unlike many thinkers, Dr. Dewey accepts democracy as the best form of government. He gives one of the most valuable accounts of the origins and development of democracy to be found since Lord Acton, discussing in a very stimulating manner the influence and contribution of such factors as the rise of the conception of individualism, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the utilitarian economic theory,

and the like. He points out that at the very time the political consciousness of the individual was being awakened, developments were taking place in the field of technology and corporate organizations which were ultimately to submerge him in the confusion and conflict of an impersonal industrial age. The baffling problems which the public confronts today are the result of the increased complexity of our social life, which knows little of the simple, friendly, face-to-face relationships of our earlier history. The growth of disinterest in government, the increased power of the boss in politics, the breakdown of the representative function of legislators, the inability of the voter to deal satisfactorily with the numerous difficult questions before the electorate, the impotence of old theories as guides to correct judgment in the formation of policy—such are striking evidences of the fact that the public is in eclipse, that society has become a mere congeries of amorphous groups.

What may be done to remedy this condition of affairs? Relief will not come by merely spinning more theories, which too often serve only to clutter up the path of direct, logical thinking and acting. Progress can be made only as the springs of true democracy are purified and restored. Community life—as Miss Follett would say, the neighborhood group—with all its creative contacts, its free discussions productive of real public opinion, its intimate investigation of mutual problems and its joint efforts toward their solution, must be revived. Education must seek to liberate individual potentialities rather than to turn out standardized automata in the model of mediocrity. Public problems must be attacked with the spirit and methods of science, wide play being allowed to investigation and experimentation. Government, however, should not be turned over to the expert, whose very specialization makes him unacquainted with the needs of the masses. The scientist should contribute his knowledge, but final decision should rest with the people. To make them competent to exercise ultimate control, it is imperative that methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and judgment be improved. Only as these fundamentals are observed will the serious question of whether popular government can survive be answered favorably.

The matters which are raised and discussed in the present study are of basic importance, and the manner of approach and analysis is consistent and sound, agreeing generally with the observations of the best writers who have given serious thought to the subject. The present work evidences the most careful study and reflection. While there may be room to quibble over some minor details, the discussion and conclusions as a whole should go unchallenged.

S. D. MYRES, JR.

Southern Methodist University.

MacKaye, Benton, *The New Exploration*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1928, pp. x, 235.)

A glance at the title of this book might lead the prospective reader to expect almost anything, or everything, or nothing. Nor is a casual examination of the work any more enlightening for the table of contents

reveals little enough of the author's purpose in writing the book. It is true that the publishers disclose something of the nature of the work in their summary. The author rescues his work from the ranks of current fiction (where his strategy would seem to warrant its being placed), by use of the sub-title, "A Philosophy of Regional Planning"; but even this does not relieve one from the necessity of reading the book if he is to learn what is in it.

Nevertheless the title is well chosen, as indeed are the chapter headings. The "old exploration," the chief characters in the unfolding of which were the man of science and the explorer himself, had for its end the exploring of new countries, the charting of unknown waterways—the finding, in short, of places in which to live. The "new exploration," under the direction of the economist and the engineer, is concerned with the solution of the problem of *how to live* in these lands made known to us through the efforts of the men of the old exploration. And as the men of the old exploration were dependent on land, water, and air, so the men of the new find as essential factors demanding consideration in the development of their undertaking—natural resources, commodity-flow (the streams of commodity movement correspond to river streams and currents), and environment. Real *living* means life in a good environment, without which no person can rise above the level of mere existence.

The shaping of a proper environment, then, is one of the prime problems facing the men of the new exploration; and the author gives most of his space to the development of this idea, working around from definitions and distinctions to a definite proposal for obtaining and securing an environment in which the citizenry may *live*. In his mind, such an environment is not to be found in metropolitan areas; indeed the "spilling-over" process which has marked the growth of such areas during recent years furnishes the chief feature of the urbanization movement against which our author rises to protest. When the city has reached such size that it can no longer take care of its population, then it becomes a liability upon itself and upon the surrounding countryside, and something ought to be done about it. That something consists in the fostering of "regional" cities or towns, each small enough to be a social unit and to permit a community spirit within itself, yet each close enough to the metropolis to permit its inhabitants to profit from the advantages which the larger unit offers. Herein lies the solution to the chief problem inherent in the growth of metropolitan areas; and, although the author introduces much that is interesting in other directions, it is upon this problem and, more especially, its solution that he concentrates.

By way of criticism, it may be observed that Mr. MacKaye has ignored most of the obvious problems of a practical nature which such a plan raises at once in the mind of the reader. The nature of the problems which come to mind will of course depend on the interests of the reader himself. In the mind of the reviewer there arises numerous and varying questions concerning the governmental problems to which the plan gives

birth. For example, the development of regional cities calls for keeping open or controlling the exploitation of the countryside surrounding them, and of the territory lying around the metropolis as well. Yet no suggestion is made of any body which would have power to condemn property, lay and collect taxes, or exercise control in these districts. Professor Reed, in an address before the International Conference on City Planning at New York in April, 1926, spoke of the region as a "new unit of local government"; but Mr. MacKaye, in a book on the subject, has said nothing of the political or governmental aspects of the proposal. And while it is readily recalled that it is not the purpose of the author to discuss concrete problems raised by his proposal, but only to develop "a philosophy of regional planning," nevertheless it appears that the book might have been a more worth-while contribution had some consideration of, or at least some allusion to, these problems been included.

In commendation, it may be said that the book is well written. The author uses many phrases and expressions found often in ordinary speech which perhaps would be frowned upon by pedants, but which serve to invigorate the general style of the writing. Thus American workingmen "fritter away" much of their time at useless things (p. 17); Thoreau "had a hunch" something was so (p. 19); certain phenomena have a "hankering lure" (p. 151). The reader does become a little tired at the repeated use of certain words, as "indigenous" and "cacophonous," and greater variety in the choice of words would have added zest to the task of reading the book. Nevertheless on the whole the writing is well done. Furthermore, while the work is not scholarly (there are no more than a dozen footnotes in the whole thing!) it is interesting. The subject matter itself is of an interesting nature, and it is unfolded in an arresting way.

ROSCOE C. MARTIN.

University of Texas.

MacDonald, Austin F., *Federal Aid*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1928, pp. xi, 285.)

MacDonald, Austin F., "Federal Aid to the States." (New York: National Municipal League, 1928, *Supplement to National Municipal Review*, October, 1928, pp. 619-659.)

To any observer of the American federal system of government, who has learned of the rapid growth of national power at the expense of state power since the Civil War, this intelligent study of Dr. MacDonald is of the utmost value. The student of American government may point out clearly certain factors in this growth, such as judicial interpretation, national laws, and the last seven amendments to the Constitution, but usually he has been at a loss in appraising the federal aid system in its supposedly centralizing effects, since only recently has the subsidy system become of such importance, due to the adoption of new principles of application and to the large sums appropriated by Congress, as to merit serious consideration. The many appraisals of the system thus far have been made largely by theorists who, without regard to, or



knowledge of, the facts, have either opposed or praised because of theoretical considerations. To the ardent devotee of States' Rights, on the one hand, the system is heinous; to the advocate of federal centralization, on the other, it is inevitable. Professor MacDonald, however, disregards all theoretical speculations, has given us an exhaustive, analytical study of the present system, based on first-hand information gleaned from hundreds of interviews "with federal, state and local officials, with representatives of farm and labor organizations and chambers of commerce, with newspaper editors, with typical farmers, merchants and bankers, with anyone and everyone who might be expected to know something of the practical operation of the subsidy system" (vii.).

In his discussion of the subject the author at first defines the American subsidy system; he traces the evolution of the federal aid policy, showing its enormous growth since 1920; then he describes the growth and present status of federal aid in forest fire prevention, agricultural extension work, highways, the national guard, vocational education, vocational rehabilitation, and in the hygiene of maternity and infancy. He ends his study with an interesting chapter, "The Future of Federal Aid," in which he concludes that the present system "makes possible the establishment of a national minimum of efficiency and economy without the sacrifice of state autonomy" (p. 271).

His conclusion, however, unlike that of many others, is not the result of bias. It was reached after a careful, first-hand survey of the facts which are presented in his book. He condemns as well as praises many features of the present system; and whenever he points out a defect, he offers a possible remedy. Because of his unbiased generalizations and his forceful presentation, Dr. MacDonald has given the student of public affairs a valuable book which treats of this most interesting and significant modern phase of federal administration.

In addition to his book on federal aid, Dr. MacDonald has recently prepared a report, "Federal Aid to the States," for the Committee on Federal Aid to the States, appointed by the National Municipal League in 1927. This report appeared as a *Supplement to the National Municipal Review* for October of the present year. In general it represents a convenient summary of his book. This report is divided into three parts. The first traces the origin, development and present extent of federal aid. The second gives a concise treatment of the present fields of federal aid with an appraisal of the administrative methods employed in each. The third gives a critical estimate of the federal subsidy system, with the recommendations of the committee for bettering the present methods of administration. This report will be extremely useful to one who desires a short, analytical account of this essential part of American federal administration.

J. ALTON BURDINE.

University of Texas.

Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., *The Inquiring Mind*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1928, pp. x, 276.)

The war-time and post-war developments in the regulation of expression of opinion have been so varied and extensive that there has been a real need for a full discussion and summary of the legal aspects of this problem. Professor Chafee in a former book, *Freedom of Speech*, examined the theoretical and historical bases of liberty of discussion and discussed the problems which arose in the events from 1917 to 1920. This book is a supplement to the earlier book and contains a thorough and critical examination of the major court decisions on this problem since 1920 and, in addition, a few chapters on the problem of effective expression of opinion by contesting groups in labor disputes. The book is really a series of essays, most of which have been printed previously as magazine articles but revised for the purpose of this book, and all of which are pertinent to some phase of the problem of freedom of discussion.

The first two essays are introductory and contain an appeal for "inquiring minds" and for tolerance for expressed opinions. They represent the liberal viewpoint from which the author approaches each aspect of this problem.

The succeeding chapters of the book give discussions of specific problems that have arisen since 1920, essays both on sedition laws and the expression of opinion in industrial relations. There are chapters on such cases as *Gilbert v. Minnesota*, the *Milwaukee Leader* Case, the *Rand School* Case, the *California I. W. W. Injunction*, the *Gitlow* Case, the *Bimba* Case, and also a chapter on "Criminal Syndicalism in the Supreme Court." In addition, there are chapters dealing with the throttling of the expression of labor opinion in the steel strike, in company towns in the coal fields, in strikes in general through the injunction. There is also a chapter on the regulation of cities of printed and expressed opinion within their limits.

The aspects of this problem are many and varied, and the author has not tried to give a comprehensive discussion of all of its phases. He has chosen only the outstanding events of a seven-year period and has tried to show the problems that have arisen and the tendencies in court decisions.

The purpose of the book was to reveal problems, not to provide remedies. However, Professor Chafee has not hesitated to suggest his opinion on sedition laws. He is convinced that toleration is the most effective means of combating sedition. He laments the abandonment of the "clear and present danger" test in the *Gitlow* Case, fears the easy acceptance by the courts of guilt by association, thinks that there is a grave error in substituting equity courts for criminal courts in punishing seditious utterances, fears the consequences of the broad power given to the Postmaster-General to suppress newspapers and magazines, and thinks the courts have been illiberal in upholding sedition laws. On the other hand, he is gratified with the decision in the *Gitlow* Case that liberty of expression was one of the rights protected against the states

by the Fourteenth Amendment, and with certain minority opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Furthermore, the author thinks there is a serious problem in the inability of labor leaders to find a medium for the expression of their side of the case in labor disputes.

At the end of the book there are several book reviews which Professor Chafee had previously written. Some of these are pertinent to the topic under consideration, but a few have no relation to any phase of the problem of freedom of discussion. The reader wonders why they were inserted.

The text is supported by ample footnotes in which cases and developments similar to those discussed in the text receives comment.

To those who are interested in the legal aspects of liberty of expression this little book is commended.

E. S. REDFORD.

University of Texas.

In this new work, *State Government*, by Frank G. Bates and Oliver P. Field (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1928, pp. vi, 584) no attempt has been made, in the words of the authors, "to make radical departures from the traditional methods of presentation" (p. v.) This book, consequently, follows the usual organization of a textbook in this field. Two chapters are devoted to federal-state and interstate relations; one chapter to constitutions; one to parties, suffrage and elections; three to the legislature; one to finance; four to the governor, the administrative system and the administrative services; two to the legal system and the judiciary; and one to local government other than cities.

There are, however, one or two novel features employed. In the first place an introductory chapter is devoted to the general subject of the study of political science. There is, moreover, a conspicuous absence of explanatory footnotes, "since the book is intended to serve as an introductory text" (p. vi.). Again, almost one hundred pages are devoted to Appendices, which contain three state constitutions, "typifying those of the earliest decades, the mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries," and the Constitution of the United States.

From a critical viewpoint, however, several defects appear. In the first place, although the authors attempted to lay stress upon functions and services rather than upon powers and prohibitions, only a few pages are given to a treatment of the reorganization of state administrative systems, which, to the minds of many, is one of the greatest problems before the states today. It may be doubted, furthermore, whether sufficient attention has been given to a study of local government and its relation to the state, especially in view of present reorganization plans. In addition, one may seriously question the advisability of devoting many pages to the mere enumeration of constitutions of different periods in the Appendices.

These defects, if they may be called defects, however, undoubtedly arise from a different point of view taken by the authors from my own concerning the relative emphasis that should be placed on the many

topics that command the attention of students of state government. On the whole, the book is excellently organized by means of marginal notes, and the style is clear. Since the book was not designed to depart radically from the methods employed by earlier writers on state government, it fulfills the purpose of its authors.

J. A. B.

Mr. Milton Conover has recently brought out a revised and enlarged edition of his *Working Manual of Original Sources in American Government*. (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1928, ix, 167), which was first published in 1924. The aim of the Manual is to provide suggestions for such supplementary work in original sources as will enable the student to get more comprehensive view of the Government of the United States than is usually offered him. In the pursuit of this end the author divides his subject into twenty parts, each of which furnishes the material for a chapter. Each chapter begins with a statement of the general problem, which is followed by a brief introduction by way of survey, explanation, or direction; a number of problems or projects which are designed to serve the student as a guide in his preparation of the assignment; suggestions for optional work (here usually is found a list of secondary works on the subject at hand); and assignments, fifty in number ordinarily, each of which is designed to direct the attention of the student to an original source in the field of the problem with which the chapter deals. The sources referred to are to be found in almost every fairly complete library; hence little or no question of availability of the materials cited will arise.

It is the hope of the author that "eventually the project method of teaching American government may be employed in much the same manner as is the case method in the teaching of law" (p. vi). Not knowing to what extent or with what success the method here recommended has been put into use, the reviewer refrains from venturing an opinion on the possibility of fulfillment of his hope. It is quite in order to say here, however, that the project system as worked out by Mr. Conover presents some very interesting possibilities, and that the author has worked out a suggestive method by which the student may be led to a different approach to certain large governmental problems than that usually offered by the college textbook. The manual appears to lack balance in that only one chapter is devoted to state government, one to local, and one to city; and if the book could be improved on in organization, it would be, it would seem, in the direction of a strengthening of this material. While this might increase the value of the work for general use, it is well worth consideration in its present form by any teacher of college classes in American government.

R. C. M.

*American Citizenship*, by Professor F. A. Cleveland (Ronald Press Company, 1927, pp. vii, 475) is the first of a series of volumes dealing with the general subject of citizenship to be prepared on the Maxwell



Foundation. The first half of the volume is in the nature of a legal treatment composed largely of quotations from secondary works, apparently without much effort to bring them up-to-date or to submit them to an independent critical analysis. The last half, which seems to have little in common with the first half, is a theoretical study, partly psychological and partly philosophical, of the relation of the citizen to his government.

I. S.

This revision of *American Government and Politics* (Fifth Ed., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928, pp. 812) by Charles A. Beard, will be welcomed by those who are interested in a scholarly and well-balanced discussion of the problem. The most important changes made in this edition relate to the chapter on political parties, which has been rewritten and considerably improved, to the addition of a brief epilogue at the end of the book dealing with the place of the citizen in government, and to the incorporation of new materials which have become available since 1924 when the fourth edition appeared. The chief value of the book is that it deals with fundamental principles, supplying a reliable interpretation without overburdening the student with minute details.

S. D. M., JR.

*Bryan, The Great Commoner*, by J. C. Long (New York, London: D. Appleton & Co., 1928, pp. xv, 422) is a characteristic Bryan book by a Bryan man. The author states his purpose is "to present the man, to realize his times,—their influence on him and his on them." In the first motive the biography is an unusual success. In the sequence of events the man and his political activity are lucidly portrayed. The components of the Bryan character, his ambition, energy, audacity, as well as his devotion to principle, are vividly evidenced in the relation of details of his personal and political life. The clap-trap appearances, the unexpected and daring actions, the blatant expressions in more than twenty years of political warfare, and capped by the final religious fight, seem to be only natural expressions of the Bryan personality. There is also ample consideration of the personalities connected with Bryan.

The "times,—their influence on him and his on them," is not so successfully treated. There is almost no discussion of the forces which caused the Bryan movement and of which Bryan was only the expression. Politics is more than a game of personalities. The Bryan personality left its impress on American history, but it only molded men and forged situations because in line with forces which were seeking expression. Also, there is little attention given to secondary issues in the campaign in which Bryan led his party.

The book is written in an agreeable, popular style, and gives a sympathetic but not eulogistic treatment of Bryan's life. It contains cartoons, excerpts from newspapers, and a panoramic outline of the political activities of Bryan's contemporaries. There is also a bibliography, an outline of sources for each chapter, and an index. As an estimate and account of Bryan's activity in politics, the book is well worth reading.

E. S. R.